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Weather and climate forecasts offer great potential for managing climate variability and 
climate risk in agricultural systems. In particular, climate forecasts at the seasonal scale can be 
considered as a key component of proactive drought management. However, there is not much 
evidence of sustained use and update of forecasts in the real world. While this, in part, has been 
associated with the characteristics of forecast information (most importantly, accuracy or skill), 
findings from field-based, empirical studies have shed light on other possible determinants of 
forecast adoptions. The primary goal of this dissertation is to use insights from empirical studies 
to develop refined, more realistic models of forecast valuation and adoption. These models are 
used to explore and understand the determinants of forecast adoption.  
The first question addressed in this dissertation is how improvement in forecast accuracy 
influences the value of forecasts. Using a refined, theoretical model of forecast valuation that 
incorporates user’s perception about forecast accuracy as a behavioral parameter, it is found that 
the benefits that users derive from improved forecasts depend on users’ characteristics including 
risk aversion and wealth level. The second research problem investigated in this work is on the 
impact of social capital and social network structure on the spatial and temporal dynamics of 
forecast adoption. An agent-based model is developed that simulates how farmers learn about the 
value of forecasts based on their own and their neighbors’ experiences. It is shown that the 
structure of the social network is an important factor in adoption of forecasts especially when 
farmers’ rate of learning from their own experiences is low. Finally, this dissertation investigates 
the role of institutional interventions (namely crop insurance and crop price) in the value of 
improved seasonal forecasts. This is investigated by developing an end-to-end forecast valuation 
iii 
 
framework that integrates a crop growth simulation model and an economic decision-making 
model. Focusing on the 2012 drought in U.S. Midwest, it is shown that crop insurance and crop 
price could significantly reduce the value of improved seasonal forecasts during drought 
conditions.  
This Dissertation presents a holistic modeling framework to address the effective use of 
forecasts for agricultural drought management. The models developed in this dissertation are used 
to generate hypotheses that can be utilized to design intervention and targeting strategies aiming 
at increasing forecast adoption and to elicit important insights about the interactions between 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Year-to-year variability of the climate (or climate variability), along with the tremendous 
amount of uncertainty it causes, is an inherent component of decision making in agriculture [Meza 
et al., 2008; Crane et al., 2010]. Coping with these uncertainties requires decision makers to 
prepare for a wide range of future possibilities, which often lead to highly-conservative strategies 
[Hansen, 2005; Crane et al., 2010]. Though these strategies may reduce the negative impacts of 
climate variability in some years, over long term, they lead to reduced productivity and 
profitability as well as inefficient use of resources [Hansen, 2002, 2005]. More specifically, these 
strategies may prevent farmers from taking advantage of favorable weather conditions  [Sonka et 
al., 1986; Cabrera et al., 2007], and they become less effective under climate extremes [Hansen, 
2005], particularly if those extremes occur more frequently than what farmers have historically 
experienced. However, as Hallstrom [2004] points out: 
“…variability by itself is not necessarily welfare decreasing if it is 
anticipated and acted upon. Surprise, however, has adverse 
consequences since the optimal ex post and ex ante choices rarely 
coincide.” 
Hence, the question is whether climate variability can be anticipated and, more importantly, 
what can be done to minimize its unfavorable socioeconomic effects. As Dr. C. H. B. Priestley, 
the recipient of the American Meteorological Society’s 1976 Rossby Research Medal, wrote in the 





“While there are great uncertainties about climatic change being 
on the way, there is no uncertainty about one thing. The world 
population must learn to live more successfully with the year-to-
year (climatic) variability. One would like to see much more work 
by economists, social scientists, agriculturalists, and subsequently 
educationists, on how man is best to live with this variability. If they 
could quantify what they have to say, this could do much to avoid 
and alleviate suffering.” 
Therefore, while climate uncertainty is recognized as a cornerstone of farmers’ risk 
management strategies [Crane et al., 2010], it seems imperative for farmers and agricultural 
decision makers, particularly in developing countries, to seek out additional information about 
future weather and climate to better cope with climate variability. Weather and climate forecasts 
could potentially provide such additional information. Climate forecasts, particularly at the 
seasonal scale, could help farmers adjust their decisions regarding crop type, land allocation, 
resource use, and crop insurance, among others [Sonka et al., 1986; Mjelde et al., 1996; Calanca 
et al., 2011; Asseng et al., 2012; Takle et al., 2014]. As such, climate forecasts could help increase 
farmers’ ability for drought mitigation, and therefore, they have a key role in proactive drought 
management [Sivakumar et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2017]. 
The idea of using weather and climate forecasts in agriculture is by no means new. For 
instance, Bonnett [1910] discussed the impact of unfavorable weather conditions during the curing 
or drying season for raisin makers in California and emphasized the important role of timely 





damage. Inspired by this study, Jorgensen [1949] developed a method to objectively forecast rain 
based on other meteorological variables for the raisin-drying season in California. However, in the 
1950s, the problem of quantifying the economic utility or value of weather forecasts started to 
receive significant attention from researchers. For meteorologists, who have always been 
interested in improving forecasts, such assessment could demonstrate the value of their scientific 
efforts and advances [Thompson and Brier, 1956] and provide an economic rationalization for 
improved weather forecasting systems [Bijvoet and Bleeker, 1951; McQuigg, 1971; Johnson and 
Holt, 1997]. Bijvoet and Bleeker [1951] used a simple dichotomous decision problem (i.e., whether 
or not to take protective measure against adverse weather) to demonstrate the value of weather 
forecasting from an economic standpoint. They concluded that the economic benefit of weather 
forecasting depends on various factors, some of which are unique to each industry. They also stated 
that more complicated examples could reveal that the character of the forecaster also plays a role 
in the economic benefits derived from weather forecasting. Thompson and Brier [1956] derived a 
general relationship between the economic value of forecast and operational risk ratio for the 
dichotomous decision problem mentioned above (which is referred to as cost-loss or umbrella 
problem). They found that depending on the operational risk ratio, the value of even a perfect 
forecast could be zero. Kolb and Rapp [1962] used the decision criterion derived in Thompson and 
Brier [1956] in conjunction with the forecast model developed by Jorgensen [1949] to determine 
the utility of forecasts for raisin growers in California. They concluded that it is necessary to fully 
grasp the effect of weather on operation in order to estimate the economic benefits of forecasts. 






Over time, with more progress in weather forecasting and climate prediction, studies in the 
domain of applied meteorology used different variants of the cost-loss problem to investigate the 
various aspects of forecast valuation problem. For instance, Murphy [1977] extended the analysis 
in Thompson and Brier [1956] and Thompson [1962] and quantified the value of climatological, 
categorical, and probabilistic forecasts in the cost-loss problem. He also estimated the value of 
forecasts for a generalized case of the cost-loss problem involving 𝑁 events and 𝑁 actions 
[Murphy, 1985]. Further, Murphy et al. [1985] and Murphy and Ye [1990] considered the dynamic 
and time-dependent version of the cost-loss model and derived relationships between economic 
value and lead time of forecasts. Zhu et al. [2002] and Richardson [2000] used the same prototype 
problem and calculated the economic value of operational ensemble-based forecasts. Some studies 
in this literature, however, have attempted to extend the forecast valuation analysis to more realistic 
decision-making situations. For instance, Katz et al. [1982] used a dynamic decision making model 
with Bayesian updating to assess the value of frost forecasts to orchardists in the Yakima Valley 
of central Washington. Brown et al. [1986] and Katz et al. [1987] used a similar approach to 
determine the value of forecasts for a wheat farmer who has to make fallowing/planting decisions. 
While these studies have provided invaluable insights regarding the relationship between forecast 
characteristics (e.g., quality, lead time, type) and the economic value, they fail to properly account 
for the complexities associated with user’s characteristics and user’s decision problem, which are 
critical determinants of forecast value [Hilton, 1981; Mjelde and Cochran, 1988].  
Assessing the economic value of forecasts has also been extensively studied in the applied 
economics literature [Hill and Mjelde, 2002; Msangi et al., 2006]. In one of the earliest studies, 





information to California raisin growers. He showed that while accurate forecasts of rain three 
weeks in advance could be significantly valuable to individual farmers, if all growers take optimal 
actions based on forecasts, the value of forecasts significantly drops because of drastic price 
reduction due to demand inelasticity. Much of this literature builds upon economics of information, 
utilizing normative models of decision making under uncertainty (e.g., combination of expected 
utility theory and Bayesian updating) [Marshak, 1954; Nelson and Winter, 1964], to assess the 
value of forecasts to individual decision makers. As such, one of the advantages of this 
methodology is that the relationship between forecast value and some of decision maker’s 
characteristics can be investigated. For instance, Bosch and Eidman [1987] presented a method for 
valuing weather forecasts for improved irrigation scheduling when risk attitudes are nonneutral, 
and found that risk aversion may significantly affect the value of information. Mjelde and Cochran 
[1988] used an inexact representation of risk preference to determine the value of climate forecasts 
for individual corn producers. They found that the farmer’s prior knowledge and risk preferences 
influence the upper and lower limits of value of forecasts.  
The interest to assess the economic value of forecasts in agriculture significantly grew in 
1990s due to tremendous advances in El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) based climate 
prediction that allowed for forecasts of seasonal climate variability [Agrawala et al., 2001]. 
Although much of this research has targeted tropical regions with rainfed systems, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, due to higher predictability of ENSO in these regions along 
with food security and livelihood implications [Cane et al., 1994; Pfaff et al., 1999; Broad and 
Agrawala, 2000], researchers also investigated the value of ENSO-based climate forecasts in the 





utilized integrated modeling techniques to assess the value of forecasts. For instance, Jones et al. 
[2000] used a crop simulation model linked to an economic optimization model to estimate the 
value of categorical ENSO-based climate forecasts for farm-scale management decision in a 
location in the Southeast US. The economic model that they used maximized the expected utility 
of wealth at the end of a one-year planning. Several other studies utilized sectoral and partial 
equilibrium models to quantify the value of ENSO-based forecasts at an aggregate level (e.g., 
[Adams et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2002; Messina et al., 2006]). For instance, Adams et al. [1995] 
used an agricultural sector model together with a large-scale crop model to estimate the value of 
different ENSO-based forecasts to the agricultural sector in southeastern US. One interesting 
aspect of this study was using Bayesian updating approach to account for different values of 
forecast accuracy. They found that despite the uncertainties and abstractions, the economic value 
of planned improvements in ENSO forecasts could be substantial for US agriculture. Readers are 
referred to Hill and Mjelde [2002] and Rubas et al. [2006] for details.   
While these modeling studies quantify the potential value of forecasts, forecasts only have 
economic value if decision makers are willing and able to use them in their real world decisions 
[Hill and Mjelde, 2002; Hansen, 2005; McIntosh et al., 2007; Kumar, 2010]. Using qualitative and 
qunatitative research methods, studies have found that farmers’ use and adoption of climate 
forecasts have changed little over time despite the improvements in the quality and delivery of 
forecasts [Hu et al., 2006; Ash et al., 2007; Mase and Prokopy, 2014]. This dichotomy between 
the apparent value of forecasts and their limited use is puzzling [Hallstrom, 2004], and has inspired 
researchers to investigate the barriers of adoption of forecast information in agricultural decision 





The common approach to address this issue is using empirical field-based case studies. One 
of the most notable studies in the literature was conducted by Glantz [1977] after the devastating 
1973 drought in West African Sahel. He surveyed various groups of stakeholders about what they 
would have done had they had accurate forecasts of the drought six months in advance. He 
concluded that:  
“…given the national structures in the Sahelian states in which a 
potential technological capability will be used, the value of a long-
range forecasts, even a perfect one, would be limited. It appears, 
however, that its value could be greatly enhanced if its 
implementation were to be coupled with the removal of the 
numerous social, political, and economic obstacles….”  
The 1997-1998 El Niño event, which was one of the most severe in the century causing 
more than $36 billion in damages and more than 22,000 casualties, can be considered as a turning 
point in identifying and studying the barriers of effective use of forecasts [Buizer et al., 2000]. 
This is because, unlike the historic 1982-83 El Niño, the onset and related impacts of this event 
were predicted in advance that led to development of pilot programs for climate forecast 
applications in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, which in some cases helped mitigate 
the negative impacts through prevention and preparedness measures [Buizer et al., 2000]. These 
anticipatory activities and the pilot programs, which in some cases lasted for more than a decade, 
provided an opportunity for users to explore the capabilities and limitations of forecasts, and 
allowed forecast producers to recognize the obstacles and improve the utility of their products 





This body of research that focuses on real-world use of forecasts has highlighted a variety 
of factors that influence farmers’ adoption of climate forecasts [Ziervogel and Downing, 2004; 
Patt et al., 2005, 2007; Roncoli, 2006; Crane et al., 2010; Mase and Prokopy, 2014]. For instance, 
early studies found that the mismatch between what forecasts provide and what farmers actually 
need to make their decisions is one of the main factors limiting the adoption of forecasts [Ingram 
et al., 2002; Patt and Gwata, 2002]. Several studies asserted that the confusion about interpreting 
probabilistic forecasts could be one of the main impediments of using forecasts [Nicholls, 1999; 
Hansen et al., 2004; Marx et al., 2007]. There is also ample evidence based on surveys and 
interviews that highlight the importance of behavioral and social factors [Roncoli, 2006; Crane et 
al., 2010; Mase and Prokopy, 2014], as well as political, institutional, and cultural contexts 
[Glantz, 1977; Ziervogel, 2004; Rayner et al., 2005; Lemos and Dilling, 2007]. In general, we can 
classify a wide range of factors influencing farmers forecast use decision into three main categories 
(Figure 1.1): 1) factors related to forecast information (e.g., quality, lead time), 2) factors related 
to farmers’ characteristics (e.g., trust, risk attitude, social interactions, wealth), and 3) institutional 






Figure 1.1: Determinants of effective use of forecasts (adopted from Cai et al. [2017] with 
minor changes) 
 
While the impacts of farmers’ risk attitude on the economic value of forecasts have been 
extensively investigated in the literature (e.g., Bosch and Eidman [1987], Mjelde and Cochran 
[1988], Cabrera et al. [Cabrera et al., 2006]), recent literature has shed light on importance of 
other social–psychological factors in farmers’ response to and adoption of climate forecasts 
[Artikov et al., 2006; Hu et al., 2006; Crane et al., 2010; Mase and Prokopy, 2014]. While such 
insights, in some cases, can help improve the effective use of forecasts by improving dissemination 
and presentation strategies [Nicholls, 1999; Marx et al., 2007], there are still important questions 
that require further research. This dissertation specifically focuses on two such factors here: user’s 






One of the most recognized behavioral barriers of forecast adoption is farmers’ low 
perception of forecast accuracy [Austen et al., 2002; Luseno et al., 2003; Ziervogel, 2004; Mase 
and Prokopy, 2014]. Farmers’ perception of forecast accuracy (or perceived accuracy) determines 
the level of trust or confidence that they have in forecasts [Millner, 2008] and influences their 
decisions to use forecasts [Mase and Prokopy, 2014]. Several studies have highlighted that farmers 
are highly likely to ignore forecasts if they do not have enough confidence in them [Austen et al., 
2002; Luseno et al., 2003]. As such, farmers’ perception of forecast accuracy is perhaps a more 
relevant and direct determinant of forecast adoption than the actual accuracy of forecasts [Millner, 
2008; Mase and Prokopy, 2014; Ripberger et al., 2015]. However, modeling studies usually ignore 
this behavioral factor in their assessments of forecast value. A few exceptions include Millner 
[2008] and Millner and Washington [2011] who incorporated perceived accuracy in the Bayesian 
updating of user’s beliefs based on forecasts. These studies showed that perceived accuracy would 
significantly influence the value of forecasts. However, to the best of knowledge, the relationship 
between forecast accuracy and perceived forecast accuracy has not been studied in the literature. 
In particular, it is of interest to ask: how is farmers’ perception of forecast accuracy influenced by 
improvement in actual forecast accuracy?  
Investigating the question above requires modeling forecast valuation as a dynamic 
problem. Generally, forecast adoption problem can be investigated as a dynamic problem that 
involves learning. This learning process is a key driver of adoption and diffusion of forecasts, 
similar to any other innovations [Feder and O’Mara, 1982]. More specifically, users may not 
initially have any knowledge about forecasts. Over time, however, they accumulate experience 





decide whether or not to adopt the forecasts [Rogers, 2003; Ziervogel, 2004; Rubas et al., 2006, 
2008]. Nevertheless, there are only a few studies that consider the dynamic aspect of forecast 
adoption [Rubas et al., 2006]. Ziervogel et al. [2005] is perhaps the most notable such study in the 
literature. Following an earlier study in which a role-play exercise was conducted with smallholder 
farmers in Lesotho [Ziervogel, 2004], Ziervogel et al. [2005] developed a simple heuristic to 
determine how farmers update their trust in seasonal forecasts over time. This heuristic was then 
used to determine whether farmers used forecasts in their decision making. They also used a simple 
DeGroot-style learning method [DeGroot, 1974] in an agent-based model framework to account 
for aggregate learning in a village in their case study. Millner [2009] also considered user’s 
learning in a theoretical model of forecast valuation. By relaxing the assumption that forecast users 
are statistically sophisticated who have complete knowledge about forecasts, he used a learning 
heuristic based on reinforcement learning mechanism [Brenner, 2006] to model how user’s 
willingness to adopt forecast changes over time based on the consequences of his past decisions. 
While both of these studies used a bottom-up modeling paradigm to demonstrate users’ learning 
behavior, Rubas et al. [2008] used the widely-accepted logistic growth curve from the literature of 
diffusion of innovation [Feder et al., 1985; Rogers, 2003] to represent the time-dependent process 
of forecast adoption among agricultural producers.  
In fact, several field studies that surveyed farmers’ responses to forecasts found that 
farmers’ forecast adoption behavior fits the diffusion of innovation framework (e.g., [Luseno et al., 
2003; Hu et al., 2006; Tarnoczi and Berkes, 2010]). Mase and Prokopy [2014] underscored the 
relevance of the diffusion of innovation framework to explain the relationships between social 





Moreover, better understanding of these relationships is an important step towards designing 
economically efficient incentive mechanisms [Baerenklau, 2015]. Therefore, it is critical to 
investigate the following questions: how does social interaction influence the forecast adoption 
behavior? To what extent is the structure of the social network important in diffusion of forecasts? 
What is the cumulative effect of social structure and individuals’ characteristic in the forecast-use 
diffusion process? 
A vast majority of modeling studies quantifying the value of climate forecasts have focused 
on the factors related to forecast characteristics, whereas the impact of institutional factors on the 
value of climate forecasts has received far less attention in the literature. Nevertheless, there are a 
small number of studies that specifically explored the role of government interventions and farm 
programs on the value of forecasts. In his study of the value of weather information for irrigation 
scheduling, Bosch [1984] investigated the effect of taxes on the value of short-term weather 
forecasts. Mjelde et al. [1996], which still remains the most comprehensive study on this matter, 
determined how government interventions in the form of federal tax law, crop insurance, disaster 
assistance, and federal farm program affects the value of seasonal climate forecasts. They included 
four different crop insurance options in their economic decision making and considered the 
interaction between crop insurance options and the disaster assistance program. They found that 
crop insurance has only a small effect on the value of improved climate forecasts. Cabrera et al. 
[Cabrera et al., 2006] also considered crop insurance in their optimization model. They showed 
that using ENSO-based forecasts to select crop insurance products increases farm incomes 
compared to the use of climatological information. In another study, Cabrera et al. [2007] used an 





value of forecasts. While their results show considerable dependency on weather patterns (e.g., El 
Niño or La Niña years) and decision maker’s risk attitude, they generally found that including crop 
insurance decreases the value of information. Following this general understanding that crop 
insurance may decrease the value of forecasts, there are several research questions that require 
further attention. For instance, to what extent does the value of climate forecasts depend on crop 
insurance program? What is the value of improved climate forecasts in the presence of crop 
insurance? What is the synergistic effect of crop insurance and climate forecasts when farmers 
have the option of forward contracts? Understanding the interaction between climate forecasts and 
crop insurance is of utmost importance for informing interventions aimed at improving forecast 
uptake [Millner and Washington, 2011], particularly among cash crop farmers in developed 
countries who have access to and can afford crop insurance programs [Cai et al., 2017].  
 
1.2 Research objectives 
Understanding the root causes of the limited use of forecasts is critical for designing 
strategies to overcome the barriers of forecast use and to increase the actual value that farmers 
receive from forecasts. Empirical studies are generally helpful in recognizing the impediments and 
obstacles of forecast adoption; however, besides being time consuming and resource intensive, 
empirical studies are inherently case specific, which makes it difficult to generalize their findings 
[Millner and Washington, 2011]. In addition, in many cases, it is difficult to identify or understand 
the complex relationships between the determinants of forecast adoption; such understanding is 
necessary for designing effective intervention strategies aiming at increasing the adoption of 





that modeling studies of forecast valuation and adoption and empirical field-based studies are in 
fact complementary. Empirical studies can be used to refine modeling studies, while modeling 
studies can provide testable hypotheses that can be used to guide the direction of field studies 
[Millner, 2009; Millner and Washington, 2011]. Therefore, the overarching goal of this 
dissertation is to bridge the gap between modeling (theoretical) and empirical studies to 
explore better understanding of determinants of forecast adoption and to generate testable 
hypotheses that can be utilized to design interventions to increase adoption of forecasts. This 
dissertation focuses on the following three objectives:      
Objective 1: To investigate how different factors, related to both user’s characteristics 
and forecast information product, influence the perceived value of forecasts.   
Hypothesis 1-1: Users’ perception of forecast accuracy significantly influences the value 
of drought forecasts.  
Hypothesis 1-2: The actual economic gain from improved drought forecasts depends on 
user’s risk attitude, wealth, and prior belief. 
To accomplish this objective, a refined, dynamic, and theoretical model of forecast 
valuation is developed and applied to a stylized crop-allocation decision making problem. The 
model, which is an extended version of the theoretical model developed by Millner [2008], 
includes two Bayesian-updating components to represent 1) how a user processes drought forecast 
information, and 2) how a user updates his or her perception of forecast accuracy once the 
uncertainty about the state of the weather condition is resolved. User’s decision making is 
represented by a utility maximization model which allows considering the impact of user’s risk 





Objective 2: To investigate the role of social interactions and social network structure in 
farmers’ forecast adoption behavior.   
Hypothesis 2-1: The diffusion curve follows the typical S-shaped growth form only if 
interactions among agents are considered (diffusion curve or adoption 
path is defined as the temporal variation in adoption rate of an innovation 
in a community). 
Hypothesis 2-2: The role of the social network structure in the diffusion process is limited 
when learning rate is large. 
Forecast adoption behavior is represented as a stochastic choice model which is 
characterized by two different forms of learning: learning by doing (i.e., learning from own 
experience) and learning from others (i.e., learning from others’ experiences). For the former, 
reinforcement learning, which is a memory-less, behavioral model of non-conscious learning, is 
used to model how farmers learn from their own experiences. For the other form of learning, a 
DeGroot-style belief aggregation model [DeGroot, 1974; Jadbabaie et al., 2012] is utilized to 
represent how farmers learn from the experiences of their peers. The model is developed following 
the agent-based modeling paradigm to account for the impacts of farmers’ social interactions and 
the structure of the social network on forecast adoption behavior. The model is applied to a 
hypothetical case study area in which the interactions among agents are controlled by inter- and 
intra-county social ties. 
Objective 3: To investigate the role of government institutional interventions on the value 





Hypothesis 3-1: Existing federal crop insurance programs could limit the value of 
improved seasonal of forecasts.  
Hypothesis 3-2: Market complicates the valuation of improved seasonal of forecasts. 
To accomplish this objective, an end-to-end forecasting framework is proposed that 
integrates a crop growth simulation model with an economic model of agricultural decision 
making. Seasonal forecasts of precipitation, minimum and maximum temperature, and solar 
radiation from a state-of-the-art climate model are translated to predictive yields which are then 
used in the economic decision-making model. The economic decision-making model is developed 
based on stochastic optimization which determines the optimal values of crop allocation (between 
corn and soybeans) forwards contracts (with ethanol refineries) decisions. To better explore the 
interactions between improved forecasts and institutional interventions (i.e., crop insurance, crop 
price), the historic 2012 drought in the Midwest is considered as the case study, and the proposed 
framework is applied to the Salt Creek watershed in Central Illinois.      
    
1.3 Organization of the dissertation  
CHAPTER 2 investigates the dependency of forecast value on users’ characteristics, which 
include risk aversion, wealth level, and perceived accuracy. First, a detailed description of the 
theoretical forecast valuation model is provided. The model is first used to explore the relationships 
between the ex ante value of probabilistic drought forecasts and users’ characteristics. Then, a 
hypothetical experiment is designed to investigate how a user’s perception of forecast accuracy 





determine the actual economic benefits that users with different characteristics may gain from 
improvements in forecast accuracy.    
Results from empirical studies suggest that adoption of forecasts, similar to other 
innovations, is a dynamic process that takes place over time as potential users gradually learn more 
about the forecasts and accumulate experience. CHAPTER 3 investigates this dynamic process 
and specifically focuses on the impact of social capital on the forecast diffusion process. An agent-
based model of forecast adoption is developed, which incorporates two heuristic algorithms to 
represent how farmers learn about the value of forecasts based on their own and their peers’ 
experiences. The model is applied to a hypothetical case study in which farmers’ interactions are 
controlled using inter- and intra-county social ties. The model is used for two main purposes: 1) to 
investigate the extent to which social interactions along with other factors (i.e., risk aversion, 
wealth level, learning rate) influence farmers’ forecast adoption behavior, and 2) to analyze the 
impact of an extension program in facilitating the diffusion of forecasts.   
CHAPTER 4 focuses on a real-world case study in Central Illinois to investigate the value 
of seasonal climate forecasts in the case of historic U.S. 2012 drought. More specifically, by 
developing an end-to-end forecasting framework, this chapter aims at better understanding the 
value of improved seasonal climate forecasts in agricultural decision making in the presence of 
federally subsidized crop insurance and forward contracts between farmers and ethanol bio-
refinery plants. Different forecast and crop insurance scenarios are considered to better elicit the 
complex relationships between improved forecasts and institutional interventions. 
Finally, CHAPTER 5 presents the major findings and key conclusions of this dissertation 





CHAPTER 2 DETERMINANTS OF FORECAST VALUE AND THE 
DEPENDENCY BETWEEN FORECAST ACCURACY AND 
PERCEIVED ACCURACY 
 
Farmers’ perception of forecasts accuracy (or their trust in forecasts) is recognized as an 
important behavioral factor in farmers’ perception of the value of forecasts. In this chapter, a 
theoretical valuation model is used to explore the impact of perceived accuracy, risk attitude, and 
wealth level on the value of forecasts. The model is then extended by incorporating a learning 
module based on Bayesian inference to investigate how improvement in forecast accuracy 
influences perceived accuracy, and in turn, how that influences the value of forecasts. A 
hypothetical experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of different scenarios of trust (or 
perceived accuracy) and forecast improvement on the long-term economic benefits that forecast 
users can gain. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Weather and climate forecasts offer great potential for managing climate variability and 
climate risks in agricultural systems [Hansen, 2005]. As such, their applications in agricultural 
decision making have been extensively studied in scientific literature. While various disciplines 
have contributed to this body of literature over the past several decades, it is possible to identify 
two overarching research questions that have been pursued by researchers. First, What is the value 
of forecasts to the decision maker (DM)? This question has been addressed in the literature from 
both ex ante and ex post perspectives. The distinction between these two perspectives is important 





2006]. Ex ante assessment of the value of forecasts is helpful to better understand how imperfect 
forecast influences DM’s behavior under uncertainty and consequently determines use or non-use 
of information [Repo, 1989; Raban, 2007]. Ex post value, on the other hand, determines how much 
forecast information is actually worth to the DM [Msangi et al., 2006; Bruno Soares et al., 2018].  
Ex ante evaluation of forecasts has received more attention in the literature. While there 
are a small number of studies that utilize direct methods for ex ante evaluation (e.g., using choice 
experiments [Park and Yoo, 2018] or participatory workshops [Patt et al., 2005]), most of the 
studies in the literature estimate the value of forecasts using economic models of decision-making 
models under uncertainty based on expected utility theory and Bayesian decision theory [Nelson 
and Winter, 1964; Winkler et al., 1983; Millner, 2008]. These economic models can also be used 
to estimate the ex post value of forecasts by comparing the benefits accrued with and without using 
forecasts after the realization of the event [Thompson, 1962; Antonovitz and Roe, 1986; Ramirez 
et al., 1988; Adams et al., 1995; Msangi et al., 2006].  
Despite the various advantages that these theoretical models may have compared to other 
evaluation methods, they can only provide an abstraction of an idealized DM’s response to 
forecasts and his decision-making process; as a result, they tend to overestimate DM’s perception 
about the value of forecasts and consequently the value that the DM realizes ex post of the event 
[Msangi et al., 2006; Ash et al., 2007; Millner, 2008, 2009]. From a broader perspective, this 
overestimation of the value of forecasts could create a misguided expectation of the potential 
benefits that can be extracted from forecasts, which in turn, can mislead policy interventions 





On the other hand, better understanding of DMs’ attitudes towards forecast and their 
perceptions of forecast value could provide opportunities to improve the adoption of forecasts in 
agricultural decision making [PytlikZillig et al., 2010; Millner and Washington, 2011; Haigh et 
al., 2015b]. This leads to the second overarching question pursued in the literature: What are the 
barriers to broader or improved use of forecast information in agricultural decision making? 
Retrospective case studies based on empirical research and applied social science methods have 
extensively focused on this question. They have highlighted a variety of factors that influence 
decision makers’ perception of forecast value thereby constraining (or facilitating) the adoption of 
climate forecasts [Ziervogel and Downing, 2004; Patt et al., 2005, 2007; Roncoli, 2006; Crane et 
al., 2010; Mase and Prokopy, 2014]. Specifically, the literature sheds light on importance of 
various social–psychological and economic factors (see [Hu et al. [2006] and Artikov et al. [2006] 
for a case study of farmers in Nebraska, and see Mase and Prokopy [2014] for a review).  
While these studies provide a more realistic picture of how DMs respond to and integrate 
forecasts in their decision making, they are very data-intensive and it is difficult to generalize their 
results [Msangi et al., 2006; Ash et al., 2007; Millner, 2008]. However, it is possible to utilize 
some of their insights to develop more realistic models of forecast evaluation [Millner, 2008; 
Millner and Washington, 2011]. For example, several studies highlighted that taking into account 
farmers’ risk aversion may be an important factor in obtaining more accurate estimates of the value 
of forecasts [Johnson and Holt, 1997; Crane et al., 2010; Mase and Prokopy, 2014]. There are 
different ways that risk attitude can be incorporated in economic models of forecast evaluation 





between risk aversion and the value of forecasts [Byerlee and Anderson, 1982; Mjelde and 
Cochran, 1988; Jones et al., 2000; Matte et al., 2017].  
Decision makers’ socioeconomic factors also have a role in their perception about the value 
of forecasts [Patt and Gwata, 2002; Orlove et al., 2004; Bharwani et al., 2005]. It is possible to 
take these factors into account in stylized models of forecast evaluation. For instance, several 
studies used a certain type of utility functions that allow investigating the impact of DM’s wealth 
on the perceived value of forecasts [Jones et al., 2000; Millner and Washington, 2011]. 
However, the most recognized behavioral barrier of forecast adoption in the literature is 
decision makers’ low perception of forecast accuracy [Austen et al., 2002; Luseno et al., 2003; 
Ziervogel, 2004; Mase and Prokopy, 2014]. For instance, in a survey of over 2500 farmers in 
Australia, 76 percent of the respondents identified perceived accuracy (also referred to as 
credibility, reliability, trust, and confidence) as their reason for not using the forecasts [Ash et al., 
2007]. In an another study that surveyed over 700 farmers in three counties in Nebraska, 
respondents identified accuracy and reliability of forecasts as the major obstacles undermining 
them from using forecasts [Hu et al., 2006]. Therefore, in order to enhance the value of forecasts, 
DMs must have some confidence in them [Austen et al., 2002; Luseno et al., 2003]. In other words, 
if DMs’ confidence in forecasts is very low, they may simply ignore the information [Ripberger 
et al., 2015].  
Although empirical studies have highlighted the importance of perceived forecast accuracy 
in DMs’ response to forecasts, there are only a few studies in the literature that incorporated this 
behavioral factor in forecast-evaluation models [Ziervogel et al., 2005; Lee and Lee, 2007; Lybbert 





users incorporate forecasts in their decision making if their trust level is larger than a threshold 
that was determined based on a role-play exercise with potential forecast users. Lee and Lee 
[2007], on the other hand, introduced subjective forecast accuracy as a constant parameter in a 
sigmoidal decision function, which was used to determine the protection level in an extended 
version of the prototype cost-loss problem. Lybbert et al. [2007] and Millner [2008] incorporated 
perceived accuracy as a parameter in the Bayesian updating component of the model.  
It is important to note that unlike some other behavioral parameters (e.g., risk attitude), 
trust or confidence in forecast information is a variable that is built upon DM’s experience of the 
accuracy of past forecasts [Patt and Gwata, 2002; Ziervogel, 2004; Bharwani et al., 2005]. As 
such, building trust in forecast information is indeed a dynamic learning process [Ziervogel, 2004; 
Roncoli, 2006]. Trust in forecasts will be undermined if past forecasts are not accurate or 
erroneous, whereas accurate forecasts increase DM’s confidence in forecasts [Patt and Gwata, 
2002; Ripberger et al., 2015].  
A seminal study by Glantz [1982] highlighted this dynamic behavior, in which farmers in 
the Yakima Valley lost their confidence in the Bureau of Reclamation’s water supply forecast after 
they took extensive protective measures based on the forecast of a drought for the summer of 1977 
issued by the Bureau of Reclamation that turned out to be a false alarm. There are several studies 
in the literature that utilized participatory approaches to better understand the temporal variation 
of farmers’ perceived accuracy [Ziervogel, 2004; Patt et al., 2005; Roncoli et al., 2008]. 
Specifically, Ziervogel [2004] used participatory role-playing exercise with smallholder farmers 
in Lesotho to determine whether participants’ decisions to use forecasts changed under repeated 





they built more confidence in forecasts, and as a result, they were more willing to use forecasts in 
their decision making. Using the data from this study, Ziervogel et al. [2005] developed a simple 
heuristic model to investigate how the trust level changes with different levels of forecast accuracy. 
In their model, it was assumed that the trust increases by one unit whenever the forecast is accurate 
and decreases by one unit if the forecast turned out to be false [Ziervogel, 2004; Ziervogel et al., 
2005].  
Although empirical studies have recognized that DM’s perception of forecast accuracy may 
fluctuate with time, as stated in some examples above [Roncoli, 2006], to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no a rigorous theoretical framework that explores and elucidates this dynamic 
behavior and illustrates its impact on forecast valuation, which is especially important to better 
understand how DMs respond to improvements in forecast accuracy. It is worth noting while 
variations in perceived accuracy could explain DMs’ dynamic pattern of forecast adoption 
[Ziervogel, 2004; Roncoli, 2006; Ripberger et al., 2015], DMs’ decision to adopt a forecast is also 
influenced by other factors, some of which are ex post in nature (e.g., effectiveness of using 
forecasts) [Chavas and Pope, 1984; Millner, 2009], and this is studied in the next chapter. In this 
chapter, however, the main focus is to better understand the dynamic process of DM’s perception 
about forecast accuracy. In particular, the following questions are explored: How does DM’s 
perceived accuracy change over time as objective forecast accuracy gradually improves? How 
does DM’s perception about forecast value change over time? To what extent including the 
perceived accuracy (and its evolution over time) in the model influence the results? What are the 
impacts of other factors (i.e., risk attitude and wealth) on the value of forecasts and on the 





To address these questions, a refined, more realistic, theoretical model of information 
valuation is developed. The proposed model, which is an extended version of the model developed 
by Millner [2008], follows the principles of Bayesian decision theory [Baquet et al., 1976; 
Harsanyi, 1980]. As such, it is assumed that the DM is an expected utility maximizer whose 
preferences are represented by a utility function in the form of constant relative risk aversion 
[Gollier, 2001; Mas-Colell et al., 2012]. This utility function allows exploring the dependency of 
forecast value to DM’s risk attitude and wealth level [Jones et al., 2000; Millner and Washington, 
2011]. In addition, it is assumed that the DM is a Bayesian learner, i.e., the subjective beliefs about 
uncertain events and outcomes (e.g., drought) are revised or updated according to Bayes’ theorem 
once new information is received. There are two Bayesian-updating components in the model. One 
is related to how the DM responds to forecast information, i.e., how the DM integrates the forecast 
with his or her prior belief to form an updated belief about the uncertain event [Lybbert et al., 
2007; Millner, 2008]. There are some studies in the literature that used such Bayesian updating to 
incorporate objective forecast accuracy (also referred to as forecast quality) in the model and 
explore the relationship between forecast quality and forecast value [Katz and Murphy, 1990, 
1997b; Adams et al., 1995]. However, the proposed methodology in this study follows Millner’s 
representation of the likelihood matrix in Bayesian updating from probabilistic forecast and 
introduces a single behavioral parameter called perceived forecast accuracy to characterize the 
likelihood matrix [Millner, 2008]. This behavioral parameter represents DM’s belief about forecast 
accuracy (or trust in forecast) rather than the objective forecast accuracy [Millner, 2008]. The 
distinction between perceived and objective forecast accuracy is critical to assess the subjective 





from empirical studies that DMs, regardless of the actual forecast accuracy, do not update their 
prior beliefs in response to new information if they do not have trust in the information [Luseno et 
al., 2003]. 
The proposed framework extends the model developed by Millner [2008] by adding a 
second Bayesian-updating component. This component, which reflects the dynamic nature of 
forecast valuation, represents the evolution (or variation) of DM’s perception about forecast 
accuracy over time. More specifically, it is assumed that the DM initially has no knowledge about 
forecast accuracy, represented by a non-informative flat prior. However, over time and as more 
information is collected about forecast accuracy, by comparing the forecast and the observation, 
the DM gradually forms a belief about forecast accuracy. The proposed framework is applied to a 
stylized crop-allocation decision problem in which the DM must decide the optimal allocation 
between two crops considering the uncertainity regarding weather condition during the crop 
season. It is worth noting that unlike most of the modeling studies in the literature (including 
Millner [2008]) that use ex ante definition of the value of information (i.e., information is valued 
before it is received by the DM), quasi ex ante defnition of the value of information is considered 
in the model (i.e., information is valued after it is received by the DM but before the realization of 
the unceratin event) [Antonovitz and Roe, 1988; Lawrence, 1999; Raban, 2007]. This is because, 
this study specifically focuses on drought forecast information and it is assumed that such 
information is publicly available to the DM, and therefore, the question is whether the DM should 
incoporate the forecast in the decision making.  
Finally, ex post value of forecasts is used to determine the actual benefit that the DM 





estimation of the value of forecasts is specifically important to determine whether (and to what 
extent) improvements in forecast quality (as well as improvements in forecast provision and 
dissemination) would offer benefit to the DMs [Winkler et al., 1983; Letson et al., 2005; Millner, 
2009]. In addition, ex post analysis provides insights into the accuracy of the ex ante measures of 
the value of information [Antonovitz and Roe, 1986]. The remainder of this chapter is organized 
as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the proposed forecast evaluation framework and provides a 
detailed explanation of the various components of the model. This will be followed by results and 




The goal of the forecast valuation framework presented here is threefold: 1) to determine 
how perception about drought forecast accuracy (hereinafter referred to as perceived accuracy) 
influences belief about the drought, 2) to determine how perceived accuracy influences the 
perception about the value of forecast, and 3) to determine how perceived accuracy evolves as the 
quality of drought forecast information improves over time. The proposed methodology is an end-
to-end forecasting framework [Coelho and Costa, 2010; Shafiee-Jood et al., 2014a], which is 
developed following the rational choice tradition, i.e., a combination of expected utility theory and 
Bayesian inference [Breen, 1999; Millner, 2008]. In order to assess the value of drought forecast 
information, the framework (presented schematically in Figure 2.1) consists of belief formation 
and decision making. The belief-formation part has two belief-updating components, both 





forecast influences DM’s perception about the likelihood of drought, and b) how DM forms a 
perception about forecast accuracy based on combined factors including actual drought forecast 
and observation. The decision-making part, on the other hand, involves a stylized decision problem 
related to hedging against drought to determine the crop allocation ahead of the crop season. In 
the remaining of this section, a detailed explanation of these components is provided (refer to 
section 2.5 for the complete list of notations used in this chapter). 
 
Figure 2.1: Forecast valuation framework 
 
 Decision making under uncertainty 
The problem is described as follows: a DM takes an action 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 in the face of an uncertain 
weather event (e.g., occurrence of a drought).  The state of this uncertain event is represented by a 
random variable 𝜃 ∈ 𝛩, where 𝛩 is a finite set of possible states of the event. The probability that 
state 𝜃 of the event occurs is given as 𝑝(𝜃). Following Bayesian inference, 𝑝(𝜃) is interpreted as 





the likelihood that state 𝜃 will occur, as opposed to its historical frequency of occurrence; 𝑝(𝜃) 
could be formed based on historical probabilities (also called climatological information) [Johnson 
and Holt, 1997] or DM’s experiences, and could be subject to cognitive biases [Sherrick et al., 
2000]. Let 𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑥, 𝜃) be the payoff resulting from each possible state 𝜃 and decision 𝑥, and 
consider a DM whose risk preferences are characterized by an increasing von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function 𝑈 = 𝑈[𝜋(𝑥, 𝜃)] [Mas-Colell et al., 2012]. Following the expected 
utility theorem (see Mas-Colell et al. [2012] for more information), it is assumed that the DM 
would make a decision to maximize the expected utility: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥
𝐸[𝑈] = ∑ 𝑝(𝜃) ∙ 𝑈[𝜋(𝑥, 𝜃)]
𝜃∈Θ
 2.1 
where 𝐸[∙] is the expectation operator. The DM’s attitude toward risk can be characterized by 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, which is assumed to be constant here, and is 
parametrized by 𝑟 ≥ 0 [Gollier, 2001]. This implies that the utility function takes the following 
form [Gollier, 2001]: 




ln 𝑊 𝑟 = 1
 2.2 
where 𝑊 is referred to as terminal wealth and is the argument of the utility function. The utility 
function defined above belongs to a class of utility functions with constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) and is widely used in economics literature. In CRRA utility functions, higher values of 𝑟 
correspond to more risk-averse behavior. One important feature that CRRA utility functions 





willing to take risks. See Gollier [2001], for more information about risk characterization and 
utility functions, and see Wakker [2008] for more details about CRRA utility functions.  
 
 Decision making context: Hedging against drought 
Consider a crop allocation decision-making problem involving two crops, A and B, where 
the DM must determine what proportion of land to allocate to each crop given the uncertainty 
associated with weather. Without loss of generality, suppose that the uncertain weather event 
considered in this study is the occurrence of a drought event. As such, the set of possible states of 
the world, 𝛩, is a binary set that includes 𝜃 = 0, corresponding to no drought (or normal), and 𝜃 =
1, corresponding to drought; in this case, 𝑝(𝜃) can be simply characterized by a single parameter 
𝑝𝜃 ≔ ℙ(𝜃 = 1), which is defined as DM’s belief about drought.  
The DM’s discretion to plant a mixture of two crops can be considered as a proactive 
strategy against drought. Suppose that crop yield (per unit area of land) for crops A and B is only 
a function of the state of the weather condition and is given as 𝑦𝐴(𝜃) and 𝑦𝐵(𝜃), respectively. 
Denote the yield for crop A under normal and drought conditions as 𝑦0
𝐴 and 𝑦1
𝐴. Similarly, the yield 
for crop B under normal and drought conditions is indicated by 𝑦0
𝐵 and 𝑦1
𝐵. Based on the yield 
distributions shown in Figure 2.2 (i.e., 𝑦0
𝐴 = 0.6, 𝑦1
𝐴 = 0.4, 𝑦0
𝐵 = 0.9, 𝑦1
𝐵 = 0.1), crop A is a more 
drought-tolerant crop, with lower yield variability, while crop B is a high-yield variety whose yield 






Figure 2.2: Discrete yield distributions for the two crops 
 
It is assumed that the costs (including direct and operational costs) are negligible. As such, 
for a DM with wealth level of Ω, the payoff function can be written as: 
 Π(𝑥, 𝜃) = Ω + 𝑥 ∙ 𝐴𝑟 ∙ 𝑦𝐴(𝜃) ∙ 𝑝𝑟𝐴 + (1 − 𝑥) ∙ 𝐴𝑟 ∙ 𝑦
𝐵(𝜃) ∙ 𝑝𝑟𝐵 2.3 
where 𝐴𝑟 is the total land (expressed in unit of area), 𝑥 is the fraction of land planted with crop A, 
𝑝𝑟𝐴 is the crop price for crop A, and 𝑝𝑟𝐵 is the crop price for crop B. If crop prices are expressed 
in dollars per unit yield per unit area, payoff (Π) and wealth level (Ω) will be expressed in unit of 
dollars. In reality, crop prices are determined by supply-demand dynamics in the market, which in 
turn could be influenced by weather and climate conditions [Brunner, 2002; Tack and Ubilava, 
2013; Ubilava, 2018]; however, for simplicity and to avoid adding new parameters to the model, 
it is assumed that 𝑝𝑟𝐴 = 𝑝𝑟𝐵 = 𝑝𝑟, and therefore the impact of crop prices in decision making is 
factored out. This assumption allows for Equation 2.3 to be normalized by land area and crop price:    








 and 𝜔 =
Ω
𝛤∙𝑝𝑟
 are normalized payoff and wealth level, expressed in the same unit 
as 𝑦𝐴 or 𝑦𝐵 (yield per unit area), which is considered as the baseline unit (𝑢) in this study. Given 
Equation 2.4, the optimization problem that the utility maximizer DM faces is given as: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥
𝐸𝜃[𝑈] = ∑ 𝑝(𝜃) ∙ 𝑈[𝜔 + 𝑥 ∙ 𝑦




where 𝐸𝜃 is the expectation operator taken with respect to 𝑝(𝜃). Given the CRRA utility function 
mentioned in Equation 2.2, the optimal allocation decision, 𝑥, must satisfy the following based on 
the first order condition of optimality:  
 ∑ 𝑝(𝜃) ∙ (
𝑦𝐴(𝜃) − 𝑦𝐵(𝜃)




= 0 2.6 
 
 Information processing: Updating beliefs about drought 
Decision makers (farmers, in this case) may use historical information and observations as 
well as their experience to form their beliefs about droughts [Saarinen, 1966; Taylor et al., 1988; 
Diggs, 1991]. This perception plays a key role in farmers’ decision making. Such perception is 
also critical when DMs process additional information about drought. Such additional information 
could be provided by drought forecasts. This section demonstrates how DMs update their beliefs 
about drought occurrence based on probabilistic drought forecasts.  
In this chapter, it is assumed that the DM is a Bayesian learner, i.e., he updates his beliefs 
according to Bayes’ theorem,1 which is consistent with the assumptions in rational choice 
 
1
 Whether or not people update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner is still an important debate in academic research 





framework [Breen, 1999]. Bayes’ theorem (or Bayes’ rule) provides the foundation for Bayesian 
updating of beliefs by combining prior beliefs with new information or evidence [Jacobs and 
Kruschke, 2011]. Following Bayesian inference, 𝑝(𝜃) is defined as DM’s prior belief about state 
𝜃 of weather, which embodies the state of DM’s knowledge about the uncertain event [Lawrence, 
1999]. Denote 𝜂 as a deterministic forecast (or signal) corresponding to state 𝜃, and suppose that 
the DM receives a probabilistic forecast, 𝑞(𝜂), which is in the form of probability mass function 
of 𝜂, generated through ensemble forecasting (note that ensemble forecasting is a method used in 
numerical weather prediction to account for initial condition uncertainty and model uncertainty). 
This implies that the forecast provides information about all possible states of the weather. Once 
𝑞(𝜂) is received, the DM will update his belief about state 𝜃 of weather in a Bayesian manner. 
Using Bayes’ rule and the law of total probability, DM’s updated belief (also referred to as 
posterior probability in Bayesian terminology) about state 𝜃 given 𝑞(𝜂), denoted 𝑝(𝜃|𝑞(𝜂)) can 
be written as [Millner, 2008]: 







where ℙ(𝜃|𝜂) is the updated belief about state 𝜃 given deterministic forecast 𝜂, 𝐿(𝜂|𝜃) is the 
likelihood function, and ℙ(𝜂) is the normalization factor which can be written as: 










The likelihood term in Equation 2.7, 𝐿(𝜂|𝜃), expresses the probability of receiving a 
deterministic forecast 𝜂 if the state of the weather is 𝜃, and therefore, as suggested by Adams et al. 
[1995] and Millner [2008], it could be interpreted as a subjective measure of the accuracy of 
forecast. Following the assumptions of inter- and intra-model democracy2 presented in Millner 
[2008], it is assumed that the likelihood can be characterized by a single parameter 𝜆 ∈ [0,1], 
which is defined as perceived forecast accuracy. Note that 𝜆 is different from objective or actual 
forecast accuracy and reflects DM’s belief about the accuracy of forecast, or equivalently, the trust 
level that the DM has in forecast information.  
For the decision-making context presented in the previous section, there are two possible 
states of the weather (i.e., 𝜃 ∈ {0,1}) and 𝑝𝜃 represents DM’s prior belief about drought  
(i.e., 𝜃 = 1). Based on the assumption of two states in the model, the probabilistic forecast (𝑞(𝜂)) 
can also be expressed by a single parameter, 𝑝𝑑, defined as probabilistic drought forecast. Hence, 
the question now becomes how DM’s belief about drought (𝑝𝜃) changes once drought forecast 
(𝑝𝑑) is received. First, the matrix of likelihoods in this case can be written as:  
 𝐿(𝜂|𝜃) = [
𝐿(𝜂 = 0|𝜃 = 0) = 𝜆 𝐿(𝜂 = 0|𝜃 = 1) = 1 − 𝜆
𝐿(𝜂 = 1|𝜃 = 0) = 1 − 𝜆 𝐿(𝜂 = 1|𝜃 = 1) = 𝜆
] 2.9 
Expanding Equation 2.7 and using this likelihood matrix, DM’s updated belief about 
drought based on probabilistic drought forecast, denoted by 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑, is written as: 
𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑 ∙
𝐿(𝜂 = 1|𝜃 = 1) ∙ 𝑝(𝜃 = 1)
∑ 𝐿(𝜂 = 1|𝜃) ∙ 𝑝(𝜃)1𝜃=0
+ (1 − 𝑝𝑑) ∙
𝐿(𝜂 = 0|𝜃 = 1) ∙ 𝑝(𝜃 = 1)




 from user’s perspective, these assumptions imply that the ensemble members have the same accuracy; they are 






𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑 ∙
𝜆 ∙ 𝑝𝜃
(1 − 𝜆) ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜃) + 𝜆 ∙ 𝑝𝜃
+ (1 − 𝑝𝑑) ∙
(1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑝𝜃
𝜆 ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜃) + (1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑝𝜃
 2.11 
Note that 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝(𝜃 = 1|𝑝𝑑). This equation expresses that there are three parameters 
that contribute to the DM’s processing of information: the information itself (𝑝𝑑), prior belief about 
the event (𝑝𝜃), and trust in the information (𝜆). It also suggests that the DM’s updated belief about 
drought is equal to the forecast (𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑) when there is full trust in the forecast (i.e., 𝜆 = 1). 
Another important observation from this equation is that 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝜃 if 𝜆 = 0.5, which implies that 
forecast does not provide any additional information.  
 
 Value of Information 
Now that it is established how DM’s belief about drought is updated using probabilistic 
drought forecast information, the focus is now turned to determining what value the DM attributes 
to that information. The basic framework for evaluation of information has been laid out based on 
the theory of information economics [Hilton, 1981], and was originally formalized in seminal 
studies of Marshak [1954] and Nelson and Winter [1964]. Theory of information economics is 
mainly based on the conventional economic and statistical decision theory that models the optimal 
selection of information in the context of decision making under uncertainty by explicitly 
considering the DM’s preferences and beliefs [Hilton, 1981; Millner, 2008]. The study of Nelson 
and Winter [1964] is the first study that used such a theoretical framework in the context of 
evaluating weather forecast information. The example studied in Nelson and Winter [1964] was 
the cost-loss or the umbrella problem, which is a dichotomous-choice decision problem with two 





problem [Thompson and Brier, 1956; Katz and Murphy, 1997b; Zhu et al., 2002]. Later studies 
have advanced the framework to investigate the interdependencies between risk and information 
in different contexts, including risky markets [Gould, 1974; Antonovitz and Roe, 1986; Willinger, 
1989] and agricultural decision making [Byerlee and Anderson, 1982; Bosch and Eidman, 1987; 
Lawrence, 1991]. Readers are referred to Arrow [1984], Lawrence [1999], and Gollier [2001] for 
more details.  
A DM may assess the value of information at three different stages depending on when the 
information is available and when the uncertainty is resolved: 1) ex ante value, which is prior to 
obtaining the information; 2) quasi ex ante value or conditional value, which is after obtaining and 
processing of the information but before the realization of the event; and 3) ex post value, which 
is assessed based on the realization of the event [Carter, 1985; Antonovitz and Roe, 1988; 
Lawrence, 1999]. In ex ante evaluation, DM might be aware of a set of possible signals, but there 
is no advanced knowledge of which specific signal will be received [Johnson and Holt, 1997]. 
This case has been widely studied in the economics of information literature, and represents 
situations where information is not publicly available, and the DM must pay to have access to the 
information. As such, the DM should form a subjective belief about the likelihood of receiving a 
particular signal [Millner, 2008]. In quasi ex ante evaluation, on the other hand, the information 
has been provided to the DM, but the question is whether DM will be better off using that 
information [Antonovitz and Roe, 1986]. Clearly, ex ante and quasi ex ante evaluations aim at 
addressing different questions and readers are referred to Antonovitz and Roe [1988] Graham-
Tomasi [1988] for more details on the differences and implications. Both ex ante and quasi ex ante 





event. In contrast, ex post evaluation is concerned with the actual or true value that the DM would 
receive from information, i.e., decisions made before the event are evaluated after the event.  
In this chapter, it is assumed that the DM has access to drought forecast information (e.g., 
the information that is publicly available through National Weather Service or National Drought 
Mitigation Center). Hence, the information evaluation presented here is quasi ex ante evaluation, 
which is similar to the models presented in Byerlee and Anderson [1982] and Antonovitz and Roe 
[1986]. In addition, ex post evaluation is used to estimate the value of forecasts realized by the DM 
after the event. In the following, the information-evaluation component of the framework (refer to 
Figure 2.1) is presented. 
Let 𝑥0
∗ be DM’s optimal crop allocation decision without information, i.e., when belief 
about drought is 𝑝𝜃; according to Equation 2.6, 𝑥0
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 Now let 𝑥∗ be DM’s optimal crop allocation decision after information (𝑝𝑑) is received; 
in this case, DM’s belief about drought is 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑, and 𝑥





(𝜔 + 𝑥∗ ∙ 𝑦1
𝐴 + (1 − 𝑥∗) ∙ 𝑦1
𝐵)𝑟




(𝜔 + 𝑥∗ ∙ 𝑦0
𝐴 + (1 − 𝑥∗) ∙ 𝑦0
𝐵)𝑟
) = 0 2.13 
Given 𝑥0
∗ and 𝑥∗, the value of forecast can be defined as the amount to be paid to the DM 
that would make him indifferent between using or not using the forecast [Hilton, 1981; Millner, 
2008]; this is also called the supply value, or willingness-to-accept value of information 
[Lawrence, 1999]. Value of forecast, 𝑉, is calculated by solving the following equation [Antonovitz 






∗, 𝜃) + 𝑉]] = 𝐸𝜃|𝑝𝑑[𝑈[𝜋(𝑥
∗, 𝜃)]] 2.14 
where 𝐸𝜃|𝑝𝑑[⦁] is the expectation operator taken over 𝑝(𝜃|𝑝𝑑), hence: 
 ∑ 𝑝(𝜃|𝑝𝑑) ∙ 𝑈[𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜃) + 𝑉]
1
𝜃=0





where 𝑝(𝜃 = 1|𝑝𝑑) = 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑, and 𝑝(𝜃 = 0|𝑝𝑑) = 1 − 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑; 𝑉 is referred to as ex ante or expected 
value of forecast and, similar to 𝜋 and 𝜔0, is expressed in the baseline unit 𝑢. 𝑉 is always non-
negative (refer to section A.1 for proof). It is important to note that this evaluation is before 
realization of the uncertain event, and 𝑉 > 0 suggests that the DM would be better off with using 
the information; however, ex ante expectation may not necessarily conform with ex post reality. 
As such, ex post evaluation can provide insights into the validity of ex ante assessment. Let 𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 
be the ex post value of forecast (also referred to as actual or true value), defined as: 
 𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝  = 𝜋(𝑥∗, 𝜑) − 𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜑) 2.16 
where 𝜑 ∈ Φ = {0,1} is the observation of the event: 𝜑 = 1 when a drought has occurred, and 
𝜑 = 0 when no drought has occurred (or the weather condition was normal). The first term on the 
right-hand side is the ex post payoff when the decision was made with the use of forecast, and the 
second term is the ex post payoff when the decision was made based on prior belief about the 
drought. Therefore, 𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 determines the actual value that the DM receives from using forecast. If 
𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝  = 0, it implies that 𝑥∗ = 𝑥0
∗, i.e., forecast information did not change the decision. Decision 
maker is better off using the forecast if 𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 > 0, whereas 𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 < 0 suggests that DM would be 





 The main advantage of ex post assessment is to determine the overall value of a forecasting 
system, i.e., how much economic benefit a DM would gain on average if he or she decides to use 
forecast information. In the literature, this overall value is usually expressed with respect to a 
reference scenario [Wilks, 1997] and often normalized by the corresponding value of perfect 
forecast [Wilks, 2001]. Although perfect forecasting may not be achievable [Westra and Sharma, 
2010], normalization based on a perfect forecast can nevertheless determine an upper limit for 
potential benefit that is achievable from using forecast. On the other hand, the value of forecast 
can also be expressed with respect to the case where DM has full trust in forecast (i.e., 𝜆 = 1) 
[Millner, 2008]. Unlike perfect forecasting, however, having full trust in information does not 
necessarily lead to higher ex post benefit; for example, one can think of a situation where a DM 
has full trust in a system with low-quality information. This indicates that the assumption usually 
adopted that users directly incorporate forecasts in their decision making is not realistic. Therefore, 
comparison between the case where DM’s trust is represented by 𝑓(𝜆) and the case where DM has 
full trust (i.e., 𝜆 = 1) could determine on what conditions influencing perceived accuracy are 
detrimental or beneficial. Hence, multiple scenarios (see Table 2.1) are defined to compute and 
compare the actual economic benefits that a DM can obtain from using forecasts.   
Table 2.1: Characteristics of the evaluation scenarios 
Evaluation Scenario  Drought Information Trust level 
Climatology Climatology, 𝑝𝜃 Not applicable 
Baseline Forecast Probabilistic forecast, 𝑝𝑑 𝑓(𝜆) 
Full Trust Probabilistic forecast, 𝑝𝑑 𝜆 = 1 






Note that these four scenarios are identified by indices 𝑐, 𝑏, 𝑓, and 𝑝, respectively. Let 𝐺𝑖→𝑗 
be the percentage of economic gain in scenario 𝑗 with respect to scenario 𝑖, where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑏, 𝑓, 𝑝}. 
𝐺𝑖→𝑗 is defined as the following: 
 





𝑡𝑜𝑡 ) 2.17 
where 𝜋𝑡𝑜𝑡 is the total ex post payoff in 𝑇 time steps: 𝜋𝑡𝑜𝑡 = ∑ 𝜋𝑡(𝑥𝑡
∗, 𝜑𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 . In the Perfect 
scenario, since 𝑓(𝜆) immediately converges to 𝜆 = 1 (this is shown later in Figure 2.17), it is 
simply assumed that 𝜆 = 1 from the beginning.  
  
 Dynamic Learning: Updating Belief about forecast accuracy 
As discussed in section 2.2.3, perceived forecast accuracy (𝜆) is a key parameter in DM’s 
response to drought forecast information (𝑝𝑑), and it subsequently influences DM’s perception 
about the value of forecast. But now the question is how DM’s perception or opinion about forecast 
accuracy is formed, especially when he has limited knowledge about forecast. To address this 
question, the proposed framework includes a dynamic learning process based on Bayesian 
inference to simulate the evolution of perceived accuracy over time. This learning process is 
formalized in the following. 
Consider the timeline of information reception, belief updating, and decision making 
presented in Figure 2.3. Suppose that DM’s belief about drought is 𝑝𝜃
3 and his or her belief about 
 
3
 It is assumed that decision maker’s prior belief about drought (𝑝𝜃) does not change from one timestep to another. 
The justification is 𝑝𝜃  has been formed over many years of experience and therefore it is not affected by new 
evidence at each time step. Also, an implicit assumption here is that decision maker’s belief updating and decision 





forecast accuracy at time step 𝑡 is represented by 𝑓𝑡(𝜆), i.e., a PDF over different values of  
𝜆 ∈ [0,1]. Once forecast (𝑝𝑑𝑡) is received (indicated by point A in Figure 2.3), DM’s updated belief 
about drought is the integration of 2.11 as shown in the following: 
  





where 𝑝(𝜃 = 1|𝑝𝑑, 𝜆) is calculated using Equation 2.11 for any given value of 𝜆 ∈ [0,1]. The 
advantage of using Equation 2.18 instead of using Equation 2.11 with a point estimate of 𝜆 is to 
take into account all the information embedded in 𝑓(𝜆).  
 
Figure 2.3: Timeline of forecast acquisition, updating beliefs, and decision making. Point A is 
when forecast is received, B is when decision is made, and C is when true state of the weather of 
realized  
 
After the decision is made (point B in Figure 2.3) and the uncertainty is resolved, DM 





as new evidence or information to update DM’s belief about forecast accuracy. Let  
𝑓𝑡
"(𝜆) = 𝑓𝑡(𝜆|𝑝𝑑𝑡 , 𝜑𝑡) be this updated or posterior belief. Using Bayes’ theorem and the law of 
total probability, 𝑓𝑡
"(𝜆) can be derived for 𝜑𝑡 = 1 and 𝜑𝑡 = 0 (refer to section A.2 for derivations): 
𝑓𝑡(𝜆|𝑝𝑑𝑡 , 𝜑𝑡 = 1) = 𝑝𝑑𝑡 ∙
𝜆 ∙ 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝑓𝑡(𝜆)




+ (1 − 𝑝𝑑𝑡) ∙
(1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝑓𝑡(𝜆)





𝑓𝑡(𝜆|𝑝𝑑𝑡 , 𝜑𝑡 = 0) = 𝑝𝑑𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜆) ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜃) ∙ 𝑓𝑡(𝜆)




+ (1 − 𝑝𝑑𝑡) ∙
𝜆 ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜃) ∙ 𝑓𝑡(𝜆)





Based on these equations, it can be inferred that perceived accuracy improves when a 
drought event (𝜑 = 1) is proceeded by a drought forecast of 𝑝𝑑 > 0.5 or a no-drought event  
(𝜑 = 1) is proceeded by a forecast of 𝑝𝑑 < 0.5. On the other hand, DM’s belief in accuracy 
decreases when a high drought chance is followed by a normal condition or a small drought chance 
is followed by a drought event. Finally, note that the posterior distribution derived at time step 𝑡, 
𝑓𝑡
"(𝜆), will be used as the prior distribution in the next time step: 𝑓𝑡+1(𝜆) = 𝑓𝑡
"(𝜆).     
 
2.3 Results and Discussions  
Results are presented in four parts. In the first part, the decision-making context is further 
explored to illustrate the dependency of optimal decisions on DM’s attitude to risk (𝑟) and wealth 
level (𝜔0). The next part explores how the DM processes drought forecast information and focuses 
on the impact of perceived forecast accuracy (𝜆) on updated belief about drought. In the third part, 
the dependencies of forecast value on behavioral and economic factors are investigated. Finally, 
the last part demonstrates how the DM learns about forecast accuracy over time, and how this 





 Decision making (on crop allocation) with climatological information 
The decision problem that the DM faces is to determine the optimal land allocation between 
two crops: crop A, which is the more drought tolerant crop with lower yield variability, and crop 
B, a high-yield crop but very sensitive to drought. When drought forecast is not available, i.e., the 
status quo situation, the DM’s belief about drought (i.e., 𝑝𝜃) is strictly formed based on historical 
probabilities (i.e., climatological information). Besides 𝑝𝜃, DM’s attitude towards risk (specified 
by 𝑟) and wealth level (𝜔) also influence the optimal decision (see Equation 2.6). For a risk neutral 
DM (𝑟 = 0), both utility and payoff are a linear function of decision variable 𝑥, with a positive 
slope for 𝑝𝜃 > 0.5 and a negative slope for 𝑝𝜃 < 0.5. Therefore, if 𝑝𝜃 < 0.5, optimal decision is 
to only plant crop B (i.e., 𝑥0
∗ = 0) because the expected payoff is the largest for this choice. For 
𝑝𝜃 = 0.5, the DM is indifferent between the two crops. The remainder of this sections focuses on 
situations where 𝑝𝜃 < 0.5 as this is more realistic if beliefs are formed based on historical 
probabilities. 
In reality, however, farmers often manage uncertainty by making decisions that increase 
the reliability of their incomes [Millner and Washington, 2011; Mase and Prokopy, 2014]. 
Therefore, although 𝑥0
∗ = 0 would maximize the expected payoff, DM may choose to plant crop 
A to reduce the uncertainty associated with his income. This behavior (or preference) is represented 
by the CRRA utility function in the model. Given CRRA utility, higher values of risk aversion (𝑟) 
correspond to more risk-averse behavior. In addition, CRRA utility also implies that individuals 
with lower wealth levels (𝜔) are less willing to make risky decisions. Figure 2.4 shows the optimal 
allocations to crop A (𝑥0
∗) as a function of risk aversion (𝑟) for three different cases of 𝑝𝜃, and for 





increases as the DM shows more risk-averse behavior. This is because the crop yield for crop A 
has much less variation with respect to states of the weather (see Figure 2.2) and therefore a more 
risk-averse DM prefers to use more of crop A in their planting mixture to minimize his exposure 
to risk. It is also observed that for any given 𝑟, the fraction of land allocated to crop A increases as 
DM’s belief about drought occurrence (𝑝𝜃) increases. This is because as 𝑝𝜃 increases from zero to 
0.5, DM perceives that drought is more likely to occur, and as such, crop A, which has a higher 
yield in drought condition, becomes more favorable even for a DM with lower level of risk 
aversion.  
 
Figure 2.4: Optimal crop allocation decision for the case of 𝜔 = 0  
 
Figure 2.5 shows the optimal decisions for different wealth levels (𝜔) when 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3. It 
can be observed for any given 𝑟 that DMs with a higher wealth level allocate a larger fraction of 
their land to crop B to ensure higher expected payoff. This essentially implies how rich and poor 
farmers make different crop-allocation decisions even when their beliefs about drought occurrence 





include crop A in their crop-allocation portfolio. Figure 2.6 specifically focuses on a case where 
risk aversion is large (𝑟 = 5). It can be concluded that farmers with a higher level of wealth  
(𝜔 ≥ 2.5) would plant crop A if the occurrence probability of the drought is relatively high (𝑝𝜃 >
0.3).   
 
Figure 2.5: Optimal crop allocation decisions in the case of 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3 
 
 





 Perceived forecast accuracy and processing of drought forecast information 
Once drought forecast information is received by the DM, it will be processed, as described 
in Equation 2.11, which demonstrates that prior knowledge (i.e., 𝑝𝜃) and new information (i.e., 
𝑝𝑑) are weighted by DM’s trust level in the information (i.e., 𝜆). Figure 2.7 shows the impact of 
perceived forecast accuracy on updated belief about drought when 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3. The results are shown 
for three different drought forecasts: 𝑝𝑑 = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. First, it can be observed that DM’s belief 
about drought occurrence is not influenced by forecast when 𝜆 = 0.5 (i.e., 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝜃), i.e., the 
DM is indifferent about forecast. This is also shown in Figure 2.8 where for each 𝑝𝜃, 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝜃 
at 𝜆 = 0.5.  
A second observation from these two figures is that when 𝜆 = 1, updated belief is equal to 
the probabilistic drought forecast, i.e., 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑. This implies forecasts are directly incorporated 
in decision making when the DM has complete trust in them. In fact, this is an implicit assumption 
in many studies on forecast applications in agriculture or water resources decision making. 
Generally, when 𝜆 > 0.5, DM’s perception of forecast is positive. Hence, as 𝜆 increases from 0.5 
to 1, updated belief about drought moves closer to the forecast: 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 → 𝑝𝑑. However, the way 
that 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 approaches 𝑝𝑑 is determined by how different the forecast is from the prior belief. As 
shown in Figure 2.8, when 𝑝𝑑 = 0.9, a DM who does not regularly experience drought (hence has 
lower 𝑝𝜃 = 0.2) must have a higher trust in information to form the same belief about drought 
occurrence compared with a DM with a higher 𝑝𝜃. Figure 2.8 also shows that the marginal increase 
in 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 with respect to 𝜆 decreases with 𝑝𝜃; this implies 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑  is more sensitive to increase in 
perceived accuracy when there is a large difference between 𝑝𝜃 and 𝑝𝑑. The implication of this 






Figure 2.7: Updated belief about drought based on drought forecast information as a function of 
perceived forecast accuracy for the case of 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3  
 
 
Figure 2.8: Updated belief about drought based on 𝑝𝑑 = 0.9.  
 
It is possible to draw similar conclusions when trust level is less than 0.5, although the key 





provide non-trivial information to the DM [Murphy and Winkler, 1987]. When 𝜆 = 0, DM believes 
that forecast is completely wrong and therefore the updated belief about drought is exactly the 
opposite of what forecast suggests: 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 1 − 𝑝𝑑. Although it might be possible to find DMs 
who would knowingly take advantage of constantly wrong forecasts [Millner and Washington, 
2011], the remainder of the results focuses on 𝜆 ≥ 0.5 as this seems to be the more realistic case 
with more plausible policy implications.   
 
 Determinants of the value of drought forecast information  
This part demonstrates the complex dependency of forecast value (𝑉) on behavioral and 
economic factors, including perceived accuracy (𝜆), attitude towards risk (𝑟), and wealth level (𝜔) 
Since the value is assessed based on quasi ex ante evaluation (see section 2.2.4), it inherently 
depends on the information (i.e., drought forecast, 𝑝𝑑) as well. First, we discuss the relationship 
between value, perceived accuracy and risk aversion for 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3 (Figure 2.9a-c). Note that wealth 
level is set at 𝜔 = 1.5𝑢, and the value is assessed based on three forecasts: 𝑝𝑑 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑑 = 0.5, 
and 𝑝𝑑 = 0.9. The figure provides several interesting insights. First, it is observed that DM’s 
perception about accuracy (𝜆) affects the value of forecast (𝑉).4 This implies that the same forecast 
could be valued differently for the same DM depending on what trust level the DM may have in 
forecast.  
When a DM is indifferent to forecast (i.e., 𝜆 = 0.5), forecast is not perceived to be valuable 
because it does not change DM’s updated belief about drought (see Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8, 
 
4
 It is noteworthy that the value discussed in this section is the quasi ex ante value of forecast, i.e., the value that DM 
assigns to forecasts before the uncertain event is realized; therefore, this value is different than the true (or ex post) 





when 𝜆 = 0.5, 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝜃), and consequently the optimal decision remains the same  
(i.e., 𝑥0
∗ = 𝑥∗) [Luseno et al., 2003; Pierson and Goodman, 2014]. However, when DM trusts the 
forecast (i.e., 𝜆 > 0.5), it can be observed that 𝑉 increases monotonically with 𝜆 for any given risk 
level. This suggests that a forecast is perceived to be more valuable if DM has more trust in it. As 
𝑉 increases from zero (at 𝜆 = 0.5) and reaches its maximum when 𝜆 = 1, it is possible to identify 
a specific value of 𝜆 after which a forecast could be perceived as valuable (i.e., 𝑉 > 0) for a DM. 
This value of 𝜆 is referred to as critical perceived accuracy (𝜆∗) [Millner, 2008], and suggests that 
a forecast is not valuable until the DM’s trust is at least 𝜆∗. This could explain, in some cases, why 
DMs may not be willing to use a forecast even though it may have a high accuracy.  
The relationship between the value of information and risk attitude has been extensively 
studied in the economics of information literature [Gould, 1974; Hilton, 1981; Gollier, 2001]. 
Intuition may suggest that information is more valuable to more risk-averse DMs [Hess, 1982; 
Gollier, 2001]. While findings may vary depending on the choice of the utility function, risk 
attitude parametrization, definition of the value of information, and the decision-making context, 
a general conclusion is that there is no monotonic relationship between the value of information 
and attitude to risk [Hilton, 1981; Meza et al., 2008]. Figure 2.9 also yields a similar conclusion. 
In addition, it is observed for any 𝜆 that there is a specific 𝑟 (referred to as 𝑟∗) for which maximum 
value is achieved. As Gollier [2001] and Millner and Washington [2011] explained, increase in 
risk aversion has two competing effects on the value of forecast, which gives rise to the hump-
shaped relationship shown in Figure 2.9: One effect is related to how increase in risk aversion 
changes the way risk is valued by the DM; second effect, on the other hand, is related to how 





𝑝𝜃 = 0.3 and 𝑝𝑑 = 0.9 (Figure 2.9c and Figure 2.10b). When 𝑟 is relatively small (to be more 
precise, when 𝑟 < 𝑟∗ = 2.1 in this case), optimal allocation for an uninformed DM is to plant crop 
B (i.e., 𝑥0
∗ = 0); therefore, the value of forecast comes from the decision to include crop A in the 
crop mixture (i.e., 𝑥∗ ≠ 0); as 𝑟 increases from zero to 𝑟∗, a larger fraction of land will be planted 
with crop A, thereby increasing the value of forecast. On the other hand, when risk aversion is 
relatively large (i.e., 𝑟 ≥ 𝑟∗), crop A is planted even when forecast is not used (i.e., 𝑥0
∗ ≠ 0) (see 
Figure 2.5); therefore, as 𝑟 increases, decisions are less affected by the forecast (i.e., the difference 
between 𝑥0
∗ and 𝑥∗ decreases), and consequently, the value of forecast decreases. It is noteworthy 
that this nonlinear behavior, as well as the value of 𝑟∗, is independent of 𝜆 (see Figure 2.9c and 
Figure 2.10b).  
Results show a similar nonlinear relationship between 𝑉 and 𝑟 for any 𝑝𝑑 ≥ 𝑝𝜃 (e.g., see 
Figure 2.9b and Figure 2.11b for 𝑝𝑑 = 0.5).
5 While this relationship is still nonlinear for 𝑝𝑑 < 𝑝𝜃, 
the pattern is different (see Figure 2.9a and Figure 2.11b for 𝑝𝑑 = 0.1). This is because the value 
from forecast in this case comes from the decision of not including crop A in the crop mixture. 
When 𝑟 < 𝑟∗, 𝑉 is always zero because optimal allocation decisions with and without forecast are 
always the same (i.e., 𝑥0
∗ = 𝑥∗). However, when 𝑟 ≥ 𝑟∗, as mentioned above, 𝑥0
∗ increases with 𝑟 
while 𝑥∗ remains zero (for 𝜆 = 1) or close to zero (or 𝜆 < 1), thereby increasing the value of 
forecast.       
 
5
 It must be noted that both Gollier [2001] and Millner and Washington [2011] show a similar relationship even 
though their results are based on ex ante evaluation in which the value is calculated before the information is 
received. Our results signify that the same qualitative relationship exists even if forecasts are evaluated individually 






Figure 2.9: Value of drought forecast information (specified with colors and contours) as a 
function of perceived forecast accuracy (𝜆) and risk aversion (𝑟). Results are for three different 
values of forecast (𝑝𝑑) and 𝜔 = 1.5𝑢. (a-c) for 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3 and (d-f) for 𝑝𝜃 = 0.4. Dashed line 
corresponds to critical perceived accuracy (𝜆∗).  
 
Another determinant of forecast value is DM’s prior belief about drought (𝑝𝜃). Figure 2.9 
(d-f) show the value of drought forecast when 𝑝𝜃 = 0.4. First, note that the relationships between 
𝑉 and 𝜆, and between 𝑉 and 𝑟 follow the same pattern (also see Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11). 
However, it is observed that forecasts of 𝑝𝑑 = 0.5 and 𝑝𝑑 = 0.9 are generally less valuable (except 





belief decreases, optimal decisions are less influenced by forecasts, which consequently decreases 
the value of forecasts. For instance, consider the case that 𝑝𝑑 = 0.9. For a DM with 𝑝𝜃 = 0.4, 𝑥0
∗ 
and 𝑥∗ are equal for more risk-averse DMs (𝑟 > 4.0) leading to 𝑉 = 0, while even highly risk-
averse DMs with 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3 can still exploit positive value from forecast. On the other hand, a DM 
who experiences drought more frequently is more likely to extract more value from a no-drought 
forecast. Hence, the forecast of 𝑝𝑑 = 0.1 is perceived to be more valuable for a DM with 𝑝𝜃 = 0.4 
compared to a DM with 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3 (see Figure 2.9a,d).    
Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 show the relationship between value and risk attitude for 
different values of 𝑝𝜃. First, notice that 𝑟
∗ decreases as 𝑝𝜃 increases. Recall that when 𝑝𝑑 > 𝑝𝜃, 
value of information decreases with 𝑟 > 𝑟∗ (see Figure 2.9). Therefore, a DM with the same level 
of risk aversion but smaller 𝑝𝜃 perceives forecast to be more valuable. The reverse is true for DMs 
with lower levels of risk aversion (𝑟 < 𝑟∗). This implies that more risk-averse DMs who do not 
experience drought frequently (e.g., 𝑝𝜃 = 0.2) are more likely to capitalize on forecasts with high 
chance of drought regardless of their trust level in the forecast (see Figure 2.10). On the other hand, 
those who experience droughts more frequently (e.g., 𝑝𝜃 = 0.4) are more likely to use forecasts 
of no-drought event. It should be noted that the value of forecast shows higher sensitivity to 𝑟 for 
larger 𝑝𝜃. The results also suggest that less risk-averse DMs could benefit more from improving 






Figure 2.10: Value of drought forecast information for the case of 𝑝𝑑 = 0.9 and 𝜔0 = 1.5𝑢.  
 
 
Figure 2.11: Value of drought forecast information for the case of 𝜆 = 1 and 𝜔 = 1.5𝑢.  
 
Do poor and wealthy DMs have different perceptions about the value of forecasts? The 
relationship between value of information and wealth level has been studied in the literature for 
DMs with different risk attitudes (e.g., see [Hilton, 1981; Lawrence, 1999; Delquié, 2008; Lall, 
2013]). In the following, this relationship will be further investigated but with more focus on the 
impact of perceived accuracy (𝜆). Results, presented in Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13, show that 
there is no monotonic relationship between value and wealth level [Hilton, 1981]. In general, for 
any given 𝜔0, it can be seen that 𝑉 monotonically increases with 𝜆, although for some 





Figure 2.12d). This suggests that there exists a monotonic relationship between 𝑉 and 𝜆 regardless 
of DM’s wealth level. 
Similar to what was discussed about the relationship between value of forecast (𝑉) and risk 
aversion previously (see Figure 2.9), there is a drastic difference in the relationship between the 𝑉 
and 𝜔0 depending on whether drought forecast is greater or smaller than DM’s prior belief about 
drought. When 𝑝𝑑 ≥ 𝑝𝜃 and risk aversion is very low (see Figure 2.12b,c), DMs with small wealth 
levels perceive forecasts to be valuable even with lower perceived accuracy. In contrast, when 𝑟 
is large (see Figure 2.12h,i), poorer DMs require higher levels of trust to have the same perception 
about the value of forecasts. This indicates that one way to increase the perceived value of forecasts 
for poor and highly risk-averse DMs is by increasing their trust in forecasts.  
The results for the case of 𝑝𝑑 ≥ 𝑝𝜃 also reveal that for any given 𝜆, there is a specific value 
of 𝜔 (referred to as 𝜔∗) that corresponds to the largest forecast value. Figure 2.13 shows that when 
𝜔 < 𝜔∗, value of forecasts increases with wealth level, while the value is almost insensitive to 
wealth level when 𝜔 > 𝜔∗. It is important to note that 𝜔∗ increases with 𝑝𝜃 (note that higher 𝑝𝜃 
implies that the DM experiences drought events more regularly) and 𝑟 (see Figure 2.13). This 
implies that for lower 𝑝𝜃 and 𝑟, value is less sensitives to DM’s wealth level. The relationship 
between 𝑉 and 𝜔0 follows a totally different pattern when 𝑝𝑑 < 𝑝𝜃. First, for any given 𝜆, forecasts 
are not perceived to have any value when 𝜔 ≥ 𝜔∗. Second, forecasts have the highest value for 
DMs with a specific range of wealth level, which implies that these DMs require lower trust levels 





   
Figure 2.12: Value of drought forecast information (specified with colors and contours) as a 
function of perceived forecast accuracy (𝜆) and wealth level (𝜔). Results are for the case of 𝑝𝜃 =








Figure 2.13: Value of drought forecast information for the case of 𝑝𝑑 = 0.9 and 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3 (a-c), 
and 𝑝𝜃 = 0.4 (d-f). 
 
 Learning about accuracy: Belief evolution and value assessment 
This part focuses on the dynamic aspect of forecast evaluation. Specifically, the 
dependency of perceived accuracy to forecast accuracy is investigated, and the value of the 
forecasts is assessed over time through ex post analysis. For this purpose, it is required to use the 
joint distribution of forecast and observation. This joint distribution is usually specified by 
calibration-refinement factorization [Murphy and Winkler, 1987]. Refinement function is simply 
a probability density function of forecasts, usually specified by beta distribution; the calibration 
function essentially determines the probability of occurrence of the event conditional on forecast 
(i.e., for a binary event). The calibration function therefore determines the reliability of the 





While it is possible to generate an infinite number of probabilistic forecasts with different 
reliabilities using  the calibration-refinement factorization, it is not straightforward to generate 
probabilistic forecasts of discrete predictands with a specified accuracy [Wilks, 2006]. For 
instance, Brier score, which is the most common scalar measure of accuracy, averages the squared 
differences between forecast probabilities and the subsequent binary events [Wilks, 2006]; 
however, one cannot simply generate forecast-observation pairs based on a given Brier score.  
Therefore, instead of using calibration-refinement factorization, an approach similar to ensemble 
forecasting is used here to generate probabilistic drought forecasts with a specified accuracy (see 
section B.1 for more details). In this approach, it is assumed that a probabilistic forecast at time 𝑡 
(𝑝𝑑𝑡) is generated from a system that produces deterministic forecasts with actual or objective 





, where 𝑁 is the total number of ensemble 
members, and 𝜂𝑖 is the deterministic forecast produced by ensemble member 𝑖. Throughout this 
part, our focus is on a hypothetical (but realistic) scenario where the objective accuracy of the 
forecasting system improves over time from 𝜅 = 0.5 at 𝑡 = 1 to 𝜅 = 0.8 at 𝑡 = 25, and remains 
constant at 𝜅 = 0.8 afterwards (see Figure 2.14). Figure 2.14 shows one possible time series of 
probabilistic drought forecasts over 𝑇 = 100 time steps for a given time series of drought events 
with 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3. The first observation from this figure is that forecasts are closer to 0.5 when 𝜅 is 
small. As 𝜅 approaches to 0.8, however, forecasts are more decisive. The second observation is 
that there are instances, particularly when 𝜅 < 0.8, where a drought event occurs despite 𝑝𝑑 < 0.5 
and vice versa. These instances, even though not regular, have significant impacts on DM’s belief 






Figure 2.14: Time series of drought forecasts (𝑝𝑑𝑡) (shown in bars) generated according to the 
actual forecast accuracy and drought events (shown in circles). Note that time series of drought 
events is generated assuming 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3. 
 
Figure 2.15 and Figure 2.16 show how DM’s belief about forecast accuracy, represented 
by 𝑓(𝜆), changes over time corresponding to the hypothetical scenario presented above. It is 
assumed that the DM initially has no knowledge or belief about forecasting system, including its 
accuracy. This is represented by a non-informative flat prior in the model at 𝑡 = 1. Note that since 
𝜆 ∈ [0,1], 𝑓1(𝜆) = 1 (see Figure 2.15). As a result, the expected value of 𝜆 (defined as:  
𝜇𝜆 = ∫ 𝜆 ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)𝑑𝜆
1
0
) at the beginning is 0.5, and the uncertainty about 𝜆 (represented by the 




 ) is relatively large  
(i.e., 𝜎𝜆 ≈ 0.29). As Figure 2.15 shows, over time, the peak of 𝑓(𝜆) becomes sharper around 0.8, 
and the tails become thinner resulting in smaller uncertainty. This implies that the DM learns more 






Figure 2.15: Evolution of decision maker’s belief about forecast accuracy (𝑓(𝜆)) in response to 
improvement in objective accuracy. Note that the initial PDF (represented by a flat line) is a non-
informative prior. 
 
Figure 2.16 shows the trajectory of DM’s belief about forecast accuracy as drought 
forecasts improve over time. Note that this figure shows the expected value of 𝜆 (𝜇𝜆) and one-
standard deviation interval (𝜇𝜆 ± 𝜎 𝜆) instead of the complete PDF. A general observation from 
this figure is that the trend of perceived forecast accuracy follows the objective accuracy, but with 
a delay in the beginning and fluctuations around 𝜅 = 0.8 during the second half of the simulation 
(i.e., 𝑡 > 50). According to Equations 2.19 and 2.20, posterior distribution significantly deviates 
from prior distribution when forecasts are either too close or too far from observations, showing 
the critical instances in the learning process. Therefore, when DM’s belief about accuracy is closer 
to the flat prior at the beginning, there would be significant changes in updated beliefs when a 





event is proceeded by a large or small 𝑝𝑑. On the other hand, when 𝑝𝑑 is closer to 0.5, which is 
mainly the case when 𝑡 < 25, there is no significant change in perceived accuracy even though 
the DM is more inclined towards new evidence (i.e., pairs of forecast-observation) in this period. 
This is because the new evidence available at this stage of the learning process is not significantly 
different than what the DM already knows. Therefore, there seems to be a delay in how perceived 
accuracy conforms to objective accuracy at the beginning. In later stages of the simulation  
(𝑡 > 50) the critical learning instances are still important, but their impact is not as significant as 
in the beginning because beliefs have already swayed away from uniform and the DM has started 
to form a belief about accuracy. Hence, perceived accuracy only fluctuates slightly around 0.8 
when 𝑡 > 50. If the simulation is continued for longer than 100 time steps, 𝑓(𝜆) becomes sharper 
around 0.8 and the fluctuations of 𝜇𝜆 around 0.8 will be reduced until 𝑓(𝜆) ultimately converges 






Figure 2.16: Evolution of decision maker’s belief about forecast accuracy in response to 
improvement in accuracy. Solid black line is 𝜇𝜆 and the shaded area is one-standard deviation 
interval (i.e., 𝜇𝜆 ± 𝜎𝜆). 
 
How is DM’s processing of drought forecasts affected by the perceived accuracy over time 
for the hypothetical scenario presented above? Since 𝑓(𝜆) is known at each time step 𝑡, Equation 
2.18 can be used to calculate DM’s updated belief about drought (𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑𝑡) given the forecast of 𝑝𝑑𝑡 . 
Note that 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3 in the hypothetical scenario. Figure 2.17 shows how DM’s updated belief about 
drought changes over time as forecast accuracy improves. In the beginning (𝑡 < 10), since DM 
has not yet formed a belief about accuracy (hence 𝜇𝜆 mainly fluctuates around 0.5 with relatively 
large uncertainty, see Figure 2.16), 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 remains close to 𝑝𝜃. However, 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 starts to deviate 
from 𝑝𝜃 and gets closer to 𝑝𝑑 as perceived accuracy begins its increasing trend (mainly after 
 𝑡 = 20) due to the improvement in forecast accuracy. It is noteworthy that 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 always remains 





[0.08,0.93]. This is because 𝜇𝜆 at best fluctuates around 0.8, and as shown in Figure 2.7, 
𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑=0.9 ≈ 0.6 when 𝜆 ≈ 0.8. For comparison, Figure 2.17 also shows how the DM’s belief about 
drought would change if drought forecasts are perfect, i.e., 𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡. In this case, 𝑓(𝜆) 
immediately approaches to 𝜆 = 1, thereby 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑𝑡 ≈ 𝜑𝑡, especially after the first few time steps.  
 
Figure 2.17: Updated belief about drought conditional on probabilistic and perfect drought 
forecasts. Time series of forecasts, drought events, and the trajectory of perceived accuracy are 
shown on top. 
 
It is now possible to address how DM’s perception about the value of forecast changes over 
time in the hypothetical scenario presented above. It is also investigated how the actual value that 
the DM receives from forecasts changes as he builds trust in forecasts. The results are shown for 
two cases of risk aversion (see Figure 2.18 for 𝑟 = 0.5 and Figure 2.19 for 𝑟 = 5.0). Recall that 





Forecasts are evaluated under three scenarios (see Table 2.1): 𝑉𝑏 and 𝑉𝑏
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 for  Baseline-forecast, 
𝑉𝑓 and 𝑉𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 for Full-trust, and 𝑉𝑝 and 𝑉𝑝
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 for Perfect. First, consider a DM with a low risk 
aversion (𝑟 = 0.5). In this case, the optimal decision without using forecast is to only plant crop 
B, i.e., 𝑥0
∗ = 0; hence, the forecast is valuable only if it results in a decision to plant crop A, partially 
or entirely, i.e., 𝑥∗ > 0. Based on the decision-making model, this requires the DM to believe that 
there is at least 45 percent chance that the drought would occur (i.e., 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 ≥ 0.45).  
Figure 2.18b shows the ex ante value of drought forecasts under the three scenarios. There 
are significant differences between 𝑉𝑏, 𝑉𝑓, and 𝑉𝑝, especially during the accuracy improvement 
phase (𝑡 < 25). First, it can be observed that 𝑉𝑏 is always zero in the 𝑡 < 25 period. This is because 
the DM has not built sufficient trust in information yet, and even though there are instances that 
𝑝𝑑 is relatively large (e.g., at 𝑡 = 10), the updated belief about drought remains closer to the prior 
belief (𝑝𝜃 = 0.3) (see Figure 2.17). As such, forecasts do not change DM’s actions and therefore 
they are not perceived to be valuable. However, as forecasts improve, DM builds more trust in 
forecasts. In particular, perceived accuracy remains relatively high (𝜇𝜆 ≥ 0.7) after 𝑡 = 25; as a 
result, any drought forecasts of 𝑝𝑑 > 0.5 would change DM’s actions and therefore is perceived 
to be valuable.  
Unlike 𝑉𝑏, the value of forecast in the Full-trust scenario (𝑉𝑓) does not depend on perceived 
accuracy. Recall that DM’s updated belief about drought is equal to the forecast received (i.e., 
𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑) when 𝜆 = 1. Therefore, 𝑉𝑓 mainly changes with 𝑝𝑑, regardless of how accurate the 
forecast is. Specifically, any forecast that predicts drought with more than 45 percent chance (i.e., 







 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 ≥ 0.45, and given 𝜆 = 1, 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑). This holds true for those forecasts received prior to 
𝑡 = 25 as well. As a result, as shown in Figure 2.18b, there are instances when 𝑡 < 25, where a 
DM with high confidence in forecasts perceives them to be valuable (𝑉𝑓 > 0) while the same 
forecasts are not valuable for another DM with lower trust level (𝑉𝑏 = 0). Hence, these two DMs 
will experience different outcomes only because they have different perceptions about the 
accuracy of the same forecast. Possible implications of these results are discussed later using ex 
post evaluation.  
In the Perfect  scenario, there are only two possible values for 𝑉𝑝 because forecasts are 
assumed to be perfect (i.e., 𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡, hence there are only possible values for forecasts) and the 
DM has full trust in forecasts (i.e., 𝜆 = 1 → 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 𝑝𝑑𝑡). When 𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 0, DM receives no 
additional benefit from forecast as it does not change his action (i.e., 𝑥∗ = 𝑥0
∗ = 0); therefore  
𝑉𝑝 = 0; when 𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 1, knowing that a drought event will occur (i.e., 𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 1) would change DM’s 
action (𝑥∗ = 1) and results in a value of 𝑉𝑝 = 0.3. It is important to note that 𝑉𝑝 does not necessarily 
provide an upper bound for 𝑉𝑏 or 𝑉𝑓. As can be seen, there are instances where 𝑉𝑏 or 𝑉𝑓 is positive 
while 𝑉𝑝 = 0.  
While ex ante assessment of the value of forecast determines whether the forecast should 
be used by a DM or not, the actual or the true value that the DM receives by using forecast is 
calculated using ex post assessment. First, note that ex ante and ex post values of forecast in the 
Perfect scenario are equal (i.e., 𝑉𝑝
𝑒𝑥𝑝 = 𝑉𝑝) since there is no uncertainty involved in calculating 𝑉𝑝. 
Hence, 𝑉𝑝
𝑒𝑥𝑝 = 0.3 if there is a drought event (𝜑𝑡 = 1) and 𝑉𝑝







 determines the maximum value that can be achieved by using a forecast at each time 
step.  
Results show that the ex post value of forecasts in Baseline-forecast and Full-trust 
scenarios are almost identical during 𝑡 ≥ 25 period. In fact, there are only four instances where 
𝑉𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 differs from 𝑉𝑏
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 (see 𝑡 = 25, 27, 32, 35). This difference stems from the difference in 
optimal decisions in the two cases. In the Full-trust scenario, the optimal decision in these time 
steps is always one, while the corresponding decisions in Baseline-forecast scenario are between 
zero and one. However, 𝑉𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 largely differs from 𝑉𝑏
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 during 𝑡 < 25 period. Recall that 𝑉𝑏 is 
always zero in this period because the DM has not yet built enough trust in forecasts. As a result, 
𝑉𝑏
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 is also zero. However, as discussed earlier, forecasts are perceived to be valuable for a DM 
with 𝜆 = 1 in some time steps in this period (see Figure 2.18b). Figure 2.18d shows that the 
corresponding ex post values in those instances could be positive or negative. More specifically, 
in the beginning where forecast accuracy is low (𝑡 < 10), having full trust in forecasts is highly 
likely to result in negative values although DM still received positive value from forecasts in some 
instances. These results indicate that if the forecast accuracy is relatively high, assuming that DM 
has full trust in forecast may not significantly influence the outcome while ex post values could be 







further supports this finding. As can be seen in Figure 2.18c-d, when 𝑡 ≥ 25, the ex post values 
are identical among the three scenarios except when a large 𝑝𝑑 is followed by a no-drought event 
(𝑉𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑝, 𝑉𝑏
𝑒𝑥𝑝 < 0 and 𝑉𝑝
𝑒𝑥𝑝 = 0), or a small 𝑝𝑑 is followed by a drought event (𝑉𝑓
𝑒𝑥𝑝, 𝑉𝑏
𝑒𝑥𝑝 = 0 and 
𝑉𝑝






Figure 2.18: Ex ante (b) and ex post (c-d) value of forecasts for 𝜔0 = 1.5𝑢 and 𝑟 = 0.5. 𝑉𝑏, 𝑉𝑓, 







 are the corresponding ex post values. Time series of forecasts, 
drought events and perceived accuracy trajectory are shown in (a). 
 
Next, results for a highly risk-averse DM (𝑟 = 5.0, Figure 2.19) are discussed. First, since 
the DM is very conservative in this case, the optimal decision without using forecast is to plant 77 
percent of the land with crop A (i.e., 𝑥0
∗ = 0.77) to minimize the risk of exposure to drought. As a 
result, the DM would receive more value from those forecasts that predict a no-drought event with 
higher chance (i.e., smaller 𝑝𝑑). On the other hand, the DM could still find forecasts with larger 





maximum values that can be achieved from using forecasts are 𝑉𝑝
𝑒𝑥𝑝
= 0.23, corresponding to no-
drought events (𝜑𝑡 = 0), and 𝑉𝑝
𝑒𝑥𝑝 = 0.07, corresponding to drought events (𝜑𝑡 = 1). Another 
major difference between these two cases is that ex post values are not identical in most time steps. 




 when 𝜑𝑡 = 0. This is because, unlike the previous 
case, the optimal decisions in Baseline-forecast and Full-trust scenarios are usually different, 
which results in different ex post payoff and consequently different ex post value.  
 
Figure 2.19: Ex ante (b) and ex post (c-d) value of forecasts for 𝜔0 = 1.5𝑢 and 𝑟 = 5. 𝑉𝑏, 𝑉𝑓, 







 are the corresponding ex post values. Time series of forecasts, drought 





To determine the average benefit that the DM receives from using the forecasts, Equation 
2.17 is used to calculate the average economic gain of using the forecasting system in Baseline-
forecast, Full-trust, and Perfect scenarios with respect to the climatology scenario (see Table 2.1). 
Also, in order to be able to draw more general conclusions, the following analysis is be based on 
50 different time series of drought forecasts, all generated based on the hypothetical scenario of 
forecast improvement (see Figure 2.14) (see sections B.1 and B.2 for more details about how 
forecast time series are generated). 
Figure 2.20 shows the percentage of economic gain under different forecast scenarios with 
reference to the climatology scenario as a function of risk aversion for the case of 𝜔 = 1.5𝑢. First, 
the relative economic gains in Baseline-forecast and Full-trust scenarios (𝐺𝑐→𝑏 and 𝐺𝑐→𝑓, 
respectively) are almost identical for 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 3. This implies that for DMs with risk aversion 
within the range of 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 3, there might be no added value in policy interventions with the goal 
of increasing their trust level in forecasts beyond the equilibrium level (𝜇𝜆 = 0.8) which is 
achieved during the DM’s learning process. However, as risk aversion increases beyond 𝑟 = 3, 
𝐺𝑐→𝑓 starts to exceed 𝐺𝑐→𝑏. This suggests that highly risk-averse DMs could possibly gain more 
if their trust level in forecasts increases. Second, the relative economic gains in all three scenarios 
increase with risk aversion when 𝑟 ≥ 2, although in Baseline-forecast scenario, it reaches a 
maximum level at 𝑟 = 3.5. While it could be anticipated that the relative gain in Perfect scenario 
would be larger than the other two scenarios, the result shows that highly risk-averse DMs will 






Figure 2.20: Percentage of economic gain in perfect (𝐺𝑐→𝑝), baseline-forecast (𝐺𝑐→𝑏), and full-
trust (𝐺𝑐→𝑓) scenarios relative to climatology scenario for the case of 𝜔 = 1.5𝑢.  
 
The results and discussions above are for the case of 𝜔 = 1.5𝑢. Next, the impact of the 
wealth level on the results is discussed. Figure 2.21 shows how increasing wealth levels impact 
the relative gain in Perfect scenario. For any level of risk aversion, it can be observed that 𝐺𝑐→𝑝 
increases as wealth level decreases. Moreover, 𝐺𝑐→𝑝 is more nonlinear in 𝑟 as wealth level 
decreases. These results suggest that generally poorer DMs with high risk aversion would benefit 






Figure 2.21: Percentage of economic gain in perfect scenario relative to climatology (𝐺𝑐→𝑝) for 
different wealth levels (𝜔0). 
 
The impact of wealth level on 𝐺𝑐→𝑏 and 𝐺𝑐→𝑓 is more complicated as shown Figure 2.22, 
but the main observation from this figure is that poorer DMs with risk aversion in the range of 
1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 3.5 will benefit the most from increasing their trust level in forecasts. On the contrary, 
wealthier DMs (especially with lower level of risk aversion) are possibly indifferent to further 
increase in their trust level (i.e., increasing the trust level beyond equilibrium (𝜇𝜆 = 0.8), which is 






Figure 2.22: Percentage of economic gain in (a) full-trust (𝐺𝑐→𝑓) and (b) baseline-forecast 
(𝐺𝑐→𝑏) scenarios relative to climatology scenario over the entire simulation for different wealth 
levels (𝜔0).  
 
The results presented so far in this part were based on 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3, i.e., given the historical 
probabilities, DM believes that there is 30 percent chance that a drought event occurs. Prior belief 
is an important parameter in the model influencing the value of forecasts in two ways: first, it 
affects how the DM processes drought forecast information thereby influencing 𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑. Second, it 
also determines the optimal decisions without using forecast (𝑥0
∗), which in turn, influences both 
ex ante and ex post values. Therefore, the final analysis focuses on the impact that prior belief (𝑝𝜃) 
could have on the economic gains from the forecasting system. Results are based on the wealth 
level of 𝜔 = 0.5𝑢. First, consider Figure 2.23 that illustrates the impact of 𝑝𝜃 on relative gains in 
Perfect scenario (i.e., 𝐺𝑐→𝑝). Results show that for a given value of risk aversion, DMs with higher 
𝑝𝜃 generally benefit more from perfect forecasting, except for 𝑝𝜃 = 0.4 when 𝑟 ≥ 2.5. In fact, it 





explained as follows. When 𝑟 is small, as explained earlier, the value of forecasts comes from the 
forecast of drought events. Therefore, since those DMs with higher 𝑝𝜃 would experience drought 
events more frequently, they will obtain more benefit from perfect forecasting. As 𝑟 increases, it 
is anticipated that DMs benefit from forecasts of both drought and no-drought events, as discussed 
earlier, however, this increasing trend in 𝐺𝑐→𝑝 occurs for smaller values of 𝑟 if DMs experience 
droughts more frequently (higher 𝑝𝜃). As such, more risk-averse DMs benefit even further from 
perfect forecasting until 𝐺𝑐→𝑝 reaches a maximum value (e.g., for 𝑝𝜃 = 0.4, this value corresponds 
to 𝑟 = 2.0). At this point, the optimal decision without forecast is 𝑥0
∗ = 1 and therefore DMs only 
benefit from forecasts of no-drought events. These results suggest that highly risk-averse DMs in 
regions where droughts are not common will benefit more if they are provided with perfect 
forecasts. 
 
Figure 2.23: Percentage of economic gain in perfect scenario relative to the climatology scenario 






Next, the impact of 𝑝𝜃 on relative gains in Baseline-forecast and Full-trust scenarios 
(Figure 2.24) is discussed. The main observation from this figure is that for 𝑝𝜃 = 0.1, 𝐺𝑐→𝑏 is 
almost always zero (except for 𝑟 = 2.5) and 𝐺𝑐→𝑓 is always negative. In other words, results 
suggest that forecasts do not provide any additional benefit for poor DMs (recall that results are 
for 𝜔 = 0.5𝑢) in a region where drought is not common (𝑝𝜃 = 0.1). More importantly, if poor 
DMs have full trust in forecast, their overall payoffs would decrease by one to seven percent if 
they use forecasts. This is mainly because, the ex post value of forecasts, especially for less risk-
averse DMs (𝑟 ≤ 2.5), is usually negative or zero unless a drought event is preceded by a large 
𝑝𝑑. However, since drought events are not common, there are many instances that even smaller 
values of 𝑝𝑑 result in negative ex post values especially in Full-trust scenarios. This is particularly 
the case during 𝑡 < 25 period where DM’s overall payoff could decrease by 4 to 16 percent. As 
𝑝𝜃 increases, the relative economic gains in both scenarios will also increase, except for highly 
risk-averse DMs. Therefore, while the results in the previous scenario suggested that highly risk-
averse DMs with 𝑝𝜃 = 0.1 could benefit from perfect forecasting, the benefit that they may receive 
from probabilistic forecasts6 is negligible (𝐺𝑐→𝑏 = 0), or even negative (𝐺𝑐→𝑓 < 0) if they have 
full trust in forecasts. 
 
6
 It must be noted again that the results and conclusions are based on the hypothetical scenario in which the actual 






Figure 2.24: Percentage of economic gain in (a) full-trust (𝐺𝑐→𝑓) and (b) baseline-forecast (𝐺𝑐→𝑏) 
scenarios relative to climatology scenario over the entire simulation for different prior beliefs 
about drought (𝑝𝜃). Results are for 𝜔 = 0.5𝑢. 
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
Despite the significant advances in weather and climate forecasting research, as well as in 
forecast delivery and dissemination methods, there is still a significant gap between the potential 
benefits offered by forecasts and what is currently realized by DMs in agriculture sector [Mase 
and Prokopy, 2014]. This unrealized potential is in part due to lack of adoption of forecasts, which, 
in turn, arises because of decision makers’ low perceived value of forecasts. Therefore, in order to 
overcome this gap, it is important to not only recognize the barriers of forecast adoption, but also 
better understand how those barriers influence DM’s perception of the value of forecasts [Millner 
and Washington, 2011]. Empirical case studies using retrospective and participatory approaches, 
especially after the 1997-98 El Niño, have provided valuable insights regarding different 





of forecasts (refer to Roncoli [2006], Garbrecht and Schneider [2007], Ash et al. [2007], Power et 
al. [2007], and Mase and Prokopy [2014] for review). These insights can be used to develop more 
realistic theoretical models of forecast valuation [Millner, 2008].  
In this chapter, a dynamic forecast valuation model is developed to investigate how 
different factors, related to DM characteristics and forecast information product, influence both 
perceived value and realized benefits of forecasts. The DM characteristics considered in the model 
are risk attitude (𝑟), wealth level (𝜔), perceived forecast accuracy (or trust) (𝜆), and prior belief 
about drought (𝑝𝜃). Risk attitude and wealth level are considered by incorporating a CRRA utility 
function to formulate decision making under uncertainty. Perceived accuracy and prior belief about 
drought, on the other hand, are considered in a Bayesian-updating framework to capture DM’s 
response to probabilistic drought forecast (𝑝𝑑). The dynamic aspect of the model, which is 
represented by another Bayesian-updating component, captures how DMs’ perceived accuracy (or 
trust in forecast) evolves over time as they learn more about the forecasting product. The 
application of the proposed forecast evaluation model is illustrated using a typical two-crop 
allocation decision problem. In the following, the main findings of this study are highlighted, and 
their implications are discussed.  
First, the results show that DM’s perception about forecast accuracy (or DM’s trust in 
forecast) (𝜆) can significantly influence the way forecast information is integrated with prior belief. 
In particular, results suggest that DMs have the tendency to ignore forecast when they have limited 
or no exposure to forecast [Ziervogel, 2004; Klopper et al., 2006]. DM’s ability to respond to 
forecast plays a critical role in his uptake of information. Lybbert et al. [2007] highlighted that 





forecast could be that [DMs] fail to update their climate expectations after receiving forecasts.” In 
this study, DM’s updated belief about drought is formulated as a function of DM’s prior belief, 
drought forecast, and perceived accuracy. The accuracy (or validity) of this relationship can be 
tested using empirical studies. Two companion studies by Luseno et al. [2003] and Lybbert et al. 
[2007] investigated this question using an empirical case study of pastoralists in Kenya. They used 
a simple Bayesian model of belief updating and introduced a behavioral parameter (defined as 
DM’s willingness to abandon his or her prior belief in favor of forecast) to build this relationship. 
Their study revealed an asymmetrical pattern of belief updating: DMs had the tendency to update 
their expectations for below-normal rainfall, but not for the above-normal state. However, a 
participatory study of smallholder farmers in Lesotho conducted by Ziervogel [2004] found that 
there is a preference for above-normal forecasts. While the model presented in this study is stylized 
in nature, it can still provide some explanations for these empirical, often contradictory, findings. 
For example, the results suggest that more risk-averse DMs who do not experience drought events 
frequently, are more likely to use forecasts with high chance of droughts (i.e., larger 𝑝𝑑). Future 
studies should further explore this gap in the literature to better understand how DMs respond to 
forecast information. 
The findings also show that perceived accuracy (𝜆) drastically influences the value of 
forecast (𝑉). While this relationship is generally nonlinear, our results demonstrate that DM’s 
perception about the value of forecast monotonically increases with perceived accuracy when the 
DM has some sort of confidence in the forecast (i.e., when 𝜆 ≥ 0.5). When the DM has full trust 





is directly incorporated in decision making models, it is likely that the (ex ante) value of forecasts 
are overestimated. 
In addition, the results show that there is a specific level of perceived accuracy (i.e., critical 
perceived accuracy, 𝜆∗ [Millner, 2008]) after which forecasts are perceived to be valuable to the 
DM. This finding expresses that DMs may neglect the forecast until they build enough trust in the 
forecast. There is an empirical support for this finding in the literature. In the heuristic model of 
forecast valuation developed in Ziervogel et al. [2005] and Bharwani et al. [2005], which was 
based on the exploratory study of smallholder farmer in Lesotho [Ziervogel, 2004], it was assumed 
that the DMs would utilize forecasts after their trust level reaches a threshold. Therefore, it is 
possible to utilize field-based studies to further explore this finding and to better characterize 𝜆∗.  
The other behavioral parameter that influences DM’s response to forecast information (𝑝𝑑), 
and therefore the decision to adopt the forecast, is prior belief about drought (𝑝𝜃). DMs naturally 
compare forecasts with their prior beliefs when they are processing the forecast information. 
Forecasts are perceived to be valuable if they result in a deviation from prior beliefs. The DM’s 
tendency to deviate from (or stick with) prior belief is characterized by perceived forecast accuracy 
in the model. Therefore, although a drought forecast that is significantly different than DM’s prior 
belief carries large potential value, the DM’s perception about its value is determined by how much 
confidence he or she has in that forecast. For instance, the results show that a DM who does not 
regularly experience drought (i.e., lower 𝑝𝜃) must have a higher trust in the forecast of 𝑝𝑑 = 0.9 
compared with a DM who regularly experiences drought (i.e., higher 𝑝𝜃) to form the same 





One issue that further complicates the forecast-valuation problem is the assumption that 
DMs are statistically sophisticated. This assumption implies that DMs have perfect knowledge of 
statistical properties of uncertain event and forecasts, and they are capable of statistical and 
analytical processing in forming their beliefs particularly in response to probabilistic information 
[Nicholls, 1999; Marx et al., 2007; Millner, 2009]. However, empirical research has shown 
considerable amount of evidence against this assumption and emphasized the importance of 
cognitive illusions that lead to forming simplified heuristics as opposed to analytical processing 
[Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981; Nicholls, 1999]. For instance, since prior beliefs (about 
drought) are usually formed internally and based on the DM’s experiences, they are subject to 
different cognitive biases (e.g., recency) [Diggs, 1991; Ripberger et al., 2015; Kaufmann et al., 
2017]. A survey of 54 agricultural producers in the US Midwest showed that farmers tend to 
overweight the possibility of adverse climate events and underweight the possibility of favorable 
events. The results also showed significant heterogeneity among the respondents [Sherrick et al., 
2000]. Different studies in the literature have highlighted the important implications of these biases 
for the communication and dissemination of probabilistic forecasts to DMs [Nicholls, 1999; 
Hansen et al., 2004; Marx et al., 2007]; however, studies that incorporate these insights in forecast 
processing and valuation models are rare (e.g., see Millner [2009]).   
With regards to the relationship between value (𝑉) and risk aversion (𝑟), the results are 
consistent with previous findings in the literature that the value is at first increasing, and then 
decreasing, in risk aversion [Gollier, 2001; Millner and Washington, 2011]. This nonlinear 
relationship between the value and risk aversion could complicate or facilitate the adoption of 





and Washington, 2011]. The dependency of forecast value (𝑉) to DM’s wealth level (𝜔) are also 
investigated in this study. Results demonstrate that when there is a high chance of drought based 
on forecast, poor and highly risk-averse DMs require a high confidence in forecast to adopt it. On 
the other hand, wealthy DMs who are almost risk-neutral would adopt the forecast if they have 
higher confidence in forecast. It is important to note that wealth level not only determines how 
DMs evaluate risk, it could also determine the capacity of the DMs to capitalize on forecasts 
[Orlove et al., 2004], which is not considered in this study. Several case studies in the literature 
point out that poor individuals and smallholder farmers may not have the sufficient capacity to 
redirect their resources to make use of forecasts even if they trust a forecast [Patt and Gwata, 2002; 
Ziervogel, 2004; Lybbert et al., 2007], whereas some other studies state that higher wealth and 
income may buffer against the adverse impacts [Orlove et al., 2004].  
The relationship between forecast quality and forecast value has been extensively studied 
in the literature, mainly to estimate the potential benefits of improving forecasts [Katz and Murphy, 
1987; Richardson, 2000; Letson et al., 2005; Cerdá Tena and Quiroga Gómez, 2011]. In these 
studies, objective (or actual) forecast accuracy is directly incorporated into the DM’s belief 
updating using the Bayes’ rule, and consequently, a direct relationship between value and quality 
is derived.  As such, these studies fail to take into account the dynamic aspect of forecast adoption 
[Rubas et al., 2006; Ash et al., 2007]. In the proposed model, however, there is no direct 
relationship between forecast quality and forecast value. The DMs interpret forecast information 
based on their perceptions about the accuracy of forecast. Results show that perceived forecast 





the DM initially does not have a prior knowledge about the forecasting product. However, the DM 
is allowed to form a belief about forecast accuracy as more information is accumulated over time.  
To illustrate this dynamic process and the impact it could have on DM’s perception about 
the value of forecasts and the realized benefits from using forecasts, a hypothetical experiment is 
conducted in which forecast accuracy gradually improves from 0.5 to 0.8 over 25 time steps and 
remains constant at 0.8 until the end of the simulation (i.e., 𝑡 = 100). Results show that perceived 
forecast accuracy generally follows the trend of objective forecast accuracy but with a time lag. 
During this period, even though forecasts could potentially be valuable, they are not perceived to 
be valuable because they do not influence DM’s actions. Given the monotonic relationship 
between perceived value of forecast and perceived accuracy (when 𝜆 ≥ 0.5), it can be 
hypothesized that this time lag would be translated to delayed adoption of forecast. In fact, this has 
been shown in previous studies of technology adoption [Msangi et al., 2006], as well as in 
empirical studies [Ziervogel, 2004]. Ziervogel [2004] highlighted that “This lesson is important 
for scientists and disseminators, who need to be reminded that they cannot expect forecast adoption 
at the initial inception phase, but rather that it is constant exposure that will increase the usage.”  
The variation of forecast value (both ex ante and ex post) over time is compared with two 
other scenarios that are commonly used in forecast application studies: one is assuming that DMs 
directly use forecast in their decision making (i.e., 𝜆 = 1), and the other is assuming perfect 
forecast. Results show there are many instances that forecasts are indeed valuable, but they are not 
used because the DM has not yet built enough trust in them. This implies that just producing and 
disseminating a good quality forecast does not lead to its adoption. It should be accompanied by 





quality forecasts [Grossman et al., 1977; Austen et al., 2002]. Several case studies have highlighted 
the important role of education and institutional support in improving farmers’ perception of 
forecast reliability and facilitation of wide adoption of forecast [Austen et al., 2002; Luseno et al., 
2003; Ziervogel and Downing, 2004; Patt et al., 2007; Buizer et al., 2016]. However, these efforts 
should be taken cautiously with the consideration (and communication) of the actual accuracy. 
Our results show that DM’s full trust (i.e., 𝜆 = 1) in forecasts early during the simulation when 
forecast quality is not high results in negative ex post values, and this can significantly undermine 
DM’s perception of the forecast in the future. 
Although the model presented here is stylized in nature, it can nevertheless offer testable 
hypotheses, which, after further investigation and validation, can be used to better guide field 
studies and direct extension efforts [Letson et al., 2005; Millner and Washington, 2011]. For 
instance, it is shown that more risk-averse DMs can benefit more from improving forecast quality 
and from educational effort that improves their trust in forecasts (Figure 2.20). Also, specific 
ranges of risk aversion are identified based on different wealth levels that can result in largest 
economic gain from improving forecast quality (Figure 2.22). Finally, the model also offers some 
hypotheses based on DM’s perception about drought frequency (𝑝𝜃), which can be used as a 
geographical factor. For instance, for the hypothetical experiment presented, it is shown that the 
economic gain from improving drought forecasts for poor DMs who regularly experience drought 
is the largest while this could have marginal or even negative impact for them if they rarely 
experience droughts (Figure 2.24). 
The theoretical model presented here provides a flexible tool to better investigate how 





applied to more complex decision-making contexts to better capture the effect of contextual factors 
and constraints. However, the major advantage of the model lies in capturing the evolution of 
DM’s trust in forecasts, which in turn influences DM’s perception about the value and ultimately 
the decision to adopt forecast. As a result, the model is also able to better estimate the ex post or 
true value of forecasts. Nevertheless, there are a few issues that should be further explored to 
improve the model. First, considering the evolution of DMs’ trust in forecast only partially 
captures the dynamic behavior of forecast adoption. The other important component that can 
influence DMs’ decision to adopt the forecast is their perception about the effectiveness of the 
forecast which can be formed based on their experiences of using forecasts in the past [Millner, 
2009]. This issue is extensively discussed in the literature of technology adoption and is the focus 
in the next chapter of this dissertation. The second area that requires additional research is to 
empirically validate the two belief-updating components of the model using surveys and 
econometric estimation [Lybbert et al., 2007]. In addition, it is also possible to use role-play 
exercise with DMs to monitor their behavior in response to forecast and to extract simple heuristics 
[Ziervogel, 2004]. These field investigations can help better understand DMs’ response to forecast 
and the evolutions of their beliefs over time which can in turn be helpful in refining the theoretical 
model. Finally, given the potential implications of the results for guiding extension efforts, it is 
imperative to work with extension specialists and agricultural advisors to revise and refine our 







2.5 Nomenclature  
List of notations used in this chapter is provided in the following table. 
Table 2.2: List of notations 
Symbol Definition 
𝐴𝑟  Total land, expressed in unit of area 
𝐸[⦁] expectation operator 
𝑓(𝜆) prior belief about 𝜆 expressed as probability density function 
𝑓"(𝜆) posterior belief about 𝜆 
𝐺𝑖→𝑗  Potential economic gain in scenario j relative to scenario i. 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑏, 𝑓, 𝑝}, where 𝑐, 𝑏, 𝑓, 𝑝 
subscripts correspond to climatology, baseline-forecast, full-trust, and perfect scenarios. 
𝐿(⦁) likelihood or likelihood matrix 
ℙ(⦁) notation for probability 
𝑝(𝜃) user’s belief about occurrence of state 𝜃 of the random weather event 
𝑝𝜃  user’s (prior) belief about drought; also called climatological information 
𝑝𝑑 probabilistic drought forecast: 𝑝𝑑 = 𝑞(𝜂 = 1) 
𝑝𝜃|𝑝𝑑 updated belief about drought given probabilistic drought forecast 
𝑝𝑟 crop price, expressed in dollars per yield 
𝑞(𝜂) probabilistic forecast in the form of probability mass function of 𝜂 
𝑟 coefficient of risk aversion, 𝑟 ≥ 0 
𝑡 time index 
𝑇 total number of time steps 
𝑈(⦁) utility function 
𝑢 baseline unit used for 𝑦𝐴, 𝑦𝐵, 𝜋, 𝜔0, and 𝑉 
𝑉 generally used for value of forecast, expressed in unit 𝑢 
𝑉𝑏  ex ante value based on probabilistic forecast (𝑝𝑑) and 𝑓(𝜆), i.e., baseline-forecast scenario 
𝑉𝑓  ex ante value based on probabilistic forecast (𝑝𝑑) and full trust (𝜆 = 1), i.e., full-trust scenario 
𝑉𝑝  ex ante value based on perfect forecast and full trust (𝜆 = 1), i.e., perfect scenario 
𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 ex post value of forecast; superscripts 𝑏, 𝑓, and 𝑝 apply to 𝑉𝑥 as well  
𝑊 argument of utility function 
𝑋 set of possible decisions: 𝑋 = [0,1] 
𝑥 decision variable: fraction of land allocated to crop A, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 
𝑥0
∗ decision maker’s optimal decision without information 
𝑥∗ decision maker’s optimal decision with information 
𝑦(𝜃) crop yield as a function of state of the weather, expressed in unit 𝑢 






Table 2.2 (Cont.): List of notations 
Symbol Definition 
𝑦1 crop yield in drought condition (𝜃 = 1) 
𝜂  
deterministic forecast of state 𝜃. For the binary drought event: 𝜂 ∈ {0,1}; 𝜂 = 1: forecast of drought 
state, and 𝜂 = 0: forecast of normal state 
𝜃 
random variable representing the state of the uncertain weather event, 𝜃 ∈ Θ; for the binary drought 
event; 𝜃 = 0: no drought, 𝜃 = 1: drought 
𝜅 objective or actual forecast accuracy used in ensemble forecasting approach 
𝜆 perceived forecast accuracy 
𝜇𝜆 expected value of 𝜆 
Π(⦁) payoff function, expressed in unit of dollars 
𝜋(⦁) normalized payoff function, expressed in unit 𝑢 
𝜋𝑡𝑜𝑡 total ex post payoff, expressed in unit 𝑢 
𝜋𝑐
𝑡𝑜𝑡 total ex post payoff in climatology scenario (decisions made based on 𝑝𝜃) 
𝜋𝑏
𝑡𝑜𝑡 total ex post payoff in baseline forecast scenario (𝑝
𝑑
 and 𝑓(𝜆)) 
𝜋𝑓
𝑡𝑜𝑡 total ex post payoff in full trust scenario (𝑝
𝑑
 and 𝜆 = 1) 
𝜋𝑝
𝑡𝑜𝑡 total ex post payoff in perfect scenario (perfect forecast and 𝜆 = 1) 
𝜎𝜆  standard deviation of 𝜆  
𝜙 a set of possible realized states of the event; for the binary drought event: 𝜙 = {0,1} 
φ observation of the event, 𝜑 ∈ Φ; for the binary drought event; 𝜑 = 1: drought, 𝜑 = 0: no drought 
Ω initial wealth level, expressed in unit of dollars 
𝜔 normalized initial wealth level, expressed in unit 𝑢 
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CHAPTER 3 A BEHAVIORAL MODEL TO STUDY THE DYNAMICS 
OF DIFFUSION OF FORECAST ADOPTION 
 
The theoretical model developed in the previous chapter included a learning module to 
represent how farmers update their beliefs (or perceptions) of forecast accuracy as forecast 
accuracy improves over time. It was shown that perceived accuracy influences the ex ante value 
of forecasts.  Following that, this chapter deals with the dynamic aspect of forecast adoption. This 
dynamics process involves learning, which is represented by behavioral learning algorithms, 
contrary to the previous chapter in which Bayesian inference was used to formulate learning. These 
algorithms are integrated in an agent-based modeling framework that allows considering the 
interactions among agents. The agent-based model is applied to a hypothetical case study area to 
investigate the impact of social interactions and social network structure on the spatial and 
temporal dynamics of forecast adoption.   
 
 Introduction 
Assessing the economic value of weather and climate forecasts, particularly in agriculture, 
has a long history in the literature of applied meteorology [Thompson and Brier, 1956] and applied 
economics [Nelson and Winter, 1964]; studies have shed light on the determinants of forecast 
information value [Hilton, 1981; Katz and Murphy, 1997a; Meza et al., 2008]. For instance, 
researchers have extensively investigated the complex relationships between economic value and 
forecast characteristics (e.g., [Katz and Murphy, 1987; Richardson, 2000, 2001; Wilks, 2001; Zhu 
et al., 2002]), as well as the relationships between users’ characteristics and the economic value 
(e.g., [Bosch and Eidman, 1987; Johnson and Holt, 1997; Lawrence, 1999; Meza et al., 2008]). 
Moreover, by integrating valuation models with partial equilibrium or sectoral models, studies 
have estimated the benefits of using forecast at an aggregate level by considering the impact that 
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large-scale adoption of forecasts may have on supply and prices (e.g., [Adams et al., 1995; Hill et 
al., 1999; Hill and Mjelde, 2002]). 
While these valuation studies provide insights that can be used to set prerequisites for 
forecasts to increase their usefulness [Hu et al., 2006] and to facilitate the acquisition and 
utilization of forecasts [Hilton, 1981; Johnson and Holt, 1997], they utilize normative models of 
decision making (e.g., Bayesian decision theory), prescribing whether and how individual decision 
makers should employ forecasts information [Lawrence, 1991; Millner, 2009]. This normative 
representation of behavior assumes that forecast users (e.g., farmers) are rational decision makers 
who possess perfect knowledge of the characteristics of forecasts and can process forecast 
information in a statistically sophisticated manner [Millner, 2009].  
The assumption of users’ perfect knowledge implies that users have confidence not only in 
forecasts but also in the outcome of using forecasts. Given this assumption, the decision problem 
that the user faces regarding forecast adoption is essentially a static problem that can be simply 
solved by computing the value of forecast [Rubas et al., 2008; Millner, 2009]. However, several 
field studies that surveyed farmers’ attitude and response toward forecasts found that farmers’ 
forecast adoption behavior fits the diffusion of innovation framework (e.g., [Luseno et al., 2003; 
Hu et al., 2006; Tarnoczi and Berkes, 2010]). In other words, adoption of forecasts, similar to any 
other technology or innovation, is dynamic: it is a process that takes place over time; some farmers 
may adopt forecasts earlier than others, and some may decide not to adopt forecasts along the 
process [Rogers, 2003; Ziervogel, 2004; Rubas et al., 2006, 2008].  
Learning is a key driver of adoption and diffusion of a technology [Feder and O’Mara, 
1982] (note that adoption is an individual decision process, while diffusion is the spread of the 
innovation within the social system [Mahajan and Peterson, 1979; Rogers, 2003]). Learning is a 
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product of experience [Arrow, 1962]. With the accumulation of experience, uncertainty associated 
with the innovation declines and it will be adopted by an increasing number of farmers [Feder and 
O’Mara, 1982]. In the context of forecast adoption, learning could even play a bigger role since 
compared to other innovations, performance of forecasts is more uncertain due to their 
probabilistic nature [Agrawala and Broad, 2002]. 
There are two different types of learning involved in the process of diffusion of innovation: 
1) learning by doing, in which users learn more about the innovation through individual 
experimentation and learning [Arrow, 1962; Lindner et al., 1979; Feder et al., 1985], and 2) 
learning from others, or social learning, in which users learn from their neighbors’ experiences  
[Besley and Case, 1993; Manski, 1993b; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004] (refer to 
Baerenklau [2015] for a concise literature review on both types of learning). Findings from field 
studies highlighted the importance of learning and experimentation in the context of forecast 
adoption. For instance, a study based on role-play exercise with smallholder farmers in Lesotho 
found that as farmers became more familiar with the forecasts provided, “using a forecast no longer 
seemed foreign” and they were more willing to use them at the end of the experiment [Ziervogel, 
2004]. Another study that surveyed a group of extension agents in Florida over five years between 
2004 and 2009 found that that agents’ knowledge and positive attitudes toward the use of 
forecasts increased by 40 percent [Breuer and Cabrera, 2010].  
There are also few field studies that highlighted the role of social norms and social 
networks in farmers’ decision to use forecast, thereby providing evidence for the second type of 
learning mentioned above. In a survey of 700 farmers in southeastern Nebraska in 2002, Artikov 
et al. [2006] and Hu et al. [2006] found that farmers’ perceived social norms greatly influence the 
use of forecasts. Specifically, they found that farmers would consult with their peers and neighbors 
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regarding use of forecasts for crop type and planting date decisions. In another study that conducted 
semi-structured interviews with 38 farmers in southern Georgia, Crane et al. [2010] emphasized 
that farmers discuss forecast information with their peers and extension agents during gatherings 
and farmers’ meetings. Furthermore, social media and online communication tools play an ever-
increasing role in mediating social interactions [Dubois and Gaffney, 2014], particularly during 
natural disasters [Alexander, 2014], including droughts [Tang et al., 2015]. These studies highlight 
the role of social networks in uptake of forecasts.    
Despite the evidence from the field studies reviewed above, modeling studies that focus on 
forecast valuation – both at individual and aggregate levels – generally tend to ignore the dynamic 
aspects of forecast adoption. While this could be due to lack of sufficient real-world data on 
forecast adoption [Ziervogel et al., 2005; Rubas et al., 2006], it is argued that modeling the 
dynamic process of forecast adoption is necessary for two reasons. First, it would lead to more 
accurate estimates of forecast value at both individual, and more importantly, sectoral levels. For 
instance, at individual level, Millner [2009] used a behavioral learning model based on 
reinforcement learning in the context of cost-loss problem and found that the value that the user 
achieves from forecasts reduces by a multiplicative factor that depends on both forecast and user’s 
characteristics. At an aggregate level, the study of Rubas et al. [2008] stands out in the literature. 
In this study the dynamic process of forecast adoption was imposed exogenously using a typical 
s-shaped adoption path, which is widely accepted in the diffusion of innovation literature [Feder 
et al., 1985; Rogers, 2003]. It was found that while adopting the forecasts is beneficial for 
producers at the beginning, as the percentage of adopters increases, the additional benefit that 
producers receive from forecasts decreases to zero.  
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Second, it leads to better understanding of the temporal and spatial dynamics of adoption 
and diffusion process, which in turn, can be used to design economically efficient and effective 
strategies to overcome the barriers and facilitate the adoption of forecasts. In particular, there are 
some critical elements in the diffusion process that have not been carefully studied in the context 
of forecast use. For instance, in the past two decades, there has been much interest in social learning 
as a key determinant of the diffusion process, especially in the context of agricultural technologies 
[Banerjee, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993]. In particular, studies have found that social 
networks could play a major role in diffusion of innovation through both diffusion of knowledge 
(information) as well as diffusion of decision [Holloway and Lapar, 2007; Cai et al., 2015a; 
Sampson and Perry, 2019]. However, these issues have not been addressed in the context of 
forecast applications. How do social interactions influence the forecast adoption behavior? To 
what extent is the structure of the social network important in diffusion of forecasts? What is the 
cumulative effect of social structure and individuals’ characteristics in the forecast-use diffusion 
process? These questions are recognized as gaps in the literature that are needed for designing 
more efficient targeting strategies and are addressed in this chapter.  
The main goal in this study is to model the dynamic (both temporal and spatial) process of 
forecast adoption and diffusion. However, instead of using a top-down approach that exogenously 
imposes an adoption path using logistic-type growth functions (see Figure E.2) [Mansfield, 1961; 
Karshenas and Stoneman, 1990; Rubas et al., 2008], a bottom-up approach is incorporated to study 
the dynamic process of diffusion by modeling farmers’ adoption choices. Several assumptions are 
made regarding farmers’ behavior. It is assumed that farmers are rational decision makers; 
however, they cannot keep track of the history of their actions and experimental outcomes as well 
as those of their neighbors (this is referred to as statistically unsophisticated [Millner, 2009]). 
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Finally, it is assumed that farmers initially are not familiar with forecasts, but over time they can 
learn about the forecasts.  
Learning plays a major role in the model. To model how farmers learn from their own 
experience (i.e., learning by doing), a behavioral model is employed based on the psychological 
theory of reinforcement learning [Bush and Mosteller, 1955; Cross, 1973; Brenner, 2006; Millner, 
2009] (see Section 3.2.2). In reinforcement learning, choice behavior is treated as a Markov 
stochastic process in which the frequencies associated with each action (in this case, adoption or 
non-adoption) determines user’s tendency (or belief) towards that action. These frequencies are 
updated at every time step based on the consequences of user’s action in the previous time step. If 
an action leads to a positive outcome, there is a higher chance that that action is chosen in the next 
time step [Brenner, 2006]. 
In the model, it is assumed that farmer’s adoption behavior is also influenced by the 
behavior of other farmers in his or her social neighborhood (i.e., a neighborhood defined by social 
interaction as opposed to geographic proximity). This form of social learning is also referred to as 
neighborhood effect [Manski, 1993b; Baerenklau, 2015]. To express how farmers internalize the 
influences from their neighbors, a simple rule-of-thumb model based on the opinion formation 
model of DeGroot is utilized [DeGroot, 1974; Jadbabaie et al., 2012] (see Section 3.2.3).  
In order to better understand the role of social interactions and social network structure in 
farmers’ forecast adoption behavior, the proposed model is developed based on an agent-based 
modeling framework. Farmers are defined as agents whose interactions are determined by different 
scenarios of social network structure. The proposed model is applied to a stylized crop-allocation 
decision problem in which each farmer must decide the optimal allocation between two crops 
considering the uncertainity regarding weather condition during the crop season.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, the crop allocation 
decision problem is described, the learning mechanisms are introduced, and the dynamics of the 
model is explained. In section 3.3, the results are presented in two main parts. The first part focuses 
on the reinforcement learning mechanism and investigates how risk aversion, wealth, and learning 
rate influence farmers’ tendency to adopt forecast overtime. In the second part, the agent-based 
model is implemented to a simulate the temporal and spatial dynamics of forecast adoption in a 
hypothetical case study. In this part, several experiments are designed to investigate the role of 
farmers’ characteristics (risk aversion, wealth, learning rate) and social network structure (inter- 
and intra-county ties, change agents) on forecast adoption and diffusion. Finally, this chapter ends 
with a summary of findings and concluding remarks in section 3.4.  
 
3.2 The Behavioral Model  
In this section, a behavioral model of forecast adoption and diffusion is introduced in which 
individuals (i.e., decision makers or agents) learn about the usefulness of drought forecasts over 
time and form a belief about adoption of forecasts. Learning occurs based on 1) agents’ own 
experience, which is referred to as learning by doing in the literature [Arrow, 1962; Lindner et al., 
1979], and 2) the experience of their neighbors through social network, which is referred to as 
social learning [Banerjee, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993] or learning from others in the 
literature [Manski, 1993a; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995]). To represent learning by doing, a 
behavioral model known as reinforcement learning is employed [Bush and Mosteller, 1951, 1955; 
Cross, 1973], while a DeGroot-style learning model of belief aggregation is used to account for 
learning from others [DeGroot, 1974; Golub and Jackson, 2010; Jadbabaie et al., 2012]. These 
components are described in this section following a brief explanation of the decision-making 
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context (refer to section 3.5 for the complete list of notations used in this chapter). A conceptual 
framework of the proposed model is presented in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework of the agent-based model. (a) shows the structure (or 
topology) of a simple social network, and (b) shows the different components of the model (only 
for agent 𝑎3). Note that given the topology of the network, the set of agent 𝑎3’s neighbors 
includes agents 𝑎2 and 𝑎4. 
 
3.2.1 Preliminaries 
Consider the crop allocation decision-making problem presented in CHAPTER 2. Let  
𝜃 ∈ 𝛩 = {0,1} be the random variable representing the state of a binary weather event where  
𝜃 = 0 and 𝜃 = 1 correspond to no-drought (or normal) and drought conditions, respectively. 
Denote 𝑝(𝜃) as the probability that state 𝜃 of the event occurs. Similar to CHAPTER 2, suppose 
that the decision-making problem involves two crops, A and B, and the decision maker (DM) must 
determine, before the realization of event, what proportion of land to allocate to each crop. Let  
𝑥 ∈ 𝒳 = [0,1] be the fraction of land that the DM allocates to crop 𝐴 (hence, 1 − 𝑥 is the land 
fraction allocated to 𝐵). Suppose that crop yield (per unit area of land) for crops A and B is only a 
function of the state of the weather condition and is given as 𝑦𝐴(𝜃) and 𝑦𝐵(𝜃), as shown in Figure 
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3.2. Denote crop yield for crop A under normal and drought conditions as 𝑦0
𝐴 and 𝑦1
𝐴. Similarly, 
crop yield for crop B under normal and drought conditions is indicated by 𝑦0
𝐵 and 𝑦1
𝐵. Based on 
the yield distributions shown in Figure 3.2 (i.e., 𝑦0
𝐴 = 0.06, 𝑦1
𝐴 = 0.03, 𝑦0
𝐵 = 0.08, 𝑦1
𝐵 = 0.01), 
crop A is a drought-tolerant crop, with lower yield variability, while crop B is a high-yield variety 
whose yield falls off significantly in drought condition.  
 
Figure 3.2: Discrete yield distributions for the two crops 
 
The same assumptions leading up to Equation 2.4 in CHAPTER 2 are made here to write 
the normalized payoff function:  
 𝜋(𝑥, 𝜃) = 𝜔 + 𝑥 ∙ 𝑦𝐴(𝜃) + (1 − 𝑥) ∙ 𝑦𝐵(𝜃) − 𝑐(𝜃) 3.1 
where 𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑥, 𝜃) is the normalized payoff resulting from each possible state 𝜃 and decision 𝑥, 
and 𝜔 is the normalized wealth level. Unlike Equation 2.4, the payoff function presented in 
Equation 3.1 includes a (normalized) cost function represented by 𝑐(𝜃), where 𝑐(𝜃 = 1) = 0.04, 
and 𝑐(𝜃 = 0) = 0.05 (these assumptions were made based on 2018 crop budget information in 
Central Illinois [Schnitkey, 2018]). This is because, as it will be explained in Section 3.2.4, wealth 
level (𝜔) is updated at every time step in the model (see Equation 3.12) and therefore, without 
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cost, wealth level quickly increases, which in turn, influences the adoption decisions. Note that 𝜋, 
𝜔, and 𝑐 are all expressed in the same unit as 𝑦 (i.e., yield per unit area), which is considered as 
the baseline unit, defined by 𝑢, in this chapter. 
 It is assumed that the DM is a utility maximizer whose risk preferences are characterized 
by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function as presented in Equation 3.2 (refer to 
sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, or see Mas-Colell et al. [2012] and Gollier [2001] for more information):   




ln 𝜋 𝑟 = 1
 3.2 
where 𝑟 ≥ 0 is Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion. Therefore, the optimization 
problem that the DM faces is given in Equation 3.3: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥
𝐸𝜃[𝑈] = ∑ 𝑝(𝜃) ∙ 𝑈[𝜔 + 𝑥 ∙ 𝑦




where 𝐸𝜃 is the expectation operator taken with respect to 𝑝(𝜃). Hence, the optimal allocation 
decision, 𝑥∗, must satisfy the following based on the first order condition of optimality:  
 ∑ 𝑝(𝜃) ∙ (
𝑦𝐴(𝜃) − 𝑦𝐵(𝜃)




= 0 3.4 
since 𝛩 = {0,1}, 𝑝(𝜃) can be characterized by a single parameter 𝑝𝜃 ≔ 𝑝(𝜃 = 1), defined as 
DM’s belief that the drought will occur. Consequently, 𝑝(𝜃 = 0) = 1 − 𝑝𝜃. Figure C.1 and  
Figure C.2 in APPENDIX C show how optimal decision changes with 𝑟, 𝑝𝜃, and 𝜔.  
Suppose that the DM has access (with no additional cost) to probabilistic drought forecasts 
(𝑝𝑑) when he or she makes crop allocation decisions. Note that 𝑝𝑑 is the probability that the 
weather state will be in drought condition, and 𝑝𝑑 ∈ ℱ, where ℱ is a finite set of possible forecasts. 
As stated earlier, the assumption that the DM is a Bayesian learner is relaxed. As such, instead of 
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processing forecast information in a Bayesian manner (which was the critical assumption in 
CHAPTER 2), at every time step, DM learns more about the value of forecasts based on his or her 
own and neighbors’ experiences and decides whether or not to adopt forecasts in the decision-
making process. It is assumed that the DM’s adoption choice is a result of a stochastic learning 
process and the goal is to model how the probability of adoption choice evolves over time.  
 
3.2.2 Learning by doing: Reinforcement learning 
According to Brenner [2006], there are two fundamentally different ways of learning: non-
conscious learning (or reinforcement learning) and cognitive learning. The fundamental difference 
between these two kinds of learning is that in reinforcement learning, learning mechanism does 
not involve any conscious reflection on the problem and people are not always aware that they are 
learning; in contrast, cognitive learning is based on reflections on actions and consequences which 
requires active thinking and knowledge from statistical processing [Brenner, 2006; Millner, 2009]. 
Although people are able to reflect on their actions and consequences, in most cases, they do not 
have the sufficient cognitive capacity to reflect on all their actions and, as such, their reflections 
are distorted by cognitive biases [Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Brenner, 2006; Marx et al., 2007].  
As such, many of the actions are conducted on the basis of reinforcement learning [Brenner, 2006]. 
Reinforcement learning is particularly relevant when the DM is statistically unsophisticated, i.e., 
he or she may not possess the statistical training to process and quantify forecast performance 
[Millner, 2009]. 
The reinforcement learning framework that is used here is a generalized form of the Bush-
Mosteller model [Bush and Mosteller, 1951, 1955], which was presented in Brenner [1999, 2006] 
and further refined by Millner [2009]. In reinforcement learning, similar to many other 
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psychology-based models (see Brenner [2006] for more information on classification of learning 
models), choice behavior is treated as a stochastic process, i.e., choice behavior is described using 
frequency distribution of alternatives, rather than selection or non-selection of alternatives [Cross, 
1973]. The learning mechanism in reinforcement learning framework is based on reward and 
punishment, i.e., if an action leads to a positive outcome, there is a higher chance that that action 
is chosen in the next time step; similarly, those actions that lead to a negative outcome are more 
likely to be avoided. In reinforcement learning mechanism, learning is assumed to be Markov 
process [Brenner, 2006]. This feature represents a memoryless learning behavior, which can be 
used to describe some real-world behavior motivated by spur-of-the-moment decisions and 
impromptu behavior [Rahimian and Jadbabaie, 2017]. Reinforcement learning also captures the 
spontaneous recovery phenomenon [Thorndike, 1932; Rescorla, 2004], which makes it possible 
for nearly-abandoned behavior (or actions) to quickly increase in frequency if they result in 
positive outcomes [Millner, 2009]. In the following, the mathematical formulation of 
reinforcement learning is presented.  
Let 𝑧𝑡 be the DM’s forecast adoption decision at time step 𝑡; 𝑧𝑡 = 1 if forecast is adopted, 
and 𝑧𝑡 = 0 if the DM decides not to use the forecast. Define ℎ𝑡 ∈ [0,1] as the probability of 
adopting the forecast at time 𝑡 (in other words, ℎ𝑡 is the probability of making the choice 𝑧𝑡 = 1, 
and it also can be interpreted as DM’s belief about forecast adoption). Consequently, the 
probability of not adopting the forecast is 1 − ℎ𝑡. Reinforcement learning framework determines 
how DM updates ℎ𝑡 based on the outcome or consequence of his past decision. Using a generalized 
form of the Bush-Mosteller model presented in Brenner [2006], the probability of adopting 




ℎ𝑡+1 = ℎ𝑡 + {
𝐿(𝑆𝑡, 𝜏) ∙ (1 − ℎ𝑡) 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑡 ≥ 0
𝐿(𝑆𝑡, 𝜏) ∙ ℎ𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑡 < 0
 3.5 
where 𝐿(⦁) is learning function, 𝑆𝑡 is reinforcement strength (expressed in unit 𝑢), and 𝜏 is the 
learning rate (expressed in unit 𝑢−1). Usually, a linear formulation is used for the learning function 
[Brenner, 2006], i.e., 𝐿(𝑆𝑡, 𝜏) = 𝑆𝑡 ∙ 𝜏. Also, to ensure that ℎ𝑡+1 remains in [0,1], it is imposed that 
𝜏 ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥|𝑆𝑡| ≤ 1. Given the formulation in Equation 3.5, if 𝑆𝑡 ≥ 0 (i.e., strength is positive), the 
probability that the DM chooses the same action that led to the positive outcome will increase in 
the next time step. This formulation shows that at each time step, the past is implicitly contained 
in the current value of ℎ𝑡 [Brenner, 2006]. 
The choice of reinforcement strength is critical in this learning framework [Millner, 2009]. 
Since the behavior that is modeled using this framework is forecast adoption choice, ex post value 
of forecast (𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝) is used to calculate reinforcement strength: 




, 𝜑𝑡) − 𝜋(𝑥𝑡





 are optimal crop allocation decisions when the DM uses forecast and 
climatological information, respectively, at time step 𝑡; 𝜑𝑡 ∈ Φ = {0,1} is the actual (or realized) 
state of the weather at time step 𝑡, where 𝜑 = 1 when a drought has occurred, and 𝜑 = 0 when no 
drought has occurred (or the weather condition was normal). Note that 𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 is expressed in 
baseline unit (𝑢). As discussed in CHAPTER 2 (section 2.2.4), ex post value of forecast determines 
the actual value that the DM receives if he had made the decisions based on forecast. Learning 




 (otherwise, 𝑆𝑡 = 0 → ℎ𝑡+1 = ℎ𝑡). When 𝑆𝑡 > 0 (hence, 𝑉𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝 > 0), 
the decision to adopt forecast is reinforced, whereas 𝑆𝑡 < 0 (hence, 𝑉𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝 < 0) decreases the 
chance of adopting forecast in the next time step. As such, reinforcement strength, as defined in  
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Equations 3.6, can be interpreted as measure of regret or happiness towards adoption of forecast 
[Millner, 2009].  
Reinforcement learning determines how the frequency distribution of choice among 
alternatives changes over time. Therefore, a threshold (or cut-off value) defined as ℎ∗ is used to 
convert stochastic choice behavior (i.e., ℎ𝑡 ∈ [0,1]) to deterministic behavior (i.e., 𝑧𝑡 ∈ {0,1}) as 
indicated in Equation 3.7: 
     
𝑧𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑡 ≥ ℎ
∗
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑡 < ℎ
∗
 3.7 
Two points here deserve further discussion. First, in the formulation above (Equation 3.7), 
the cut-off value (ℎ∗) for adoption choice is imposed as an exogenous parameter. The cut-off value 
could also be derived endogenously by comparing the utilities of adoption and non-adoption 
choices (i.e., 𝑧𝑡 = 1 if 𝑈[𝜋(𝑥𝑡
∗,𝑓
, 𝜃)] > 𝑈[𝜋(𝑥𝑡
∗,𝑐, 𝜃)]) (e.g., as in Ellison and Fudenberg [1993] 
and Adhvaryu [2014]). However, deriving an explicit relationship between ℎ𝑡 and a cut-off value 
requires imposing more simplifying assumptions to the model, particularly on the functional form 
of utility function. Second, based on our formulation, adoption choice at each time step (i.e., 𝑧𝑡) is 
independent of adoption choice in the previous time steps. In other words, agents treat the adoption 
or discontinuance decisions symmetrically. This is different from the common approach in 
modeling technology adoption in the literature in which agents are assumed to continue using the 
new technology forever once they decided to adopt it [Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993]. The rationale 
for considering this symmetrical behavior in our model is that unlike most other technological 
transitions, no cost would be incurred if agents decide to switch between the two available options, 
i.e., adopting forecast or relying on climatological information.  
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Once 𝑧𝑡 is determined using Equation 3.7, Equation 3.8 is used to determine the final crop 
allocation decision at time step 𝑡 (𝑥𝑡
∗): 




∗,𝑓 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑡 = 1
𝑥𝑡
∗,𝑐 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑡 = 0
 3.8 
 
3.2.3 Social learning 
Consider set ℳ of agents, indexed by 𝑖, with |ℳ| = 𝑚. Suppose that the underlying 
structure of the social network is known and can be represented by a directed graph on 𝑚 vertices. 
Each vertex corresponds to an agent and a directed edge is present from vertex (agent) 𝑗 to vertex 
𝑖 only if agent 𝑗 is a neighbor of agent 𝑖, i.e., agent 𝑖’s beliefs can be influenced by agent 𝑗’s beliefs. 
For each agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀, define 𝒩𝑖 as the set of agents in agent 𝑖’s social space [Akerlof, 1997], with 
|𝒩𝑖| = 𝑛𝑖. The social network can be summarized by matrix Δ = [𝛼𝑖𝑗]𝑚×𝑚, defined as the matrix 
of social interaction [Jadbabaie et al., 2012], where for each agent 𝑖, 𝛼𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 determines the 
weight that agent 𝑖 assigns to the belief of agent 𝑗, and weights must satisfy ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 = 1. Note 
that 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 0 if agent 𝑗 is not a neighbor of agent 𝑖 (or 𝑗 ∉ 𝒩𝑖). 𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the weight that agent 𝑖 assigns 
to his or her own belief, which is referred to as self-reliance, and ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 1 − 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖) . Therefore, 
matrix Δ determines both social connection and the extent of social interaction. The underlying 
social network is said to be strongly connected if there exists a directed path from each vertex to 
any other vertex [Bala and Goyal, 1998; Molavi et al., 2018].  
The social-learning component of the model is mainly based on the belief-aggregation 
model of DeGroot [1974]. In DeGroot-style models, agents update their beliefs as a convex 
combination (i.e., weighted average) of the beliefs of their neighbors. The weights determine the 
trust that agents have for their neighbors [DeGroot, 1974; Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011]. Let ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
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be agent 𝑖’s belief of forecast adoption at time step 𝑡. Using DeGroot model of social-learning, 
agent 𝑖 updates his or her belief about forecast adoption (i.e., ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1) according to the following 
rule: 
 ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 ∙ ℎ𝑗,𝑡
𝑗∈𝒩𝑖
 3.9 
In the next section, the timing and dynamics of the model are discussed, and a framework 
is provided to embed individual learning, which is based on reinforcement learning, into the 
DeGroot-style social learning component.  
 
3.2.4 Dynamics of the Model 
Figure 2.3 shows the flowchart of the model. Time steps are indexed by 𝑡 = 1, 2 . . . , 𝑇, and 
the simulation begins at time 𝑡 = 1. For all agents (𝑖 ∈ ℳ), parameters such as risk attitude 
(represented by the coefficient of risk aversion, 𝑟𝑖), adoption threshold (ℎ𝑖
∗), initial wealth level 
(𝜔𝑖), learning rate (𝜏𝑖), and initial belief about adoption (ℎ𝑖,1) are set before the start of simulation. 
The structure of the social network is also known (i.e., Δ = [𝛼𝑖𝑗]𝑚×𝑚). Each time step represents 
a crop season. Let ℎ𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 be agent 𝑖’s belief about adoption and wealth at the beginning of 
time step 𝑡, i.e., before the crop season starts when crop allocation decisions are made (note that 
𝑊𝑖,1 = 𝜔𝑖). At the beginning of each time step 𝑡, agents have a belief about drought occurrence 
(𝑝𝜃𝑖,𝑡) and receive a probabilistic drought forecast (𝑝𝑑𝑖,𝑡). Agents then learn about their neighbors’ 
beliefs about forecast adoption and update their own belief about forecast adoption using Equation 
3.9. Agents’ updated beliefs at this stage are referred to as interim beliefs about forecast adoption 





𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚 = 𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 ∙ ℎ𝑗,𝑡
𝑗∈𝒩𝑖
 3.10 
These interim beliefs are used to make adoption decisions according to Equation 3.7. Once 
the adoption decisions are made, agents make the crop allocation decisions (𝑥𝑖,𝑡
∗ ) according to 
Equation 3.7. Once the crop allocation decisions are made and the true state of the world (i.e., 𝜑𝑖,𝑡) 
is observed, for each agent, reinforcement strength (𝑆𝑖,𝑡) is calculated according to Equation 3.6, 




𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝜏𝑖 ∙ (1 − ℎ𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚) 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝜏𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 < 0
 3.11 
 It is assumed for all the agents that agriculture is the main economic activity; as such, the 
consequence of agricultural decision making at each time step directly affects agents’ wealth level. 
If 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is defined as agent 𝑖’s wealth level at time 𝑡, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 can be written as follows:  
 𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋(𝑥𝑖,𝑡
∗ , 𝜑𝑖,𝑡) 3.12 
At the end of time step 𝑡, the cumulative ex post payoff (𝜋𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡) is calculated as follows:  
 
𝜋𝑡





At this point, time step 𝑡 is completed and the simulation at period 𝑡 + 1 begins. These 




Figure 3.3: Flowchart of the model   
 
3.3 Results and Discussions  
This section first focuses on the reinforcement learning mechanism to illustrate how 
different parameters, such as risk aversion (𝑟), initial wealth level (𝜔), and learning rate (𝜏), 
influence an individual’s learning from his or her own experience. Then, we apply the forecast 
adoption and diffusion framework, developed in the previous section, to a hypothetical case study 
to explore how different social-psychological and economic factors influence the rate of forecast 
adoption and the diffusion of forecast as a technology. Throughout this section, it is assumed that 
individuals’ belief about drought is equal to the climatological probability of the drought event, 
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which is assumed to be 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3. Also, it is assumed that the forecasting system is perfectly 
reliable [Murphy and Winkler, 1987; Wilks, 2001] and the probabilistic drought forecasts (i.e., 
time series of 𝑝𝑑𝑡, where 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇) are generated following inverse transform sampling 
approach (see Section B.3 for more details). Finally, it is assumed that the time series of the drought 
events is known (i.e., 𝜑𝑡 is known for 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇).   
 
 Reinforcement learning mechanism  
The key factor in reinforcement learning mechanism, in this context, is how an individual 
learns from the consequence of his or her adoption (or non-adoption) decision in the past. This 
learning is reflected in individual’s tendency to follow the forecast (ℎ) and depends on the 
reinforcement strength (𝑆) and learning rate (𝜏). Since reinforcement strength is defined as the ex 
post value of forecast (Equation 3.6), it inherently depends on the individual’s decision-making 
structure. In Figure 3.4, one possible trajectory of ℎ is shown for a risk-averse DM with 𝑟 = 10, 
initial wealth level of 𝜔 = 0.5, learning rate of 𝜏 = 3, adoption threshold of ℎ∗ = 0.65, and initial 
adoption belief of ℎ1 = 0.5. This trajectory is based on the time series of drought events and 
forecasts shown in Figure 3.4c. As stated above, it is assumed that the forecasts are perfectly 
reliable with the Brier skill score 𝐵𝑆𝑆 = 0.529 (the reliability diagram associated with the 
forecasts used here is shown in Figure B.2). Note that ℎ𝑡 is calculated at the beginning of time step 
𝑡, whereas 𝑆𝑡 is calculated after the decisions are made in time step 𝑡.  
First, notice that the change in probability of adoption (ℎ𝑡) is dictated by the reinforcement 
strength (Figure 3.4b) and ℎ𝑡 remains unchanged when 𝑆 = 0. Additionally, it can be observed 
that the change in probability of adoption due to the same reinforcement strength only depends on 
the current value of ℎ𝑡. As an example, see the changes in ℎ𝑡 at 𝑡 = 47 and 𝑡 = 96 where 𝑆𝑡 =
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0.02 at both times. This behavior reflects the key feature of the reinforcement learning mechanism, 
which assumes that the past is implicitly contained in the current value of ℎ𝑡 [Brenner, 2006]. The 
figure also shows that while the trajectory of ℎ has an increasing (almost monotonically) trend at 
the beginning of the simulation (until 𝑡 < 30), it fluctuates afterwards with a slight increasing 
trend. In addition, the increasing trend at the beginning is smooth while the fluctuations in the 
second portion are rather sharp and steep. Figure 3.4b shows that the reinforcement strength also 
has two distinct patterns which correspond to the two trends of ℎ mentioned above. In the first 
portion (when 𝑡 < 30), 𝑆 is usually positive, which results in the smooth, increasing trend of ℎ. In 
the second portion (𝑡 > 30), however, reinforcement strength is mostly zero but with positive or 
negative values in few occasions. These positive or negative values result in (relatively) steep drop 
or rise of ℎ𝑡.  
In order to explain the two different patterns, it is important to consider the decision-
making context and the parameters that influence the decisions under uncertainty. At the 
beginning, since ℎ𝑡 < ℎ
∗, the DM relies on the climatological information to make crop allocation 
decisions. However, the combination of lower wealth level and higher risk aversion results in 
highly conservative crop allocation decisions in order to minimize the potential risk of drought 
(i.e., larger fraction of land is allocated to crop 𝐴, which is a more drought-tolerant crop but also 
with lower yield in normal condition; see APPENDIX C). As a result, the DM does not gain much 
from his or her farming practice (Figure 3.4d shows the cumulative ex post payoff at the end of 
each time step). On the other hand, since forecasts have positive values in most cases, positive 
reinforcement strength increases the chance that the DM follows the forecast (hence the increasing 
trend in ℎ) until the DM finally decides to adopt forecast (at 𝑡 = 22). Once the DM starts following 
the forecast, as shown in Figure 3.4d, DM gains positive payoffs, which in turn, increases DM’s 
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wealth level. With increase in wealth level, the DM’s treatment of uncertainty becomes similar to 
that of a risk-neutral DM (i.e., 𝑥∗,𝑐 = 0, see APPENDIX C). Therefore, in situations that a small 
𝑝𝑑 is followed by a no-drought condition (hence, 𝑥
∗,𝑓 = 0), optimal decisions guided by forecasts 
and climatological information become identical and as a result, 𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 = 𝑆 = 0. This situation 
happens often because no-drought condition is more frequent (𝑝𝜃 = 0.3, hence, no-drought 
condition occurs 70 percent of the time), and the forecasts are in general good (𝐵𝑆𝑆 = 0.529). In 
situations that the decisions with and without forecasts are not identical (e.g., when 𝑝𝑑 is large 
enough that enforces planting of crop 𝐴), value of the forecast, and consequently the reinforcement 
strength, are not zero. These situations, in which the DM learns about his experience and updates 
his or her belief about adoption, are less frequent when 𝑡 > 30 (see Figure 3.4b) which leads to 




Figure 3.4: (a) One possible trajectory of the probability of adopting forecast. Corresponding 
time series of reinforcement strength is shown in (b). Time series of drought events and forecasts 
are shown in (c). The corresponding trajectory of cumulative ex post payoff is shown in (d). 
Here, 𝑟 = 10, 𝜔 = 0.5, 𝜏 = 3.  
 
In Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, the impacts of risk aversion and initial wealth level on the 
trajectory of DM’s belief about adoption (ℎ) are further explored. The results show that DMs with 
higher risk aversion grow a higher tendency towards using the forecast at the beginning. As such, 
they adopt the forecast before less risk averse DMs. The reason for this pattern, as explained 
earlier, is that their decisions without forecast is highly conservative, which in turn, makes 
forecasts highly valuable. On the other hand, when risk aversion is low (𝑟 = 0.5, Figure 3.5), even 
at the beginning, learning occurs on a fewer number of occasions (hence the sharp fluctuations), 
and therefore, it takes longer for the belief about adoption (ℎ) to exceed the adoption threshold 
(ℎ∗). As DM’s cumulative payoff (hence, DM’s wealth) increases over time, crop allocation 
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decisions become less conservative, regardless of DM’s level of risk aversion; therefore, there will 
be fewer learning occasions. It is noteworthy that while the less risk averse DM (𝑟 = 0.5) gains 
more profit at the beginning (see Figure 3.5b), results show that the more risk averse DM (𝑟 = 10) 
would catch up the deficit since he or she has adopted the forecast earlier; once the less risk averse 
DM also adopts the forecast, the trajectories of cumulative payoff become identical. Therefore, it 
is concluded that while adoption of the forecasts is beneficial to DMs, regardless of their level of 
risk aversion, more risk averse DMs will gain higher benefit mainly due to earlier adoption of 
forecasts (see the difference between solid and dashed lines in Figure 3.5b).    
 
Figure 3.5: (a) Trajectories of the probability of adopting forecast and (b) the corresponding 
trajectories of cumulative ex post payoff for different values of risk aversion; dashed lines 
correspond to wealth trajectories when decisions are entirely based on climatological 




Figure 3.6 shows that initial wealth level also has a significant impact on how DM’s belief 
about adoption of forecasts evolves over time. The results are for the case of 𝑟 = 10. The case of 
𝜔 = 0.25 represents an extreme case of conservative decision making. As such, the increasing 
trend of ℎ continues even after the forecast was adopted. This is because even though DM’s 
cumulative ex post payoff (and therefore wealth) increases after adoption of forecasts (which will 
lead to less conservative decisions), the forecasts still have positive values which further reinforces 
the probability of following them. Figure 3.6b shows that this DM benefits the most from the 
decision to adopt the forecast. In fact, the final wealth is 54.5 percent higher than what would have 
been achieved had all the decisions been made based on the climatological information. This value 
for the cases of 𝜔 = 0.5 is 12.4 percent.     
 
Figure 3.6: (a) Trajectories of the probability of adopting forecast and (b) the corresponding 
trajectories of cumulative ex post payoff for different values of initial wealth level (𝜔); dashed 
lines correspond to payoff trajectories when decisions are entirely based on climatological 
information. Here, 𝜏 = 3, 𝑟 = 10. 
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The final analysis in this section explores how learning rate (𝜏) influences the evolution of 
probability of adoption (Figure 3.7). As Equation 3.5 indicates, learning rate determines the extent 
of DM’s response to the stimulus provided by the consequences of forecast adoption decision. 
Larger values of 𝜏 indicate that the DM is more triggered by the consequences of his or her past 
decision, thereby representing a fast learning behavior. It is observed from Figure 3.7 that learning 
occurs at a higher pace as 𝜏 increases. The DM with 𝜏 = 5 starts following the forecasts before the 
DMs with 𝜏 = 3 and 𝜏 = 1, and therefore, achieves the highest cumulative ex post payoff (Figure 
3.7b). For the case of 𝜏 = 1, even though it is possible to identify an increasing learning trend, the 
probability of adoption never exceeds the threshold (ℎ∗) and forecast is never adopted leading to 
the lowest final wealth.  
Finally, notice that despite DM’s high tendency towards using forecast in the case of  
𝜏 = 5 (e.g., see high values of ℎ when 20 < 𝑡 < 39 or 67 < 𝑡 < 93), there are instances that ℎ 
significantly drops after only one punishing outcome (see for example the drop at 𝑡 = 93). This 
behavior, which is captured by the reinforcement learning mechanism and is referred to as 
spontaneous recovery in psychological studies [Thorndike, 1932], implies that low-probability 
actions (in this case, not following the forecast) that have been abandoned by the DM could be 
quickly reinforced after a positive (rewarding) outcome (note that probability of not adopting 
forecast is 1 − ℎ𝑡, and therefore a punishing outcome for adoption is a rewarding outcome for non-




Figure 3.7: (a) Trajectories of the probability of adopting forecast and (b) the corresponding 
trajectories of cumulative ex post payoff for different values of learning rate; dashed line 
corresponds to payoff trajectory when decisions are entirely based on forecast. Here, 𝑟 = 10 and 
𝜔 = 0.5. 
 
 Agent-based modeling: Forecast adoption and diffusion 
In this section, agent-based modeling framework is used to implement the model of 
forecast adoption developed in section 3.2. An experimental case study is designed to simulate the 
diffusion of forecast as an innovation and to explore how different factors – related to DMs and to 
social network structure – influence forecast adoption and its diffusion. 
Model set-up and assumptions: The hypothetical case study area, shown in Figure 3.8, is 
a region consisting of 25 counties (or communities, villages), with 25 agents (or farmers) in each 
county. Agents may interact with other agents in their social space (also referred to as social 
neighborhood) and learn from their experiences. This interaction, which stimulates social learning, 
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is in the form of communication of beliefs of forecast adoption (i.e., the probability of adoption, 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡). It is assumed that the social neighborhood for each agent simply consists of his or her 
geographic neighbors but is also dictated by inter- and intra-county social ties, which are 
represented by two binary variables in the model: 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 ∈ {0,1} for intra-county ties, and 𝑆𝐼𝑒𝑥 ∈
{0,1}. The extent of social interaction (i.e., the weights assigned to neighbors’ beliefs) is 
represented by the matrix of social interaction (Δ = [𝛼𝑖𝑗]𝑚×𝑚, where 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 0 if 𝑗 ∉ 𝒩𝑖; 
∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑗∈𝒩𝑖 = 1 − 𝛼𝑖𝑖, and 𝛼𝑖𝑖 is agent’s self-reliance). When both 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 and 𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 are zero, there is 
no social interaction and agents only rely on their own experience (i.e., 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1). When either of 
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 and 𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 is one, it is assumed that the agents are equally influenced (i.e., equal weights) by 
their own and other agents’ beliefs in their social neighborhood (unless it is stated otherwise, e.g., 
Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19). 
It is assumed that climatological probability of drought event in the case study area is 30 
percent, and the same time series of drought events (i.e., 𝜑𝑡, 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇) is observed by all 
agents in the case study area. It is also assumed that all agents share the same belief about the 
chance of drought event (which is equal to climatological probability of drought in the area) and 
this belief remains unchanged throughout the entire simulation, i.e., ∀𝑖, 𝑡: 𝑝𝜃𝑖,𝑡 = 0.3. Although 
the latter is a very simplifying assumption, particularly given the mounting evidence that supports 
recency and availability biases in experience-based decision making [Hertwig et al., 2004; Marx 
et al., 2007; Barron and Ursino, 2013; van Duinen et al., 2015], this is left as a future work. 
Regarding drought forecast information, it is assumed that forecasts are different from one county 
to another, but all agents in a county receive the same forecasts. As stated earlier, forecasts are 
assumed to perfectly reliable with Brier skill scores ranging from 0.47 to 0.54 (see section B.3 




Figure 3.8: Hypothetical case study used for the agent-based model of forecast adoption. (a) 
Location of the counties. (b) Location of the agents. (c) Topology of the social network (only 
shown for selected agents inside the blue box); solid and dashed arrows indicate intra-county and 
inter-county interactions, respectively. County 13 is highlighted as the target of extension efforts 
for later reference.   
 
As Equations 3.5 and 3.7 indicate, initial belief (or tendency) of adoption (ℎ1) and adoption 
threshold (ℎ∗) are important parameters which can influence the adoption and diffusion of 
forecasts. For instance, a higher initial tendency to use forecast or a lower value of adoption 
threshold can lead to faster adoption decisions. However, the sensitivity analysis is focused on 
other parameters (namely, risk aversion, initial wealth, and learning rate) and assume that ℎ∗ and 
ℎ1 are constant. More specifically, it is assumed that adoption threshold for all agents is 0.65  
(i.e., ∀𝑖, 𝑡: ℎ𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 0.65). In addition, it is assumed that agents are initially indifferent between 
adopting and not adopting the forecasts (i.e., ℎ𝑖,1 = 0.5). The remaining of the this section explores 
how agents’ parameters, such as learning rate (𝜏𝑖), risk aversion (𝑟𝑖), and initial wealth (𝜔𝑖), as 
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well as parameters related to the topology of social network (e.g., inter- and intra-county ties, self-
reliance) influence the temporal and spatial diffusion of forecast adoption. 
Diffusion of forecast in the system: Figure 3.9 shows the percentage of agents in the case 
study area who base their decisions on forecasts at each time step. In the literature, this is referred 
to as diffusion curve or adoption path. Three different scenarios of social interaction are 
considered: 1) full interaction scenario, in which agents interact with all their neighbors both inside 
and outside of their counties (i.e., 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 = 1, 𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1), 2) only intra-county ties, in which agents 
only interact with those neighbors inside their counties (i.e., 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 = 1, 𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 0), and 3) no 
interaction, in which agents only learn based on their own experiences (i.e., 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 = 0, 𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 0). 
Learning rate (𝜏), risk aversion (𝑟) and initial wealth (𝜔) are randomly generated using Normal 
distributions with 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1), 𝑟~𝑁(10,1), and 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.05), where 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎) indicates a 
Normal distribution with mean 𝜇 and standard deviation 𝜎 (see Figure E.1).  
The diffusion curve for the full-interaction scenario is generally in the form of a logistic-
type growth curve (or s-shaped), which is consistent with the epidemic or logistic models used  in 
literature to model the diffusion process [Mansfield, 1961; Stoneman, 1983; Rogers, 2003]). 
However, instead of the typical monotonically increasing trend (as shown in Figure E.2), the 
results show a fluctuating trend, which is because discontinuance is allowed in the model; in other 
words, agents may decide to discontinue using the forecast and base their decisions on 
climatological information despite adopting the forecast earlier (if discontinuance is not allowed, 
the same s-shaped curve with monotonically increasing trend would be obtained, see Figure E.3). 
The fluctuations are more frequent at the beginning of the take-off phase because beliefs about 
forecast adoption, on average, are closer to the adoption threshold of ℎ∗ = 0.65 during this period 
(see Figure E.5). This s-shaped pattern of adoption can be explained as follows. In the beginning, 
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since agents have a low propensity for adopting forecast (i.e., ℎ is low), forecast is rejected and 
decisions are made based on climatological information. However, since forecasts are more 
valuable than climatology on average, agents gradually learn from their own and their neighbors’ 
experiences and form a higher tendency to use forecasts. This learning process is different for each 
agent because of various heterogeneities involved in representing agents’ behavior and decision 
making as well as different sets of neighbors for each agent. As such, some agents (e.g., more risk-
averse agents, or those with higher learning rate or lower initial wealth) decide to adopt the 
forecasts earlier than others. These agents are called early adopters. As the number of early-
adopter agents increases, since the social network is strongly connected, agents adopt the forecasts 
at a higher pace. This phase of the diffusion process (50 < 𝑡 < 70) is referred to as take-off phase. 
As the number of potential adopters decreases, the rate of adoption decreases until an adoption 
ceiling or equilibrium is reached.  
 
Figure 3.9: Diffusion curve for different scenarios of social interaction. Learning rate, risk 
aversion, and initial wealth are randomly assigned based on 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1), 𝑟~𝑁(10,1) and 




One of the key elements in diffusion of innovations is the social system within which the 
diffusion occurs [Rogers, 2003]. Figure 3.9 demonstrates how the s-shaped pattern of the diffusion 
curve is influenced by the structure of the social network. Notice that the diffusion curve is almost 
linear when there is no interaction among the agents (i.e., 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 = 0, 𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 0); in other words, in 
this case, the total number of agents who adopt forecasts increases linearly (with fluctuations), 
which could be attributed to the linear form of learning function selected for the reinforcement 
learning mechanism (Equation 3.11). As interaction increases among agents, the diffusion curve 
becomes more non-linear. It can be concluded from this finding that the non-linear form of the 
diffusion curve, particularly in the take-off phase, is related to the interaction among agents [Xiong 
et al., 2016].  
This figure also shows that under no social interaction, there is a larger number of adopters 
in the beginning (20 < 𝑡 < 50) than the other two scenarios; under full interaction, on the other 
hand, agents start adopting the forecasts later than the other two scenarios. In addition, the final 
adoption rate is the greatest when there is full interaction among agents, whereas almost 15 percent 
of the population decide not to follow the forecasts at the end under no-interaction scenario. These 
observations can be better explained by considering the spatial and temporal dynamics of diffusion 
(Figure 3.10, also see Figure E.4, and Animation F.1 in the supplementary file). First, note that 
since risk aversion (𝑟𝑖) and initial wealth (𝜔𝑖) are randomly assigned, agents could make different 
crop allocation decisions; hence, the ex post values of forecasts vary among agents. Besides, 
learning rate (𝜏𝑖) is also randomly assigned. Therefore, even in one county, agents could form 
different beliefs about adopting forecasts. When agents interact with their neighbors, their beliefs 
about forecast adoption are a weighted average of their own beliefs as well as those of their 
neighbors (see Equation 3.10). As such, the tendency to adopt forecast is balanced or smoothed by 
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neighbors’ beliefs, particularly when both inter- and intra-county interactions are considered (see 
Figure E.5, which shows the average belief in each county under the three scenarios of 
interactions). However, when there is no interaction, an agent’s belief about adoption is only 
influenced by his or her own experience (i.e., individual learning). In this case, as Figure 3.10b 
shows, there is no continuity or specific pattern in the way forecast is adopted by agents (because 
the parameters are assigned randomly, as explained above, and there is no interaction). However, 
when intra-county ties (Figure E.4b) and full interaction exist (Figure 3.10a), it is observed that 
the spatial pattern of forecast adoption is more continuous and it spreads out from early adopters 




Figure 3.10: Diffusion of forecast adoption in the case study area. (a) Full interaction, (b) no 
interaction. Learning rate, risk aversion, and initial wealth are randomly assigned based on 
𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1), 𝑟~𝑁(10,1) and 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.05), respectively (see Figure E.1). 
 
Since forecasts are more accurate than the climatological information (refer to the 𝐵𝑆𝑆 in 
Figure B.3), it is expected that forecast adoption, in the long term, results in a higher total economic 
gain (i.e., 𝜋𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡  @ 𝑡 = 100) for the agents . If it is assumed that forecasts are adopted by the agents 
from the beginning, the total economic gain, on average, will be 27.89 percent (± 11.56 percent) 
117 
 
higher than the case of relying only on climatological information, which is referred to as baseline 
scenario hereafter. However, results indicate that forecast adoption is a dynamic process and the 
timing and rate of adoption not only depend on agents’ characteristics but also on the structure of 
the social network. Table 3.1 shows that the average increase in total economic gain with respect 
to the baseline scenario is the largest under no interaction scenario with 7.45 percent. This is 
because adoption occurs much earlier than the other two scenarios. However, the standard 
deviation under no interaction scenario is also the largest. The maximum increase is for agent 
#350 (from county 14) with 68.31 percent, and the minimum increase belongs to agent #394 
(from county 16) with −3.80 percent. Under two other scenarios, the average increase in total 
economic gain is slightly lower but so is the standard deviation. For example, for agent #394, 
there is 7.26 percent increase in final wealth. 
Table 3.1: Percentage increase in total economic gain in each scenario relative to the baseline*  
Scenario Average St. Deviation 
Full Interaction 6.51 3.67 
Only intra-county ties 6.18 4.82 
No Interaction 7.45 10.32 
* 
baseline is when all decisions are made based on climatological 
information 
 
Figure 3.11 demonstrate how forecast adoption and diffusion is influenced by the learning 
rate under each one of the three social interaction scenarios. For each scenario, the same 
realizations of 𝜔 and 𝑟 are used as before, generated four different realizations of learning rate are 
generated, where 𝜏~𝑁(𝜇𝜏 , 0.1), and 𝜇𝜏 ∈ {1, 1.5, 2, 3}. The results show that under each scenario, 
adoption starts earlier and reaches its maximum level quicker as learning rate (or 𝜇𝜏) increases 
(Figure E.6 compares the spatial and temporal dynamics of forecast diffusion for two cases of  
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𝜇𝜏 = 1.5 and 𝜇𝜏 = 2 under full interaction scenario; also see Animation F.2 in the supplementary 
file). This was expected as it was observed in Figure 3.7 that the probability of adoption increases 
at a faster pace as 𝜏 increases. Figure 3.11 also shows that only a small number of agents decide 
to follow the forecasts when learning rate is small (𝜇𝜏 = 1). This is because it takes a long time 
for agents to form a positive opinion (i.e., an opinion that leads to adoption choice) about forecasts. 
In particular, when there is full interaction, agents almost never follow the forecasts except for a 
small percentage in the last 10 time steps. On the other hand, when learning rate is large (𝜇𝜏 = 3), 
the diffusion curves under the three scenarios are more like each other, particularly in terms of 
when the adoption begins to occur. This essentially implies that the social structure becomes less 
important for the diffusion of forecasts when agents are quick to respond to new information and 
learn from the consequences of their actions. Finally, the results in Figure 3.11c also confirm the 
earlier finding that the adoption rate follows a linear order when there is no interaction among 




Figure 3.11: Diffusion curve for different scenarios of learning rate (𝜏). (a) Full social 
interaction, (b) Only intra-county ties, and (c) no interaction. Risk aversion and initial wealth are 
randomly assigned based on 𝑟~𝑁(10,1) and 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.05), respectively (see Figure E.1a,b). 
 
Figure 3.12 shows the impacts of risk aversion (𝑟) and initial wealth (𝜔) on the adoption 
timing and the diffusion process when there is full interaction among agents  
(i.e., 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 = 1, 𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1). The results show that diffusion curves shift leftward as 𝜔 decreases or 
𝑟 increases. In other words, lower values of 𝜔 or higher values of 𝑟 result in earlier adoption and 
quicker diffusion. This is mainly because, as shown in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, there are more 
learning instances for agents under these situations which, in most cases, result in an increase in 
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agent’s willingness to adopt the forecasts. In addition, less fluctuations are observed as 𝜔 decreases 
or 𝑟 increases. This is because highly risk averse agents or agents with very low initial wealth find 
forecasts much more valuable as their decisions without forecasts are extremely conservative. 
Finally, Figure 3.12b shows that the diffusion process is sensitive to 𝑟 when 7.5 < 𝜇𝑟 < 12.5. This 
is because for these values of risk aversion, the optimal crop allocation decision without forecasts 
remains between zero and one (see APPENDIX C), which in turn has significant impact on the 
value of forecast and eventually on how agents learn from their experiences.       
 
Figure 3.12: Diffusion curve for different scenarios of (a) initial wealth and (b) risk aversion. 
Full social interaction is considered. Learning rate is randomly assigned based on 
𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1) (see Figure E.1c). For (a) risk aversion is randomly assigned based on 𝑟~𝑁(10,1) 





Change agents and the effect of targeting interventions: Early adopters play a key role in 
diffusion of a technology especially when there is a strongly-connected social network [Rogers, 
2003]. As the results indicated, the early adopters in the model are those agents who are more risk 
averse, have lower initial wealth, or have higher learning rates. However, as Figure 3.9 shows, 
under full interaction, adoption does not start until 𝑡 = 48. As a result, there is only 6.54 percent 
(on average) increase in total economic gain with respect to the baseline scenario (i.e., relying only 
on climatological information) as opposed to the 27.89 percent increase that would have been 
achieved on average had all agents adopted the forecast from the beginning. One way to facilitate 
the adoption of forecasts is to educate agents about the potential value of forecasts, for example 
through local extension services, crop advisors or boundary organizations [Mase and Prokopy, 
2014; Templeton et al., 2018]. The impact of such educational programs can be modeled as an 
increase in agents’ initial beliefs about adoption of the forecast (i.e., ℎ𝑖,1) in the model. Since it 
may not be feasible to target the entire population with the educational program, here, a Training 
and Visit Extension system [Feder and Slade, 1986; Munshi, 2004] is considered where the 
educational program has targeted only one county in the case study (i.e., county 13 located in the 
middle of the case study area, refer to Figure 3.8). The agents in this county are referred to as 
change agents in the model as they instigate adoption and facilitate the diffusion of forecasts. Note 
that in the literature, a change agent is usually defined as a trained professional, e.g., agricultural 
extension professionals, who can provide an effective communication link between a resources 
system and a client system to facilitate the flow of innovations [Rogers, 2003].  
For the change agents, the assumption is that they have a positive opinion about forecasts 
because of their engagement in the educational program and are willing to base their decisions on 
forecasts from the beginning (i.e., ℎ𝑖,1 = 0.65, where 𝑖 = 301, 302, … , 325). Additionally, it is 
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assumed that they are not influenced by the neighbors outside of their county (i.e., for these agents, 
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 = 1, 𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 0). Figure 3.13 shows the impact of change agents on the diffusion curve for the 
three scenarios of social interaction. First, notice that when there is no inter-county interaction 
(i.e., 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 0), the only change in the diffusion curves is a slightly upward shift at the beginning 
which is because of forecast adoption in county 13. This was expected as the change agents cannot 
influence the diffusion process without inter-county interaction. This is also highlighted in  
Table 3.2. The average percentage increase in final wealth relative to the baseline scenario has 
changed from 6.18 to 7.16 when there is only intra-county interaction and from 7.45 to 8.35 when 
there is no interaction.  
However, the diffusion process is significantly influenced by change agents when inter-
county interaction exists (i.e., 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1). As Figure 3.13  shows, with presence of change agents, 
the diffusion curve is entirely shifted to the left, which implies that the diffusion process begins 
earlier and at any time step, there is a higher percentage of agents who follow the forecast. In 
addition, there seems to be a structural change in the take-off phase of the diffusion process. Instead 
of a late but rapid increase in adoption rate, the take-off phase now starts much earlier but with a 
slower pace (10 < 𝑡 < 30). As Figure 3.14 demonstrates (and Animation F.3), this is specifically 
because of the impact that change agents have on adoption decision of their neighbors in their 
surrounding counties (also refer to Figure E.7). Adoption of forecast spreads further in those 
counties due to intra-county ties (30 < 𝑡 < 40); this, together with increase in agents’ willingness 
to adopt forecasts in other counties mainly due to individual learning, results in a rapid increase in 
the adoption rate during the period of 40 < 𝑡 < 55. In the period of 55 < 𝑡 < 70, adoption still 
increases but at a slower rate and with fluctuation. As shown in Figure E.7, this is mainly because 
agents’ belief about adoption in corner counties (particularly counties 1, 5, and 11) fluctuates 
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around the adoption threshold in this period. After 𝑡 = 70, since fewer and fewer agents remain 
who have not yet adopted the forecasts, the adoption rate levels off and an adoption ceiling is 
reached. With the presence of change agents, the final wealth on average will increase by 10.31 
percent relative to the baseline scenario as opposed to 6.51 percent increase when there were no 
change agents in the system (Table 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.13: Diffusion curve for different scenarios of social interaction with change agents 
(solid lines) and without change agents (dashed lines). Learning rate, risk aversion, and initial 
wealth are randomly assigned based on 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1), 𝑟~𝑁(10,1) and 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.05), 
respectively (see Figure E.1). 
 
Table 3.2: Impact of change agents on total economic gain relative to the baseline*  
 With Change Agents Without Change Agents 
Scenario Average St. Deviation Average St. Deviation 
Full Interaction 10.31 7.35 6.51 3.67 
Only intra-county ties 7.16 6.47 6.18 4.82 
No Interaction 8.35 10.98 7.45 10.32 




Figure 3.14: Diffusion of forecast adoption in the case study area under full social interaction (a) 
with and (b) without change agents. Risk aversion, initial wealth, and learning rate are randomly 
assigned based on 𝑟~𝑁(10,1), 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.05), and 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1), respectively  
(see Figure E.1). 
 
Next, the impact of learning rate on diffusion of forecasts in the presence of change agents 
is investigated. In order to analyze the role of change agents, the same scenarios of learning rate 
as in Figure 3.11a are considered. The results are presented in Figure 3.15. First, notice that change 
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agents have a significant impact in the diffusion process when learning rate is low. This is 
particularly clear in the case of 𝜏~𝑁(1,0.1) where adoption rate reaches the maximum of 88.16 
percent when change agents are present as opposed to the maximum of 18.4 percent without 
change agents (also see Figure E.8, and Animation F.4). Moreover, as discussed in Figure 3.11a, 
adoption of forecast spreads quicker among agents as learning rate increases (also see  
Animation F.5); however, the results show that with increase in learning rate, change agents have 
less impact on the diffusion process. For instance, as can be seen in the case of 𝜏~𝑁(3,0.1), the 
diffusion curves with and without change agents are almost identical. This confirms our earlier 
finding that the structure of the social network becomes less important in the diffusion process as 
learning rate increases.  
 
Figure 3.15: Diffusion curve under full social interaction for different scenarios of learning rate 
with change agents (solid lines) and without change agents (dashed lines). 𝑟~𝑁(10,1) and 




How would change agents’ characteristics influence the diffusion process? Would agents’ 
characteristics in the counties surrounding the target county influence the diffusion of forecast 
adoption? Answering these questions can help better guide the targeting efforts of an extension 
program. Here, the focus is only on agents’ initial wealth level as it is the easiest parameter to 
measure among the other important parameters in the model. What is the impact of change agents’ 
initial wealth? Multiple realizations of initial wealth level were generated for county 13 based on 
𝑁(𝜇𝜔, 0.05) where 𝜇𝜔 ∈ [0.25,1.5] and the results are shown in Figure 3.16. Although forecast 
adoption diffuses quicker for lower values of 𝜇𝜔, it can be observed that initial wealth level in the 
target county has small impact on the diffusion of forecast adoption. This can be explained as 
follows. Recall that there are more learning instances for agents with lower wealth. Therefore, it 
is expected that agents’ belief about adoption, on average, will be greater for lower values of 𝜇𝜔, 
which in turn will influence the beliefs of their out-of-county neighbors. However, the differences 
in beliefs for different values of 𝜇𝜔 are not large enough to cause significant changes in their 
neighbors’ beliefs, particularly in the second half of the simulation, where agents in other counties 




Figure 3.16: Impact of wealth level in the target county on forecast diffusion under full 
interaction. The shaded area represents the envelope of diffusion curves for different scenarios of 
𝜔 in the target county. The two extremes correspond to 𝜔~𝑁(1.5,0.05) and 𝜔~𝑁(0.025,0.05). 
For other counties, 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.1) (see Figure E.1b). For all counties, 𝑟~𝑁(10,1), 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1) 
(see Figure E.1a,c).  
 
A more interesting question is to what extent initial wealth of agents in the counties next 
to the target county (i.e., counties 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 17, 18, and 19, refer to Figure 3.8) would 
influence the adoption dynamics. To answer this question, multiple realizations of initial wealth 
were generated for these counties based on 𝑁(𝜇𝜔, 0.05) where 𝜇𝜔 ∈ [0.25,1], while for agents in 
other counties, including those in county 13, initial wealth was generated based on 𝑁(0.5,0.05). 
The results, shown in Figure 3.17, indicate that the initial wealth of agents located in change 
agents’ social neighborhoods can in fact facilitate or obstruct the diffusion of forecast adoption. If 
change agents are surrounded by poorer agents (i.e., lower values of 𝜇𝜔), adoption rate increases 
with higher speed and quickly reaches saturation. This is because agents in these counties already 
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have a high tendency towards using the forecast (recall that there are more learning instances in 
the beginning for agents with lower initial wealth), and therefore the influence from the change 
agents would quickly push their beliefs beyond the adoption threshold leading to adoption 
decisions. On the other hand, if the agents in the surrounding counties are relatively wealthy (i.e., 
higher values of 𝜇𝜔), while they are still influenced by change agents, their tendency towards using 
the forecast remains low as there are limited learning instances for them and for other agents in 
their counties (see Animation F.6). As such, this obstructs or delays the diffusion of forecast 
adoption in the system, which, as discussed earlier, could result in lower final wealth for agents. 
 
Figure 3.17: Impact of wealth level in the counties surrounding the target county on forecast 
diffusion under full interaction. The shaded area represents the envelope of diffusion curves for 
different scenarios of 𝜔 in the surrounding counties. The two extremes correspond to 
𝜔~𝑁(0.25,0.05) and 𝜔~𝑁(1,0.05). For other counties, 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.1) (see Figure E.1b). For 




So far, it has been assumed that agents are equally influenced by their own beliefs and the 
beliefs of other agents in their social space. The only exception was the case of no social interaction 
in which the agents were completely self-reliant (i.e., 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1). Here, the impact of self-reliance 
on the diffusion process is explored. Multiple scenarios are considered with self-reliance 
coefficient varying from 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0 (i.e. no self-reliance) to 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0.95. In each case, the remaining 
weights are evenly distributed among those neighbors in the social neighborhood. Note that in all 
cases, both inter- and intra-county ties exist but the extent of social interaction changes with 𝛼𝑖𝑖.  
Results show that the diffusion process slows down as self-reliance increases (Figure 3.18). 
However, even when 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0.95, there is a structural difference in the shape of the diffusion curve, 
compared to the case of no social interaction (shown with red line in the figure), which is caused 
by the mixed impact of individual learning (which is linear) and the influence from neighbors (see 
Animation F.7). Without social interaction, the diffusion curve has a linear trend.  
The results seem to suggest that self-reliance has a small impact in the diffusion process at 
the beginning of the take-off phase (see the small different between two extremes when 10 < 𝑡 <
45); however, the small difference in adoption rate in fact is directly related to self-reliance factor. 
This can be better explained using the spatial dynamics of the diffusion (Figure 3.19, and see 
Animation F.8). When self-reliance is low (e.g., 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0), interaction plays a critical role in shaping 
agents’ beliefs about adoption, and as explained earlier, this narrows down the differences among 
the beliefs of the agents in vicinity of each other, which can in turn reduce the number of early 
adopters (notice the continuous pattern of adoption in Figure 3.19a). However, when self-reliance 
is high (e.g., 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1), even though agents are influenced by their neighbors, they put more weight 
on their own beliefs, which are primarily formed by the individual learning mechanism. Therefore, 
those agents who find forecasts valuable in the beginning (based on their individual learning) 
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decide to adopt the forecasts, which in turn increases the number of early adopters in the area. 
However, since individual learning is a function of 𝑟, 𝜔, and 𝜏, all of which are assigned randomly, 
the adoption pattern during early stages is to some extent random (see the discontinuous pattern of 
adoption in Figure 3.19b). Note that even in this case (𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0.95), the adoption pattern is not 
entirely random because of the impact that change agents have on their neighbors’ beliefs. 
 
Figure 3.18: Impact of self-reliance on forecast diffusion under full interaction. The shaded area 
represents the envelope of diffusion curves when 𝛼𝑖𝑖 changes from 0 to 0.95. Red line 
corresponds to 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1. 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.1), 𝑟~𝑁(10,1), and 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1) were randomly assigned 





Figure 3.19: Diffusion of forecast adoption in the case study area under full interaction when  
(a) 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0, and (b) 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0.95. 𝑟~𝑁(10,1), 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.1), and 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1) are randomly 
assigned (see Figure E.1).  
 
 Asymmetric learning  
The Brenner’s version of the Bush-Mosteller model ([Brenner, 1999, 2006]) presented in 
section 3.2.2 overcomes the shortcoming of Cross’s version of the model ([Cross, 1973]) by taking 
into account both positive and negative reinforcements. In Brenner’s version, which is the model 
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used in this study, rewarding and punishing outcomes are reflected by positive and negative 
reinforcement strengths, respectively; as stated in Equation 3.5, a linear formulation is commonly 
used to represent the learning function in the algorithm. The linear formulation (i.e.,  
𝐿(𝑆, 𝜏) = 𝑆 ∙ 𝜏) implies that a single learning rate is used for learning from both rewarding and 
punishing outcomes. However, behavioral studies suggest that rewarding and punishing outcomes 
do not have symmetric impacts on learning and decision making [Frank et al., 2004, 2007; Cazé 
and Van Der Meer, 2013; Gershman, 2015]. In particular, most studies have found that negative 
learning rate is generally higher than positive learning rate (e.g., see [Rasmussen and Newland 
[2008], Niv et al. [2012], and Gershman [2015]), although studies also have found evidence for 
optimistic reinforcement learning, which is referred to as optimism bias [Lefebvre et al., 2017]. In 
the following, the reinforcement learning algorithm (Equation 3.5) is modified to take into account 
this asymmetric updating, which is also known as asymmetry in the law of effect [Rasmussen and 
Newland, 2008]. In particular, a parameter, defined as asymmetric learning coefficient (𝛾), is used 
to amplify the impact of punishing outcomes: 𝐿(𝑆, 𝜏) = 𝑆 ∙ 𝛾 ∙ 𝜏, where 𝛾 = 1 if 𝑆 ≥ 0, and 𝛾 > 1 
if 𝑆 < 0.     
Figure 3.20 shows the impact of asymmetric learning coefficient (𝛾) on the probability of 
adopting forecast (ℎ𝑡) for a give timeseries of drought forecasts. When 𝛾 = 1, the rate of learning 
is the same (i.e., 𝜏 = 2) for rewarding and punishing outcomes. However, as 𝛾 increases, punishing 
outcomes (e.g., when a drought event is proceeded by a low 𝑝𝑑) have larger impacts on the learning 
process. Therefore, when the ex post value of forecast is negative (i.e., 𝑆𝑡 < 0), the probability of 
adopting the forecast decreases more for a DM with larger 𝛾. The results show that under 𝛾 = 1.5 
and 𝛾 = 2, the probability of adoption never exceeds the adoption threshold (i.e., ℎ∗ = 0.65), 
133 
 
which implies that forecasts are never adopted during over the course of simulation under these 
two scenarios.   
 
Figure 3.20: (a) Time series of drought events and forecasts, (b) corresponding trajectory of the 
probability of adopting forecast for a DM with 𝑟 = 10, 𝜔 = 0.5, and 𝜏 = 2 under three scenarios 
of asymmetric learning coefficient (𝛾).  
 
Figure 3.21 shows the impact of asymmetric learning coefficient on adoption and diffusion 
of forecasts in the hypothetical case study area. The diffusion curve corresponding to 𝛾 = 1 is 
similar to the curves shown in Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.15.. The results show that 𝛾 could 
significantly influence the diffusion of forecasts. In particular, for values of 𝛾 = 1.25 and 𝛾 = 1.5, 
diffusion occurs at a slower pace, compared to the case of 𝛾 = 1, and reaches an equilibrium which 
is less than 100 percent adoption rate in the case study area. The adoption rate further decreases 
for larger values of asymmetric learning coefficient, and for 𝛾 = 2, it reaches the equilibrium of 




Figure 3.21: Diffusion curves for different scenarios of asymmetric learning coefficient. 
Learning rate, risk aversion, and initial wealth are randomly assigned based on 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1), 
𝑟~𝑁(10,1) and 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.05), respectively (see Figure E.1). 
 
 Social network beyond physical proximity  
In the results and analyses presented so far, it was assumed that the social neighborhood 
for each agent is simply shaped based on physical proximity, as well as inter- and intra-county 
social ties. Although interactions mediated through physical proximity remain critical in shaping 
social networks [Stopczynski et al., 2018], social media and online communication tools also play 
a key role in mediating social interactions [Dubois and Gaffney, 2014]. In fact, using social media 
has become increasingly important in the context natural disasters risk reduction and crisis 
management [Alexander, 2014; Houston et al., 2015]. For instance, Tang et al. [2015] found that 
governmental agencies in California used popular social media platform to communicate drought 
information during the historic California drought in 2014. Although social media have been 
extensively used in the past couple of years to spread warnings of natural disasters, they can also 
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play a key role in shaping users’ perceptions of natural disasters risk thereby altering their 
decisions. For instance, focusing on Hurricane Matthew in 2016, Jiang et al. [2019] found that 
people in the same social network (determined by users’ activities in Twitter) tend to make the 
same evacuation decision.  
Exploring the role of social media in shaping farmers’ perception of forecasts is beyond 
the scope of this study; however, given the ever increasing role of social media in people’s lives, 
it is important to recognize that social interactions based on both physical proximity and social 
media could shape more complex social networks. The agent-based model presented in this study 
can be extended to explore the impact of such complex social networks on forecast adoption 
behavior and diffusion process. Since the structure of the social network is an input of the model, 
a simple algorithm (see APPENDIX D) is used to generate a pseudo-random social network that 
is shaped by both short- and long-range social interactions. The network is generated for the similar 
hypothetical case study presented in Figure 3.8, and is referred to as complex social network. In 
this network, social neighborhood, 𝒩𝑖, is defined as a set of agents who are in agent 𝑖’s social 
clique regardless of their physical proximity. Figure 3.22 shows the social neighborhoods for two 




Figure 3.22: Social neighborhoods for two representative agents (agents 214 and 401, see 
Figure 3.8) in the form of a sociogram. Agents identified with the same color are in the same 
county. 
 
Figure 3.23 demonstrates the impact of a complex social network structure on the diffusion 
process. For comparison, the figure also shows a diffusion curve based on the simple version of 
social network (i.e., only physical neighbors interact with each other) used in the previous sections. 
In both cases, it is assumed that change agents are present, and they are influenced by agents 
outside of their county. Also, note that the results are for the case of symmetric learning. This 
figure shows that the diffusion process occurs at a much faster pace (with a very steep take-off 
phase) when both short-range (e.g., based on physical proximity) and long-range (e.g., based on 
social media) interactions exist in the social network. This is because of the joint impact of change 
agents and interactions beyond physical neighbors. When agents only interact with their physical 
neighbors, diffusion gradually spreads out from change agents (county 13) to the entire area; 
however, in the case of complex network, since change agents could be socially connected to 
distant agents (for example, as shown in Figure 3.22, both agents 214 and 401 interact with 
multiple agents even though they are not physical neighbors), the diffusion process spreads out 
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faster with less spatial continuity (see Animation F.9). It is worth noting that this finding is robust 
to the randomness in structure of complex social network (see Figure E.9)   
 
Figure 3.23: The impact of complex social network on the diffusion process. The red curve is 
the same diffusion curve shown in Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.15. Learning rate, risk aversion, and 
initial wealth are randomly assigned based on 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1), 𝑟~𝑁(10,1) and 𝜔~𝑁(0.5,0.05), 
respectively (see Figure E.1). 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
The modeling studies of forecast valuation and impact assessment tend to ignore the 
dynamic aspect of forecast adoption [Rubas et al., 2006]. As such, forecast adoption is usually 
treated as a static and binary decision problem. In the real world, however, similar to any other 
innovations, adoption of forecasts among farmers requires some experimentation and practice [Hu 
et al., 2006], and it is a dynamic process that takes place over time [Rubas et al., 2008]. Modeling 
this dynamic process, particularly in a social setting, could help better understand the factors that 
influence forecast adoption and diffusion and would support design effective targeting strategies.  
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In this study, an agent-based model of forecast adoption is developed to study the impacts 
of farmers’ characteristics (e.g., risk aversion, wealth, learning rate) and the social network 
structure (e.g., inter- and intra-county ties, change agents, self-reliance) in the diffusion process. 
In the proposed model, farmers’ learning from their own experiences is represented by the 
reinforcement learning mechanism. In addition, a DeGroot-style opinion formation model is used 
to represent neighborhood effect (i.e., farmers’ learning from their neighbors). The agent-based 
model is applied to a hypothetical case study with 25 clusters (representing counties) and 625 
agents (representing farmers). Therefore, instead of exogenously imposing adoption behavior, 
adoption patterns are derived as an emergence of collective behavior.  
If it is assumed that forecast users have perfect knowledge of the characteristics of 
forecasts, forecast valuation turns into a static, binary problem; for instance, if forecasts are 
perfectly reliable, users with perfect knowledge know that they are better off using the forecasts 
than basing their decisions on climatological information [Millner, 2009]. However, by relaxing 
this assumption and modeling user’s forecast adoption as a stochastic choice behavior using 
reinforcement learning, it is shown that users’ tendency to use forecasts evolves over time based 
on the consequences of their decisions in the past. In addition, it is shown that risk attitude, wealth 
level, and learning rate influence this learning process. For users with higher risk aversion or lower 
wealth level who usually make highly conservative decisions, there are more instances where 
𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 ≠ 0 (i.e., decisions with and without forecast do not match). Since forecasts are generally 
better than climatology, it is expected that positive values of 𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 would reinforce these user’s 
tendency to use forecasts and therefore they adopt forecasts quicker than others.  
While farmers learn from their own experiences of working with a new technology, they 
are also influenced by the decisions made by (and subsequently the experiences of) their peers 
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[Banerjee, 1992; Baerenklau, 2015]. Results show that under full interaction scenario (with both 
inter-county and intra county ties), adoption pattern follows the widely used logistic-type growth 
curve. On the other hand, when social learning is ignored, it is found that adoption pattern is 
(mainly) linear (Figure 3.9). Therefore, it is hypothesized that the s-shaped pattern of adoption is 
caused by social interaction. Xiong et al. [2016] argue that while peer effect exists in different 
forms at different stages of the diffusion process, during the intermediate stage (i.e., take-off phase) 
where there is an exponential growth in number of adopters, “experience sharing is the major form 
of social interaction that affects individuals’ adoption behavior.” 
The results also show that under no-interaction scenario, diffusion process starts earlier but 
reaches a much lower ceiling compared to full interaction scenario. This observation is related to 
heterogeneities associated with farmers’ characteristics. It can be argued that although adopting 
forecast could be more beneficial for some farmers, the influence from their neighbors results in 
the decision not to adopt. This finding is consistent with Munshi [2004], who extensively studied 
this issue and concluded that when performance of a new technology is sensitive to neighbors’ 
unobserved characteristics (e.g., risk aversion or initial wealth, in this case), social learning will 
be weaker in heterogenous population. He also pointed out social learning could break down if 
unobserved individual characteristics are important determinants of neighbors’ outcomes. 
Learning rate is one of the important behavioral factors in the model. Learning essentially 
determines how users respond to the negative or positive consequences of their past decisions. In 
two separate experimental analyses, it is found that when learning rate is large, social structure has 
limited impact on adoption pattern. In Figure 3.11, it is found that adoption patterns are almost 
identical under three different interaction scenarios when 𝜇𝜏 = 3. Similarly, in Figure 3.15, it is 
found that adoption curves with and without change agents are almost similar when 𝜇𝜏 = 3. In 
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other words, when learning rate is large, the individual learning part of the model dominates the 
learning process leading to quick adoption of forecasts. The results also show that asymmetric 
learning due to the asymmetric impacts of punishing and rewarding outcomes could significantly 
influence the diffusion process and the adoption rate at the equilibrium.   
One of the advantages of the model presented in this chapter is that once it is tested and 
validated (e.g., using structured interviews [Luseno et al., 2003; Lybbert et al., 2007], or role-play 
experiments [Ziervogel, 2004; Millner, 2009]), it can be used to design more effective intervention 
or targeting strategies to facilitate adoption of forecasts. In this study, the impact of using an 
extension strategy similar to Training and Visit Extension system [Feder and Slade, 1986; Munshi, 
2004] on the dynamics of forecast adoption is investigated. Results show that adding change agents 
to the system significantly impacts the diffusion process when inter-county interaction exists (i.e., 
𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1). In addition, it is found that with addition of changes agents, there is a structural change 
in the diffusion process (except for large values of learning rate), particularly when 𝜇𝜏 = 1. These 
findings imply that eliciting farmers’ learning rate could play an important role in the effectiveness 
of Training and Visit Extension program with the aim of improving forecast use. Another potential 
implication of the findings is related to targeting strategies. For instance, it is shown that if change 
agents are surrounded by farmers with lower wealth level, forecasts are adopted earlier and would 
spread quicker (see Figure 3.17). Such insights could improve the effectiveness of the targeting 
strategies that are usually costly and resource intensive.   
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3.5 Nomenclature  
List of notations used in this chapter is provided in the following table. 
Table 3.3: List of notations 
Symbol Definition 
𝑐(𝜃) cost as a function of state of the weather, expressed in unit 𝑢 
𝐸[⦁] expectation operator 
ℱ finite set of possible drought forecasts 
ℎ 
probability of adopting forecast 
belief about forecast adoption at the beginning of a time step; ℎ ∈ [0,1] 
ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚 is the updated belief based on social learning  
ℎ∗  adoption threshold or cut-off, ℎ∗ ∈ [0,1] 
𝐿(⦁) learning function in reinforcement learning framework 
ℳ set of agents 
𝑚 total number of agents 
𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎)  Indicating Normal distribution, with two parameters: mean and standard deviation of the distribution 
𝒩𝑖  set of neighbors of agent 𝑖 
𝑛𝑖 total number of neighbors of agent 𝑖 
ℙ(⦁) notation for probability 
𝑝(𝜃) user’s belief about occurrence of state 𝜃 of the random weather event 
𝑝𝜃  user’s belief about occurrence of drought 
𝑝𝑑 probabilistic drought forecast: 𝑝𝑑 ∈ 𝓕 
𝑟 coefficient of risk aversion, 𝑟 ≥ 0 
𝑆 reinforcement strength, expressed in unit 𝑢 
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛  
binary parameter indicating whether agents have social interaction with neighbors in their counties; 
interaction exists if 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑛 = 1. 
𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡  
binary parameter indicating whether agents have social interaction with neighbors outside of their 
counties; interaction exists if 𝑆𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1. 
𝑡 time index 
𝑇 total number of time steps 
𝑈(⦁) utility function 
𝑢 baseline unit used for 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜋, ω, 𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝, 𝑊 
𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 ex post value of forecast, expressed in unit 𝑢 
𝑊 Wealth level, at the beginning of each time step, expressed in unit 𝑢; 𝑊1 = 𝜔 
𝒳 set of possible decisions/actions: 𝒳 = [0,1] 
𝑥 decision variable: fraction of land allocated to crop A, 𝑥 ∈ 𝒳 = [0,1] 
𝑥∗  optimal crop allocation decision  
𝑥∗,𝑐  optimal crop allocation decision based on 𝑝𝜃  (or climatology) 
𝑥∗,𝑓  optimal crop allocation decision based on 𝑝𝑑 (forecast) 
𝑦(𝜃) crop yield as a function of state of the weather, expressed in unit 𝑢 
𝑦0 crop yield in normal condition (𝜃 = 0) 




Table 3.3 (Cont.): Lists of notations 
Symbol Definition 
𝑧  forecast adoption decision, 𝑧 ∈ {0,1}  
α𝑖𝑗  
extent/strength of social interaction between agents 𝑖 and 𝑗 
weight assigned by agent  𝑖 to agent 𝑗’s belief  
𝛾 coefficient for asymmetric learning; 𝛾 = 1 if 𝑆 > 0, and 𝛾 ≥ 1 if 𝑆 < 0. 
Δ = [α𝑖𝑗] 𝑚-by-𝑚 matrix of social interaction  
𝛩  a set of possible states for the random weather event; for the binary drought event: 𝛩 = {0,1} 
𝜃 
random variable representing the state of the uncertain weather event, 𝜃 ∈ Θ; for the binary drought 
event; 𝜃 = 0: no drought, 𝜃 = 1: drought 
𝜋(⦁) normalized payoff function, expressed in unit 𝑢 
𝜋𝑡𝑜𝑡 cumulative ex post payoff by the end of time step 𝑡, expressed in unit 𝑢 
𝜏 learning rate 
𝜙 a set of possible realized states of the event; for the binary drought event: 𝜙 = {0,1} 
φ observation of the event, 𝜑 ∈ Φ; for the binary drought event; 𝜑 = 1: drought, 𝜑 = 0: no drought 





CHAPTER 4 ASSESSING THE VALUE OF SEASONAL CLIMATE 
FORECAST INFORMATION: APPLICATION TO U.S. 
2012 DROUGHT IN CENTRAL ILLINOIS7 
 
In this chapter, an end-to-end forecasting framework is developed to assess the value of 
seasonal climate forecasts in the case of U.S. 2012 drought. The framework integrates a crop 
growth simulation model and an economic decision making to translate seasonal climate forecasts 
into predictive yield which is then used to make cropland allocation and forward contract 
decisions. The model is applied to Salt Creek watershed, which is a typical rainfed watershed in 
Central Illinois. Different scenarios of seasonal climate forecasts are considered to represent 
improvement in the quality of forecasts. The U.S. 2012 drought is specifically chosen as a case 
study to better elicit how improved climate forecast interact with crop insurance in determining 
the value of forecasts. In addition, the drought condition makes it possible to explore the impact 
of increased crop price on the value of forecasts. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In 2012, the United States experienced one of the worst droughts in the history of the 
country. Favorable weather conditions prior to the 2012 crop growth season had increased farmers’ 
expectations of crop production [Westcott and Jewison, 2013]; however, drought developed 
rapidly during May and further extended into the summer, with three quarters of the country 
experiencing abnormally dry conditions [Hoerling et al., 2014]. In the U.S. Midwest and Central 
 
7
 This chapter has been published as Shafiee-Jood et al. [2014b], “Assessing the value of seasonal climate forecast 
information through an end-to-end forecasting framework: Application to U.S. 2012 drought in Central Illinois,” 





Plains, specifically, the combination of low precipitation and high temperature was exceptional, at 
least in the past 25 years, and was comparable to droughts of the 1930s and 1980s [Mallya et al., 
2013; Hoerling et al., 2014]. In Illinois, for example, hot and dry conditions in June and July were 
among the highest recorded since 1895 [Westcott and Jewison, 2013]. The meteorological drought 
immediately propagated to the agricultural system with devastating impacts on crop production 
[Henderson and Kauffman, 2012], particularly in rainfed agriculture systems where farmers’ 
decisions are vulnerable to droughts since they can do little to mitigate drought impacts after 
planting a crop. These decisions include not only operational (e.g., crop type, use of resources), 
but also financial (e.g., crop insurance) and marketing (e.g., contracts) decisions. With the biofuel 
development in recent years in the U.S. Midwest, farmers in the region have been making corn 
contracts with ethanol refineries to obtain a better price ahead of the crop season. Although usually 
profitable, contract farmers suffer the most during severe drought conditions, when low crop 
production is accompanied by high crop prices in the market, as was the case during the 2012 
drought in the U.S. [Zulauf, 2012]. 
The 2012 drought, with its catastrophic economic consequences [NOAA, 2013] particularly 
for farmers, has again raised the question of what is needed and what is available from science and 
engineering communities to help mitigate the drought damage. Utilizing information from 
seasonal climate forecast and long-term climate prediction has always been of great interest to 
improve drought preparedness and mitigation [Hansen, 2005; Cai et al., 2015b]. Long-term 
climate prediction can provide guidance on longstanding and large-scale drought preparedness and 
risk management solutions beyond farmers’ activities, such as infrastructure investment and long-





forecasts are potentially beneficial for increasing farmers’ ability for drought mitigation [Hill and 
Mjelde, 2002; Dutra et al., 2014; Wetterhall et al., 2014]. This is especially true when the seasonal 
forecast lead-time allows farmers, particularly in rainfed systems, to use the information to decide 
crop type, resource use and crop insurance [Sonka et al., 1986; Calanca et al., 2011; Asseng et al., 
2012], as well as farmers’ contracts. In fact, advances in seasonal climate forecasting, especially 
the improvement in GCM-based forecasts and downscaling techniques, have made it possible for 
climate scientists to provide more skillful forecasts to the users [Hansen, 2005; 
Sankarasubramanian et al., 2009; Han and Ines, 2017]. Nevertheless, insufficient skill of seasonal 
forecasts and inefficient information delivery pose challenges for efficiently incorporating 
forecasts in decision-making by farmers [Coelho and Costa, 2010; Kumar, 2010], particularly 
when considering farmers’ risk attitude that makes adoption of new technologies harder [Bosch 
and Eidman, 1987; Asseng et al., 2012]. This is especially the case for drought prediction in extra-
tropical regions that is subject to large uncertainty [Kumar, 2010]. Kumar et al. [2013] studied the 
U.S. 2012 drought over the Great Plains and argued that limited predictability in the mid-latitudes 
would make it difficult to guarantee the reliability of seasonal climate forecasts.  
On the other hand, even if skillful seasonal forecasts are produced, an efficient approach is 
needed to fill the gap between what forecasts provide and what farmers need [Hansen, 2005; 
Kumar, 2010]. In fact, seasonal forecast information will not have economic value unless they 
enable farmers to change management decisions [Hansen, 2005; McIntosh et al., 2007; Kumar, 
2010]. Therefore, proper assessment of seasonal forecasts’ value requires them to be translated 
into user-related variables (e.g., crop yield) and further into decisions [Hill and Mjelde, 2002; 





limiting or fostering utilization of seasonal forecasting in agriculture, especially for drought events 
[Hill and Mjelde, 2002; Hansen, 2005]. 
The main purpose of this study is to assess the possible value of seasonal climate forecasts 
from a regional climate model through an end-to-end forecasting framework using the U.S. 2012 
drought as a case study. The framework is based on the premise that the value of forecast should 
be assessed through end-users’ (e.g., farmers) perspectives rather than just the comparison between 
the outputs of forecast model and observation data; it employs climate and system sciences to 
explore the impacts of climate on human and nature systems, and provides useful information for 
end-user decision making [Coelho and Costa, 2010]. This framework helps better address the 
concern of what would happen if erroneous seasonal forecast information is employed by farmers.  
A further objective of this study is then to investigate the value of improved seasonal 
forecasts in the case of U.S. 2012 drought. For this purpose, reanalysis data are used to drive a 
regional climate model (RCM). Reanalysis is a systematic data assimilation approach that makes 
use of available observation data to produce spatially and temporally consistent global data sets 
[Parker, 2016]. Reanalysis is mainly used in large-scale climate modeling either to provide the 
lateral boundary conditions for driving RCMs or to calibrate transfer functions [Dee et al., 2011; 
Brands et al., 2012]. Compared to the reanalysis data, GCMs normally contain much larger forcing 
errors that are the primary source of RCM downscaling errors [Anthes, 1983; Cocke and LaRow, 
2000; Liang et al., 2001]. The rationale for utilizing observational reanalysis to drive RCMs is that 
the reanalysis-based simulation results can be considered the best possible seasonal forecasts that 
one can obtain. Thus, the reanalysis can be used to evaluate the maximum value added from using 





improves decision-making. Hence, utilizing observational reanalysis-based forecasts in the 
proposed framework with the assumption that it provides the best achievable quality of prediction 
can bring a message to scientific communities regarding what forecast is truly valuable from the 
users’ point of view.  
Finally, this paper also explores the role of government policies and institutional 
interventions on the value of forecast information. Crop insurance and crop price are the two 
common interferences from government and institutions that highly affect farmers’ welfare during 
drought conditions. These interventions in some cases may decrease the value of seasonal 
forecasts, thereby limiting their adoption by farmers [Mjelde et al., 1996; Hill and Mjelde, 2002]. 
The proposed framework is applied to the Salt Creek watershed in Central Illinois in which rainfed 
agriculture is the dominant agricultural activity.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 4.2 detailed description of the 
proposed framework is presented. Following that, sections 4.3 and 4.4 present the results, address 
the objectives of this study and provide complementary discussions based on the results. Finally, 
this chapter is wrapped up with concluding remarks in section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
In this chapter, an end-to-end forecasting framework is proposed (Figure 4.1) by coupling 
a physically-based crop growth simulation model and a stochastic agricultural decision-making 
model. Seasonal forecasts of weather parameters are the inputs to the crop simulation model, which 
are obtained from regional Climate-Weather Research and Forecasting model (CWRF) with 





2012]. It is assumed that seasonal forecasts are provided one month prior to the crop growth season 
so that farmers have sufficient lead-time to adjust or alter their decisions. The crop growth model 
converts multi-scenario weather forecasts into ensemble crop yield prediction thus providing a tool 
to capture spatial heterogeneity in the watershed and simulate different agricultural management 
practices. The stochastic decision-making model determines the optimal farm management and 
marketing decisions based on the multiple forecast scenarios. The framework, therefore, enables 
the translation of the seasonal forecast information into user-relevant variables and decisions that 
help assess the value of seasonal forecasts from farmers’ perspective. Consequently, the 
framework allows exploring the factors affecting the value of forecast such as forecast uncertainty 
and institutional interventions. In the following sections, a detailed explanation of the three major 
components of the framework is presented (Figure 4.1), and the transfer of optimal decisions to 






Figure 4.1: Conceptual end-to-end forecasting framework and the boundary of present study 
 
 Seasonal climate forecasts  
 This study uses seasonal climate forecasts from the state-of-the-science regional Climate-
Weather Research and Forecasting model (CWRF) [Liang et al., 2012], which is a climate 
extension of WRF version 3.1.1 [Skamarock et al., 2008]. CWRF has been developed 
progressively by incorporating various improvements of climate time-scale applications and 
through continuous and intensive validation, so that it can be used in both weather forecasting and 
climate prediction. CWRF provides multi-model ensemble prediction capability by incorporating 
a comprehensive list of alternative parameterization schemes for each of the key physical 





cloud, aerosol, and radiation. The computational domain of CWRF covers the entire U.S. with 30-
km horizontal and 36-level vertical resolutions. Detailed explanation of CWRF and its 
performance can be found in Liang et al. [2012].  
 In this study, CWRF was driven by two GCMs (i.e., Climate Forecast System version 2 
(CFSv2) operated in National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP): CWRF/CFSv2, and 
ECHAM version 4.5 (ECHAM4.5) operated at the International Research Institute for Climate 
Prediction (IRI) in Columbia University: CWRF/ECHAM4.5) to capture the GCM model 
uncertainties [Laurent and Cai, 2007]. For each CWRF set with certain driving forces (e.g., 
CWRF/CFSv2, CWRF/ECHAM4.5), multiple physics configurations (i.e., CWRF/CFSv2 has two 
combinations, and CWRF/ECHAM4.5 has eight combinations) are used to produce ensemble 
prediction. These physics combinations have been intensively evaluated and are a subset of the 
physics ensemble prediction test used in Liang et al. [2012]. Furthermore, CWRF is also driven 
by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) Reanalysis-Interim 
(ERI, [Dee et al., 2011]) with five realizations using different physics-configurations 
(CWRF/ERI). In these CWRF/ERI realizations, the observational reanalysis data are used to drive 
CWRF forecasts of the historical records by providing initial and boundary conditions.  
 CWRF is able to provide seasonal forecasts for a number of parameters. This is useful for 
drought events because crop growth and development is not only affected by precipitation deficit 
but also by high temperature and solar radiation [Calanca et al., 2011]; therefore, precipitation, 
maximum and minimum temperature, and solar radiation (all at daily time-scale) are extracted 






 Crop growth simulation model 
 Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) is used to simulate crop yield using CWRF 
forecasts and reanalysis. SWAT has been extensively used to study hydrology and water quality 
in agricultural watersheds [Ng et al., 2010], as well as climate change impacts on droughts and 
crop yield [Wang et al., 2011]. It also has the capability to simulate crop growth under different 
agricultural management practices [Wang et al., 2011]. The crop growth component of SWAT is 
mainly controlled by the crop-specific input parameters summarized in the SWAT crop database 
and farm operations are determined by the user in the SWAT management files [Neitsch et al., 
2011]. SWAT runs at a daily time scale and therefore calculates the daily biomass production, and 
the crop yield is calculated based on the accumulated biomass produced during the crop season 
[Neitsch et al., 2011].  
 
 Agricultural decision-making model 
 Model Description: The core of the end-to-end forecasting framework is the stochastic 
optimization decision-making model, which includes two decision variables: crop type and 
farmers’ contracts with ethanol refineries. Although drought stress adversely affects crop growth 
and yield, the extent of the impacts depends on the crop type, and the development stage(s) during 
which crop is exposed to the stress [Lipiec et al., 2013]. For example, corn yield is highly 
dependent on weather conditions in June and July, while for soybean, August is also important 
[Westcott and Jewison, 2013]. Therefore, crop type is one of the key management decisions for 
farmers if they are provided with appropriate information before the crop growth season. Another 





with ethanol refinery plants. Among farmers in the U.S. Midwest, for example, such contracts have 
been common over the past decade after biofuel development. In these contracts, similar to other 
forward contracts, farmers and refineries agree upon a contract price, which is usually between the 
regular market price and ethanol plant’s shutdown price (A. Hughes, G. Schnitkey, Personal 
communications, 2013; [Irwin, 2012]), and a threshold production that is determined based on 
corn production in recent years. If farmers cannot provide the threshold production, they need to 
compensate the deficit from the market. These contracts are usually made before the crop growth 
season when farmers have to anticipate the conditions of weather during that period and the crop 
price at harvest based on the knowledge of historical records [A. Hughes, G. Schnitkey, Personal 
communications, 2013].  
 Crop yield (simulated by SWAT) and the consequence of the contracts are the main factors 
that contribute to farmers’ net benefits. Crop yield depends on the crop type (optimized by the 
decision-making model), as well as other farm-level management practices. Therefore, the 
proposed framework couples the decision-making model with the SWAT model so that outputs 
from one model are passed as inputs to the other model until the optimal decisions are determined. 
The decision-making model, therefore, maximizes the expected net benefit of crop production in 
the watershed (Equation 2.17) by determining the optimal crop type and contract choices. In the 
following text, a detailed mathematical formulation of the decision-making model is presented. 
The expected net benefit is calculated as (refer to section 4.6 for a list of notations used in this 
chapter):  
 










where, 𝑁𝐵(∙) ($) is the expected total net benefit in the watershed for one crop growth season as 
a function of weather condition (𝜉) and management decisions (𝑥) including crop type (𝛼) and 
contract decisions (𝛽); 𝑘 is the index of CWRF realizations (or scenarios), and 𝐾 is the total 
number of realizations (i.e., ten for CWRF driven by GCMs and five for CWRF driven by ERI); 𝑖 
is the index of decision units (DUs) (e.g., subbasins as defined in this study), and 𝐼 is the total 
number of DUs; 𝜌𝑘 is the probability of occurrence of realization 𝑘 (e.g., if equally likely, 𝜌𝑘 =
1/𝐾); 𝑅𝑖,𝑘 and 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 ($) are revenue and cost for DU i under forecast realization k, and are defined 
by Equations 4.2–4.4 and Equation 4.5, respectively.                                                                      
 𝑅𝑖,𝑘 = max (𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑘 , 𝐺𝑅𝑖) 4.2 
where, 𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑘 ($) is the direct revenue obtained by selling crops under forecast realization 𝑘 for DU 
𝑖 (Equation 4.3), and 𝐺𝑅𝑖 ($) is the guaranteed revenue determined by crop insurance program for 
DU 𝑖 (Equation 4.4). Farmers will receive payment from crop insurance agency when the direct 
revenue falls below the guaranteed revenue (which is equal to 𝐺𝑅 − 𝐷𝑅).  
𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑘 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝛽𝑖,𝑛) ∙ 𝑦𝑖(𝜉, 𝑘, 𝛼𝑖,𝑛) ∙ 𝐴𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1




where, 𝑛 is the index of crop types, and 𝑁 is the total number of crop types; 𝐴𝑖 (ha) is the area 
specified for DU i; 𝛼𝑖,𝑛 is the crop type decision variable that indicates the fraction of 𝐴𝑖 for crop 
n, where ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 = 1; 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 is the contract decision variable that indicates the fraction of planted 
area for crop 𝑛 with the purpose of selling to the refinery; 𝑦𝑖(∙) (𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎
−1) is the crop yield for 
DU 𝑖 as a function of 𝑘th forecast realization, weather input 𝜉 and crop type 𝛼𝑖,𝑛; 𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑛  ($/𝑡𝑜𝑛) 





refinery. The two terms in this equation present the revenue obtained from planting crop 𝑛 and 
selling it to the regular market and to the refinery, respectively.  
In order to calculate 𝐺𝑅, it is assumed that all farms are enrolled in a revenue protection 
(RP) crop insurance program. RP is a popular insurance program that guarantees farmers’ revenue 
by considering the maximum of projected and harvest prices (𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗 and 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣, respectively). These 
prices, determined by the Risk Management Agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA-RMA), are different from crop market prices and used only for crop insurance purposes. 
When farmers want to make their decisions prior to crop season, they are aware of the projected 
price (𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗) and the current market price (𝑃𝑀𝐵), while harvest price (𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣) is determined later 
during or after the harvest period. Therefore, 𝐺𝑅 ($) is calculated by Equation 4.4 (For more 
information about parameters and formulation refer to http://www.rma.usda.gov/policies/): 
 




where, 𝑐𝑙 is insurance coverage level (50 − 85 percent); 𝐴𝑃𝐻 (𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1) is trend-adjusted actual 
production history determined by USDA-RMA; and 𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑛  ($/𝑡𝑜𝑛) is the projected price for crop 
𝑛.  
𝐶𝑖,𝑘 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑛 ∙ 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑛 ∙ 𝐴𝑖 +
𝑁
𝑛=1
∑[max (𝑇𝑦𝑖,𝑛 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑛(𝜉, 𝑘, 𝛼), 0)]
𝑁
𝑛=1
∙ 𝛼𝑖,𝑛 ∙ 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 ∙ 𝐴𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑛 4.5 
where, 𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑛 ($/ℎ𝑎) is the projected farm cost that depends on crop types selected in the current 
year (𝛼𝑖,𝑛) and in the preceding year (known); and 𝑇𝑦𝑖,𝑛 (𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎
−1) is the yield threshold for DU 
𝑖. The first term in this equation indicates the farm costs, and the second term expresses the refinery 





need to provide the deficit from the market. Since the decisions are being made before crop season, 
𝑃𝑀𝐵 is the best estimate of market price. 
 Value Assessment: The expected net benefit defined in Equation 4.1 can also be considered 
as ex ante net benefit, i.e., the decisions are determined and evaluated under forecast weather 
conditions, estimates of market crop prices, projected prices, and projected farm costs. However, 
in retrospective analysis, it is also profitable to calculate the ex post net benefit, i.e., decisions 
made prior to crop growth season are evaluated under actual weather conditions (𝜉𝑎𝑐𝑡), actual farm 
costs (𝐹𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡), market crop prices in harvest period (𝑃𝑀𝐻) and harvest prices (𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣). In this 
chapter, 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 is defined as a metric to assess the ex post value of seasonal climate forecasts, as 
in Equation 4.6: 
  𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑁𝐵𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝜉𝑎𝑐𝑡, 𝑥
∗|𝐹) − 𝑁𝐵𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝜉𝑎𝑐𝑡, 𝑥
∗|Θ) 
4.6 
where, 𝑥∗|𝐹 and 𝑥∗|Θ are optimal management decisions made prior to crop season based on 
forecast information (𝐹) (e.g., CWRF forecasts) and farmers’ prior knowledge or experience (Θ), 
respectively. In other words, 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 evaluates the difference between ex post net benefits gained 
with and without using forecast information 
 
4.3 Application of the framework 
4.3.1 Case study  
 The end-to-end forecasting framework developed in section 2.24.2 is applied to the Salt 
Creek watershed in Central Illinois (Figure 4.2) to assess the value of seasonal climate forecasts 





agriculture is the main activity, and corn and soybean are the two dominant crops planted in 
rotation [Wang et al., 2011]. Also, farmers in the watershed have supplied feedstocks (particularly 
corn) for the production of biofuels over the past years. All these conditions make the watershed a 
desirable case study for the purpose of elucidating the proposed framework.  
 The SWAT model for the Salt Creek watershed has been developed and calibrated for the 
purpose of another study [Ng et al., 2010]; however, the model is updated and re-calibrated in this 
study to consider recent weather conditions and crop planting and harvesting dates. Figure 4.2 
shows the subbasin delineation for Salt Creek (performed by ArcGIS-ArcView extension for 
SWAT: AVSWAT) and the location of the CWRF gridpoints. The 2002-2004 period is used for 
model warm-up and soil moisture initialization, and then crop yield is simulated for the period of 
2005-2012. Crop yield outputs in 2005-2011 are used to calculate the threshold yield for corn and 
subsequently the refinery penalty cost in each subbasin, as in Equation 4.5, and outputs in 2012 






Figure 4.2: Salt Creek watershed in Illinois (left); subbasin delineation by AVSWAT and the 
location of the CWRF gridpoints (right) 
 
 During normal years in Salt Creek, the crop growth season for corn and soybean starts in 
late April and early May, respectively; therefore, CWRF simulations are initialized for April 1st, 
2012, so that optimal decisions are provided to the farmers one month ahead of the crop season. 
The CWRF simulations end at September 30th, 2012 for CWRF/CFSv2 and CWRF/ERI 
realizations, and at August 30th, 2012 for CWRF/ECHAM4.5 realizations. It is assumed that these 
forecast realizations are equally likely to occur (i.e., 𝜌𝑘 = 1/𝐾) since there is no prior information 
available in this context to determine if any of the GCMs can provide superior predictions. 
Forecasts of daily precipitation, maximum and minimum temperature, and solar radiation are 
extracted from ten CWRF gridpoints in or close to Salt Creek watershed (Figure 4.2). In addition, 
daily weather parameters for Salt Creek are extracted from Illinois State Water Survey [WARM, 





Administration (NOAA) (http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/) for gauges close to CWRF 
gridpoints.  
Each of the 34 delineated subbasins in the watershed is considered as an individual DU 
(i.e., 𝐼 = 34 in Equation 4.1) in the decision-making model with two decision variables: 1) crop 
type (𝑛 = 1: corn, 𝑛 = 2: soybean), and 2) making contract with ethanol refineries (only applies 
to corn: 𝛽𝑖,2 = 0). Table 4.1 presents the values for key parameters used in the decision-making 
model. 
Table 4.1: Values for parameters used in the decision-making model 
Parameter Description Corn Soybean Reference 
𝑃𝑀𝐵a ($/𝑏𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙) 
Market crop price before crop growth 
season (in April) 
6.34 14.23 USDA-NASS b 
𝑃𝑀𝐻 ($/𝑏𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙) 
Market crop price in harvest period 
(averaged over October, November, 
December) 
6.89 14.72 USDA-NASS 
𝑃𝑅 ($/𝑏𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙) Price offered by refinery (for corn) 6.60 − 
Assumption made 
based on Irwin [2012] 
𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗 ($/𝑏𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙) Projected price 5.68 12.55 Schnitkey [2012a] 
𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣  ($/𝑏𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙) Harvest price 7.50 15.39 Schnitkey [2012a] 
𝐴𝑃𝐻 (𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1) Trend-adjusted actual production history 11.6 3.6 FAST c 
𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗 ($/ℎ𝑎) 








Actual farm cost when planted after corn 1408.5 872.3 
Schnitkey [2013b] 
Actual farm cost when planted after corn 1445.6 872.3 
a Prices are reported per bushel of corn or soybean in the U.S., but they are converted to ($/ton) when using in the 
model 
b U.S. Department of Agriculture - National Agricultural Statistics Service (http://www.nass.usda.gov/) 







2012 Drought in Salt Creek: The recent historical relationship (for 2000-2012 period) 
between precipitation departures and maximum temperature departures averaged in June-July (JJ) 
and June-August (JJA) in the Salt Creek watershed is depicted in Figure 4.3. The point representing 
JJ-averaged departures in 2012 is located in the top-left corner indicating combination of extreme 
dry and hot weather conditions. June and July of 2012, in particular, were significantly drier and 
hotter, respectively, than the past 4 years in Salt Creek (see Table 4.2). However, in August, 
weather condition in Northern and Central Illinois recovered to some extent with precipitation and 
temperature being near-normal levels (http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/maps.php). In 
Salt Creek, the August of 2012 was wetter and slightly milder than the previous two years (Table 
4.2), and therefore the point representing JJA-averaged departures in 2012 corresponds to less 
unfavorable weather conditions compared to JJ-averaged departures. 
 
Figure 4.3: The relationship between June-July (JJ) averaged and June-August (JJA) averaged 
precipitation departures and maximum temperature departures in 2000-2012 period with respect 






Table 4.2: Monthly averages of precipitation and maximum temperature for June, July and 
August in Salt Creek* 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
June 186.9 , 29.4 143.2 , 28.7 260.9 , 29.9 139.9 , 29.2 42.0 , 29.7 
July 203.8 , 28.8 117.1 , 26.3 90.1 , 30.8 44.7 , 32.5 27.8 , 34.2 
August 33.0 , 27.9 132.1 , 26.6 66.3 , 31.2 26.2 , 30.5 89.3 , 30.5 
* In each cell, the value on the left side represents precipitation (𝑚𝑚) and the value on the right side 
represents maximum temperature (℃) 
 
The meteorological drought in 2012 affected the agricultural system. Figure 4.4 shows the 
variation of corn and soybean yields in Salt Creek during 2000-2012 period based on USDA 
county-level data sets (available from http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov). The 2012 corn yield in Salt 
Creek was 7.3 (𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1), which is its lowest level since 1989. The excessive heat and drought 
condition during June and July significantly decreased pollination efficiency during the most 
critical stages of corn development (i.e., silking/tasselling), which usually take place in mid-
summer [Sonka et al., 1986]. However, the situation was to some extent different for soybean, 
since the most critical stages for soybean yield occur in late July and early August when soybean 
pods begin to develop [Doss et al., 1974]. During this stage, soybean can retain young and 
developing pods and increase seed size if it receives adequate rainfall. Therefore, boosted by 
favorable weather condition in August 2012 (Table 4.2), soybean yield in Salt Creek was not 
significantly affected by the 2012 drought (similar to Northern and Central regions in Illinois; 
Schnitkey [2013a]) and reached the value of 3.6 (𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1), which is slightly less than its average 






Figure 4.4: Variation of corn and soybean yields in Salt Creek over 2000-2012 period 
 
4.3.2 Seasonal forecasts and predictive yield 
Results from CWRF seasonal forecasts: GCM-driven CWRF operational seasonal 
forecasts (hereafter referred to as CWRF forecasts) of precipitation, maximum and minimum 
temperature, and solar radiation for 2012 summer (monthly averages of June, July and August for 
Salt Creek) are shown in Figure 4.5. It can be seen that most of the forecast realizations fail to 
capture the drought condition in June and July of 2012. CWRF forecasts generally tend to highly 
overestimate precipitation and underestimate maximum temperature in June and July of 2012. 
However, the mismatch between ensemble mean and observation for these two variables is 
negligible in August. For minimum temperature, CWRF forecasts are slightly and substantially 
lower than observations in June and August, respectively, while the model shows a better 
performance for July. In July and August, there is a good correspondence between solar radiation 
observation and forecast ensemble means; however, forecasts generally have a tendency to 






Figure 4.5: Monthly averages of an ensemble of 10 CWRF forecast realizations for June, July 
and August of 2012 for Salt Creek watershed 
 
SWAT model utilizes the CWRF forecasts realizations to predict the crop yield in different 
subbasins of Salt Creek. Crop yield prediction results depicted in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 reflect 
the spatial variability associated with weather forecast information and heterogeneity of soil types 
in the watershed. Under some realizations (for example realization 2 of CWRF/CFSv2 and 
realization 7 of CWRF/ECHAM4.5), crop yield varies significantly across the watershed. Figure 
4.6 and Figure 4.7 also present the comparison between predicted (watershed-averaged for each 
realization) and observed corn and soybean yields in Salt Creek. It can be seen that model’s 





prediction (Figure 4.6). The average of predicted corn yield in the watershed (11.3 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1) is 
55 percent greater than USDA reported corn yield in 2012 (7.3 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1) and 49 percent greater 
than simulated corn yield based on 2012 actual climate data (7.6 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1, not shown in the 
figure). On the other hand, soybean yield prediction on average also overestimates the 2012 
historical yield (Figure 4.7) by 11 percent (4.0 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1 compared with 3.6 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1); however, 
the difference is not as significant as corn yield because there is a good correspondence between 
CWRF forecasts of precipitation, maximum temperature and solar radiation and observation data 
in August (Figure 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.6: Variability of predicted corn yield in different subbasins of Salt Creek for each of 10 
CWRF forecast realizations; the box plot compares predictive yields averaged for Salt Creek 







Figure 4.7: Variability of predicted soybean yield in different subbasins of Salt Creek for each 
of 10 CWRF forecast realizations; the box plot compares predictive yields averaged for Salt 
Creek watershed with 2012 observation 
 
Results from observational reanalysis-based CWRF forecasts: CWRF is also driven by 
reanalysis data (CWRF/ERI realizations) to help better evaluate the proposed framework and 
address the question of What is the value of improved seasonal forecasts from farmers’ 
perspective? Table 4.3 compares monthly averages of precipitation and maximum temperature 
from CWRF forecasts (ten realizations) with CWRF observational reanalysis-driven forecasts 
(hereafter referred to as reanalysis-based forecasts) (five realizations) and observation data 
averaged over three major CWRF gridpoints (2, 5, and 9 in Figure 4.2) in June, July and August 
of 2012. It can be observed that realizations of reanalysis-based forecasts are able to capture (and 





Table 4.3: Comparing CWRF forecasts of precipitation and maximum temperature with 
reanalysis-based forecasts and 2012 observation* 
 Precipitation (𝒎𝒎)  Maximum Temperature (°𝑪) 
 June July August  June July August 
CWRF Forecast 
Realizations 
128.6 92.0 106.2   28.3 30.8 29.4 
Reanalysis-based CWRF 
Forecast Realizations 
26.6 43.2 55.7   30.0 34.9 32.4 
2012 Observation 33.5 33.1 94.2   29.1 34.3 30.3 
* The values are averaged over gridpoints 2, 5, and 9 (see Figure 2.5) 
 
Therefore, when SWAT model is driven with reanalysis-based forecasts, it is expected that 
the corn yield drops compared to the case of CWRF forecasts. The results presented in Table 4.4 
show that the average corn yield under reanalysis realizations in Salt Creek (7.2 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1) 
matches the 2012 observed yield (7.3 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1). On the other hand, reanalysis realizations cannot 
completely reproduce the recovered weather conditions in August, despite the consistency between 
CWRF forecasts and observation data in this month. Hence, the predicted soybean yields in this 
case are less than the 2012 observed yield (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4: Corn and soybean yields (ton.ha-1) averaged over Salt Creek based on reanalysis-
based forecast realizations 
 Reanalysis-based Forecast 
Realizations 2012 Observation 
(USDA) 
CWRF Forecast 
Realizations (Mean)  Lowest Mean Highest 
Corn 6.8 7.2 7.7 7.3 11.3 
Soybean 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 4.0 
 
The results presented in this section show that the predicted corn yield using CWRF 





soybean yield by only 11 percent. However, utilizing reanalysis-based forecasts makes the yield 
prediction closer to observation, specifically for corn, although soybean yield is slightly 
underestimated because the weather condition in August is not predicted well by the reanalysis-
based forecasts.   
 
4.3.3 Optimal decisions and value assessment 
 This section presents the results of the decision-making model based on three cases of 
forecast information support: CWRF forecasts, reanalysis-based CWRF forecasts, and perfect 
forecasts (i.e., 2012 weather observation). In the case of CWRF forecasts, planting corn (97 
percent of subbasins) and contracting with ethanol refineries (70 percent of applicable subbasins, 
see Figure 4.8) are dominant decisions in the watershed. This is because predicted corn yield is 
high (Figure 4.6) and farmers expect to obtain more benefit by planting corn and making contracts 
with refineries, similar to preceding years. Nevertheless, making contracts is not the preferred 
strategy in some subbasins because of high values of the yield threshold, which is a result of high 
corn yields in the previous years. The expected net benefit in subbasins with contract is on average 






Figure 4.8: Optimal contract decisions in different subbasins of Salt Creek watershed in the case 
of CWRF forecasts information (“Not Applicable” corresponds to soybean) 
  
Under reanalysis-based CWRF forecasts, “corn” and “no-contract” are the optimal 
decisions in the whole watershed. In this case, the predicted corn yield (Table 4.4) is significantly 
lower than the average corn yield in the previous years (11.4 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1 in 2000-2011 period) due 
to drought anticipation; thus, it is not beneficial to make a contract with refineries. Also, since the 
predicted corn and soybean yields (7.2 and 3.2 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1, respectively) are lower than the USDA-
RMA projected yield (11.6 and 3.6 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1, respectively), farmers expect that crop insurance 
payments will compensate for their reduced revenue. However, the payback from RP insurance 
program for corn is very high due to the considerable difference between predicted yield and 
USDA-RMA projected yield, which makes corn more profitable than soybean. In the case of 
perfect forecast information, similar to the previous case, “no-contract” in the whole watershed is 





extreme drought condition. However, almost in half of the Salt Creek (41 percent, see Figure 4.9), 
soybean is the optimal crop type. In this case, soybean yield on average (3.6 𝑡𝑜𝑛. ℎ𝑎−1) is greater 
than that under reanalysis-based forecasts and thus the actual revenue gained by selling soybean 
to the market, especially in northern and eastern subbasins, is more than corn even when 
considering insurance paybacks for corn.  
Table 4.5: Average expected net benefit ($/ℎ𝑎) over Salt Creek based on different cases of 
information support 





All Subbasins 1,605.2 1,054.6 1,212.7 
Subbasins with 
Contract 
1,663.5 0.0 0.0 
Subbasins 
without Contract 
1,453.4 1,054.6 1,212.7 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Optimal crop type decisions in different subbasins of Salt Creek watershed in the 





As shown in Table 4.5, the average expected net benefit when decisions are informed by 
CWRF forecasts is larger than the other two cases as the drought is not anticipated in this case and 
high predicted corn yield leads to higher income. Nonetheless, it was shown that CWRF seasonal 
forecasts cannot capture the drought condition in Salt Creek (Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6); hence, 
when these decisions are implemented, the ex post net benefit will be significantly smaller than 
the expected (ex ante) net benefit. Table 4.6 presents the ex post net benefit and value of forecast 
information (Equation 4.6) under different types of forecast information support. The average ex 
post net benefit over Salt Creek in the case of CWRF forecast ($636.6/ℎ𝑎) is 60 percent less than 
its expected value ($1605.2/ℎ𝑎), which is mainly associated with subbasins with contract (ex post 
net benefit of $392.9/ℎ𝑎 compared with expected net benefit of $1,663.5/ℎ𝑎). In fact, even with 
CWRF forecast information, the net benefit of non-contract farmers drops only by 12 percent. This 
is because the increased corn price in the market during harvest period (10 percent more than 
market price in April) and the elevated crop insurance paybacks due to high harvest price for corn 
(32 percent more than corn projected price) to some extent offset the outcome of employing 
erroneous information. In this case, the ex post value of forecast information is negative implying 
that utilizing them would make farmers worse off in the case of 2012 drought in Salt Creek. In the 
two other cases (i.e., reanalysis-based forecasts and perfect forecasts), the ex post net benefits 
(Table 4.6) are larger than their expected values (Table 4.5) as a result of increase in both market 
and harvest prices due to drought impacts. Also, in both cases, information has positive ex post 
value indicating that it would be valuable for farmers to utilize them instead of making decisions 
based on their experiences. Under perfect forecast, ex post net benefit is larger than that under 





difference in expected net benefit values (15 percent), despite the fact that crop type decisions are 
different in the two cases. This implies that farmers’ revenues are regulated because of institutional 
and governmental interventions (in the form of market prices and crop insurance) during severe 
drought conditions.  
Table 4.6: Average ex post net benefit and value ($/ℎ𝑎) over Salt Creek based on different cases 
of information support 




𝑵𝑩𝒆𝒙−𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕 636.6* 1,320.9 1,347.7 
𝑽𝒆𝒙−𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕 −216.4 467.9 494.7 
* For subbasins with contract: 392.9, and for subbasins without contract: 1,271.3 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 In this section, the results are further elaborated, and the challenges associated with using 
seasonal climate forecast in agricultural decision-making, particularly during extreme drought 
conditions, are discussed. 
 2012 drought predictability and forecast reliability: The multi-model and ensemble 
seasonal climate forecasts provided by CWRF driven by two operational GCMs predictions could 
not capture the 2012 drought in Salt Creek watershed. The main reason for CWRF’s inability to 
capture the 2012 drought can be attributed to the limited inherent predictability of the U.S. 2012 
drought. Drought onset predictability (detection) and reliability (false alarms) are the main 
challenges associated with drought prediction [Yuan and Wood, 2013]. Despite the potential 
capability of GCM-based seasonal forecasting systems in drought prediction, the mechanisms 
those models employ might not be sufficient to make them capable of predicting all kinds of 





[2014] argued that all extreme events do not necessarily require strong external forcings; they 
further discussed that the U.S. 2012 drought in the Great Plains (and possibly in the Midwest) was 
a flash drought [Otkin et al., 2018] caused by atmospheric noises with little predictability. 
Moreover, although it has been well established in the literature that extreme climate events over 
tropical regions depend on extreme SST (sea surface temperature) anomalies [Kumar et al., 2013], 
a recent study conducted by Dutra et al. [2013] on the 2010-2011 drought in the Horn of Africa 
(HoA) showed that state-of-the-art ECMWF seasonal precipitation forecasts cannot capture the 
HoA 2011 drought condition in the March-May (MAM) rainy season, as they claimed no strong 
correlation exists between MAM precipitation and large-scale anomalies. All this evidence has 
raised new challenges regarding the capability of seasonal climate forecasting systems for 
predicting droughts, particularly in extra-tropical latitudes [Kumar et al., 2013; Hoerling et al., 
2014].  
It should be made clear that one flaw in the forecast assessment framework is that bias 
correction was not applied for the forecasted weather parameters. Bias correction methods such as 
quantile mapping can reduce the model forecast bias, which is expected to result in better overall 
system performance (e.g., [Hejazi et al., 2014]). The underlying idea of bias correction is to 
employ a transformation algorithm that identifies possible biases between observed and model 
climate variables to adjust model output [Teutschbein and Seibert, 2012]. For the case of this study 
with a single year as the prediction period that experienced extreme weather, multi-year GCM-
based CWRF simulation of a training period (e.g., 1982-2011) is required as a reference against 
the observation. Currently it is difficult, if not impossible, to perform the required multi-year 





Although seasonal forecasts from CWRF have been utilized to test the products from a 
state-of-the-art dynamic climate model, different approaches, including statistical methods, can be 
used to provide forecasts inputs to the framework [Coelho and Costa, 2010; Yuan et al., 2013]. 
However, comparing various types of forecasts is beyond the scope of this study.  
 End-to-end forecasting framework: The main advantage of the end-to-end forecasting 
framework is to convert probabilistic information into real-world management decisions in an 
understandable format for the end users. The need of such a framework is related to the mismatches 
between the type of information currently provided to farmers and the type of information farmers 
need to make the decisions. This discrepancy has been pointed out by several studies in the 
literature [Hill and Mjelde, 2002; Hansen, 2005; Kumar, 2010]. Nevertheless, there exist several 
important concerns to successfully overcome this challenge. As this study shows, different types 
of information would result in distinct decisions, which might end up having different values for 
farmers. Moreover, if information is not sufficiently accurate, specifically in drought conditions, 
it can make farmers worse off. For instance, Table 4.6 shows that using seasonal forecast 
information in the case of the 2012 drought would have resulted in even worse conditions for 
farmers in Salt Creek. However, the challenges are not limited to the reliability of forecast 
information. Another challenge can arise when forecast information is being translated into crop 
yield; in other words, even with highly skillful forecasts, the crop growth model may not be able 
to accurately simulate crop responses to drought conditions [Savage, 2013]. Physically-based crop 
growth simulation models (e.g., SWAT) usually require a large number of input parameters that 
need to be calibrated and validated based on historical data. The performance of such models 





the reliability of model predictions beyond the calibration and validation conditions is highly 
limited. The model typically exceeds its predictive limits when modelling extreme climatic events, 
such as drought, unless the model is specifically calibrated under such drought conditions. Finally, 
an important challenge that has not been discussed so far in this study lies at the last stage of the 
proposed framework (Figure 4.1), i.e., transferring optimal decisions to farmers, monitoring their 
responses to the information provided, and adjusting the decision-making model based on farmers’ 
attitude toward forecast information. In this study, it is assumed that farmers are risk neutral and 
utility maximizers. It is also assumed that farmers’ behavior over the study region is homogenous. 
These assumptions, however, can affect the assessment of forecast value. There are some studies 
in the literature trying to address the impacts of farmers’ risk attitudes on forecast value [Marshall 
et al., 1996; Mjelde et al., 1996; Meza et al., 2008; Ng et al., 2011], and also the effect of the 
heterogeneity of farmers’ behaviors in the decision-making models [Ng et al., 2011]; However, 
relaxing these assumptions requires further research, which is beyond the scope of the current 
study. Furthermore, the information dissemination is important for farmers to actually use the 
information in their decision-making. For example, text messages and Twitter, as well as new 
technologies such as smartphones, are promising ways to convey the information and optimal 
decisions to farmers and monitor their feedbacks [Mittal and Parthasarathy, 2013].  
 Institutional effects: No matter how skillful seasonal forecasts are or how efficient the 
end-to-end framework is in translating and transferring that information to end users, the value of 
such information for farmers highly depends on institutional interventions such as crop market 
prices, insurance programs (including projected and harvest prices), ad hoc disaster programs, and 





demonstrates how these interventions can affect farmers’ decisions. Although crop production in 
the Midwest was greatly affected in 2012, the crop insurance programs well compensated farmers 
for their loss of revenue. In fact, on average, Midwestern farmers (non-contract farmers) had even 
larger income in 2012 than in 2011 due to higher market prices and, more importantly, crop 
insurance payments based on higher harvest prices [USDA-ERS, 2014]. The results presented in 
Table 4.6 imply that crop insurance and market prices have an effect on the perceived value of 
forecast. It shows that crop insurance has even decreased the value of information, which can be 
justified as the goal of crop insurance programs [Mjelde et al., 1996]. As shown in Table 4.6, the 
average ex post net benefits for non-contract subbasins are almost the same under three different 
types of information (CWRF forecasts: $1271.3/ℎ𝑎, reanalysis-based CWRF forecasts: 
$1320.9/ℎ𝑎, and perfect forecasts: $1347.7/ℎ𝑎); meanwhile the difference in 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 under 
reanalysis-based forecasts and perfect forecasts is negligible (Table 4.6), despite the differences in 
crop type decisions (see Figure 4.9). To elaborate more on the effect of crop insurance, ex post 
values of information are compared under three different crop insurance scenarios: revenue 
protection (RP), yield protection (YP), and no-insurance (NI) (Table 4.7). The optimal decisions 
under the YP scenario are very similar to the RP scenario presented in section 3, regardless of the 
type of information support. For the NI scenarios, however, the optimal decisions under CWRF 
forecasts are similar to the YP and RP scenarios, while for reanalysis-based forecasts and perfect 
forecasts soybean is the dominant crop type in the watershed (100 percent and 97 percent of 
subbasins, respectively). Table 4.7 indicates that the difference between ex post value of 
reanalysis-based forecasts and perfect forecasts under YP is significant, which is not the case for 





benefits is larger than the RP program, which can be attributed to the fact that YP is a weaker 
insurance program than RP. Alternatively, the role of skillful forecasts is more evident in the NI 
scenario. It can be seen from Table 4.7 that flawed information would subsequently lead to even 
more negative 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 under the NI scenario, while more accurate information results in larger 
positive 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡. It should be mentioned that the difference between 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 in reanalysis-based 
forecasts and perfect forecasts is negligible because the crop decisions are almost the same. 
Table 4.7: Ex post value of information for all subbasins in Salt Creek based on different 







Revenue Protection −216.4 467.9 494.7 
Yield Protection −352.7 389.4 526.1 
No Insurance −505.3 628.1 628.8 
 
 The uncertainty associated with market and harvest prices also affects the value of forecast 
information. Figure 4.10 illustrates the effect of corn harvest price on differential ex post value of 
perfect forecasts (𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑃𝐹 ) and reanalysis-based forecasts (𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑅𝐹 ), i.e., 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑅𝐹 , 
under two scenarios: 1) corn harvest price is variable, while other prices are kept constant at their 
2012 values, and 2) all prices are variable following their relationships in 2012. The second 
scenario is more realistic since there is a strong correlation between market and harvest prices for 
each crop and also between corn and soybean prices. Under both scenarios, it can be observed that 
the value of perfect forecasts declines compared to reanalysis-based forecasts as corn harvest price 
increases. This is because under reanalysis-based forecasts, corn is the only crop planted in the 





paybacks and subsequently more revenue for farmers. In fact, when the corn harvest price is 
between 7.4 and 7.9 ($/𝑏𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙), there is no significant difference between 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑃𝐹  and 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑅𝐹 , 
despite the considerable differences in the optimal crop type decisions. The decline of the marginal 
value is milder under the second scenario since corn harvest price varies with other prices. It should 
be mentioned that the two curves cross each other in the point where the prices are all equal to the 
2012 values. 
 
Figure 4.10: Effect of corn harvest price on the differential ex post value of perfect forecasts and 
reanalysis-based CWRF forecasts 
 
 Value Assessment: The standard definition of value of information is discussed in 
information economics literature (e.g., [Hilton, 1981; Mjelde et al., 1988, 1996]), and can be 
represented by Equation 4.7: 
 
𝑉 = ∫ max
𝑥
∫ 𝑁𝐵(𝜉, 𝑥) ∙ 𝑓(𝜉|𝑘) ∙ 𝜌𝑘𝑑𝜉𝑑𝑘 − max
𝑥





where, 𝑉 ($) is the value of information; 𝑁𝐵(∙) is the net benefit but only for one realization of 
weather condition; 𝑓(𝜉) is the prior knowledge about the weather condition that can be based on 
the historical probability density functions; and 𝑓(𝜉|𝑘) is the updated weather information based 
on the 𝑘th forecast realization. The two terms in this equation represent the optimal expected net 
benefit based on forecast information and prior knowledge (e.g., farmers’ experiences), 
respectively. The value of information expressed in this equation can also be considered as a metric 
for ex ante value assessment, since the information is evaluated before occurrence of the event 
(e.g., crop season); therefore, this measure is different from what is presented in Equation 4.6 
which can only be utilized in retrospective analysis. The rationale behind the definition in Equation 
4.7 is that “forecasts are specified to insure that overall probability of each forecasted climatic 
conditions equals its historical probability” [Mjelde et al., 1988]. When there is an exceptional 
drought condition, as in the case of 2012 drought, this underlying assumption is violated, and this 
definition is no longer valid to assess the value of forecast information. For instance, the positive 
values of 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 in Table 4.8 suggest that utilizing information from either reanalysis-based 
forecasts or perfect forecasts makes farmers better off at the end of the crop growth season; 
meanwhile 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 values with these cases are negative which implies that employing such 
forecast information would make farmers worse off. Moreover, 𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒  can lead to meaningful 
information only if the forecasting system provides sufficiently skillful prediction (e.g., see the 
difference for ex ante and ex post value of CWRF forecasts in Table 4.8). Accordingly, it is needed 
to define a new metric for ex ante assessment of forecast values that can be applied to extreme 





Table 4.8: Comparison of ex ante and ex post value of forecasts ($/ℎ𝑎) over Salt Creek based 
on different cases of information support 




𝑽𝒆𝒙−𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆 217.6  −333.1 −175.0 
𝑽𝒆𝒙−𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕 −216.4 467.9 494.7 
  
4.5 Conclusion 
 This study proposes an end-to-end forecasting framework to assess the value of seasonal 
climate forecasts and applies it to the case of the U.S. 2012 drought. The end-to-end forecasting 
framework simulates information propagation and translates raw information into user-relevant 
decision support. Hence, it helps avoid the inherent confusions associated with probabilistic 
forecasts and provides a tool to differentiate among different types of information and assess their 
values. This study highlights some of the challenges extensively mentioned in the literature (e.g., 
forecast skill) and brings up some other issues (e.g., institutional intervention), which play crucial 
roles in determining the usefulness of seasonal forecasts in farmers’ decision-making, particularly 
during droughts. Despite all the efforts and progress made in climate sciences to improve the skill 
of seasonal forecasts, the limited capability of seasonal predictions in extra-tropical regions in 
providing useful information for farmers (especially with rainfed crops) is a concern. The results 
of this study show that the current operational seasonal forecasts are insufficient to predict the 
extreme drought condition in the summer of 2012, and the direct use of the forecasts in that case 
could actually worsen the potential benefit for farmers. In the end-to-end forecasting framework, 
erroneous information propagates from weather forecast to famers’ decision making, which may 





reliability) is still the main challenge in this context. It should be indicated again that bias 
correction could possibly improve the performance of the seasonal forecasts; however, to what 
extent it could do so might be limited given that the GCMs (e.g., CFSv2) failed in predicting the 
2012 U.S. drought in the Great Plains and Midwest [Kumar et al., 2013]. Also, it is noteworthy 
that this study does not intend to devalue successful uses of seasonal forecasts for other cases.   
 This study also shows that employing reanalysis-based CWRF forecasts as a surrogate for 
improved seasonal climate forecasts provide useful information to adjust farmers’ decisions on 
their contracts with ethanol refineries, which was the main reason for some farmers’ huge 
economic losses during the U.S. 2012 drought in the Midwest, regardless of the uncertainties 
associated with drought impacts on prices. Furthermore, the comparative analysis of the U.S. 2012 
drought impacts on corn and soybean yields in Salt Creek watershed highlights the needs for 
accurate prediction of the evolution of climate anomalies, not just the seasonal mean conditions, 
which impose even tougher challenges for seasonal climate prediction.  
 This study also demonstrates the role of institutional intervention on the perceived value 
of seasonal forecasts. It is observed that institutional effects in the form of crop insurance and crop 
prices influence farmers’ decisions and, thereby, regulate farmers’ revenue, especially during 
drought events. The analysis presented in this study implies that institutional interventions could 
impose another challenge for utilizing climate forecast information by farmers, particularly 
considering their risk aversion attitude [Hill and Mjelde, 2002]. Therefore, we suggest that 
institutional effects should be considered in value assessment studies. Moreover, the feedbacks 
among the institutional interventions and climate forecast information should also be explored, 





and/or how advanced forecast technology may alter supply-demand relations and subsequently 
pricing mechanisms [Hill and Mjelde, 2002; Kumar, 2010]. 
 Another important issue that is highlighted in this study is the need for improved metrics 
to assess the value of information. It is found that the metric that has been widely used in the 
literature for ex ante value assessment of forecast information is associated with an assumption of 
stationary climate, i.e., the historical probability distribution of weather parameters remains stable. 
However, extreme droughts, such as the 2012 drought, may not even fall in the range of the 
historical distribution. For those events, the ex ante assessment based on the existing metric is not 
able to provide valid information and it could even mislead farmers by suggesting decisions that 
make farmers worse off. As shown in this study, the ex post assessment, though conducted in a 
retrospective context, provides useful information in terms of the value of forecast.   
 
4.6 Nomenclature  
List of notations used in this chapter is provided in the following table. 
Table 4.9: List of notations 
Symbol Definition 
𝐴𝑖  area specified for DU 𝑖 [ℎ𝑎] 
𝐴𝑃𝐻 trend-adjusted actual production history [𝑡𝑜𝑛 ∙ ℎ𝑎−1] 
𝐶𝑖,𝑘  cost for DU 𝑖 under forecast realization 𝑘 [$] 
𝑐𝑙 crop insurance coverage level 
𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑘  direct revenue obtained by selling crops under forecast realization k for DU i [$] 
𝐹 information based on forecast 
𝑓(𝜉) probability density function representing farmers’ prior knowledge of weather condition 
𝑓(𝜉|𝑘) 
probability density function representing updated weather information based on kth forecast 
realization 
𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗 projected farm cost as a function of crop types in the current and the previous years [$/ℎ𝑎] 





Table 4.9 (Cont.): List of notations 
Symbol Definition 
𝐺𝑅𝑖 guaranteed revenue determined by crop insurance program for DU i [$] 
𝑖 index of DUs; 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼 
𝑘 index of forecast realizations; 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾 
𝑛 index of crop types; 𝑛 = 1,2, … , 𝑁 
𝑁𝐵(∙) 
expected total net benefit in the watershed for one crop season as a function of weather condition and 
management decisions [$] 
𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗 
crop projected price determined by USDA-RMA before the crop growth season and used only for 
crop insurance purposes [$/𝑡𝑜𝑛] 
𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣  
crop harvest price determined by USDA-RMA almost at the end of crop growth season and used only 
for crop insurance purposes [$/𝑡𝑜𝑛] 
𝑃𝑀𝐵  crop price at the market (one month) before crop growth season [$/𝑡𝑜𝑛] 
𝑃𝑀𝐻  crop price at the market during harvest period [$/𝑡𝑜𝑛] 
𝑃𝑅 crop price offered by refinery in contracts [$/𝑡𝑜𝑛] 
𝑅𝑖,𝑘  gross revenue for DU 𝑖 under k
th forecast realization [$] 
𝑇𝑦𝑖,𝑘 yield threshold specified in the contracts [$/𝑡𝑜𝑛] 
𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 expected (ex ante) value of forecast information [$] 
𝑉𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ex post value of employing forecast information [$] 
𝑥 farm management decisions; 𝑥∗ corresponds to optimal decisions 
𝑦𝑖(∙) crop yield as a function of weather condition, forecast realization and crop type [𝑡𝑜𝑛 ∙ ℎ𝑎
−1] 
𝛼𝑖,𝑛 crop type decision variable for DU 𝑖 denoting the fraction of 𝐴𝑖 for crop 𝑛 
𝛽𝑖,𝑛 
contract decision variable for DU 𝑖 denoting the fraction of 𝐴𝑖 specified for crop n only for contract 
purposes 
Θ information based on farmers’ prior knowledge 
𝜉 weather condition input that can be based on forecast realizations or farmers’ prior knowledge 
𝜉𝑎𝑐𝑡  actual weather condition during the crop growth season 
𝜌𝑘  probability of occurrence of k






CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Summary and main findings  
Climate forecasts, particularly at seasonal scale, could potentially help farmers and 
agricultural decisions makers manage climate variability in agricultural systems more effectively 
[Hansen, 2005], and could play a key role in proactive drought management [Sivakumar et al., 
2014; Cai et al., 2017]. However, although climate forecasts have been available for couple of 
decades, and despite the improvements in their quality, there is not much evidence of sustained 
uptake and use of forecasts in farmers’ decision making [Millner and Washington, 2011; Mase 
and Prokopy, 2014]. This contradicts “the notion suggesting that the route to improved forecast 
use is primarily via forecast improvement” [Hu et al., 2006]. It is therefore important to pay 
attention to other factors in order to increase the use of forecasts, particularly in regions where 
forecasts have been shown to be skillful.  
By using insights from empirical field-based studies investigating the barriers to the use of 
forecasts, refined, more realistic models of forecast valuation and adoption were developed in this 
dissertation. These models incorporate a diverse set of factors related to forecast characteristics, 
users’ characteristics, and institutions. These models serve two important purposes. First, they 
provide new understanding of how the interactions among different factors contribute to users’ 
perceived value of forecasts and their adoption behaviors. Second, they also provide testable 
hypotheses that can be used to guide empirical research and design more effective intervention 
strategies. These hypotheses can be (and should be) investigated in the field or in controlled 
laboratory experiments before they are used for policy recommendations [Millner and 





This dissertation investigated three key questions:  
1) What is the role of institutional interventions in the value of improved seasonal 
forecasts? 
2) How does improvement in forecast accuracy influence user’s response to forecasts?  
3) What is the impact of social interactions and social network structure on farmers’ 
adoption behavior?   
To answer these questions, different theoretical and applied models were developed in this 
dissertation. Recognizing the importance of perceived accuracy as a behavioral factor influencing 
adoption of forecasts, CHAPTER 2 focused on investigating how the interaction between forecast 
accuracy and perceived accuracy influences user’s response to forecasts. A theoretical model of 
forecast valuation was developed that incorporates three key user-related factors: risk attitude, 
wealth level, and perceived accuracy. The model includes two belief-updating components. One 
of these two components captures how users process probabilistic drought forecast information 
(i.e., how users update their beliefs about drought once they receive a probabilistic drought 
forecast), whereas the other expresses how users update their beliefs about forecast accuracy based 
on comparison of forecasts and observation. The model was applied to a stylized, yet realistic, 
cropland allocation problem in which farmers should determine his optimal land allocation 
between two crops.  
Despite the abstraction and simplification, the model provides a tool to better understand 
the complex relationship between the value of forecast and the three behavioral parameters. It is 
found that for any given risk aversion and wealth levels, users must have a minimum trust in 





between forecast accuracy and perceived accuracy, an experiment was designed in which the 
accuracy of forecasts first improves gradually and then remains constant. It is shown that although 
perceived accuracy generally follows the trend of forecast accuracy, there is a lag in the beginning 
which significantly influences both ex ante and ex post value of forecasts. This is particularly 
important when forecasts have relatively lower accuracy; in this case, fully trusting forecasts 
overestimates the ex ante value of forecasts; however, since forecasts are not accurate, ex post 
values of forecasts often become negative. The model was then used to determine the relationships 
between the long-term economic gain of using drought forecasts and user’s characteristics. This 
analysis generates some counter-intuitive, testable hypotheses which can provide important 
insights to guide the educational efforts with the goal of increasing users’ trust in forecasts. For 
instance, a range of risk aversion and wealth levels is determined for which such educational efforts 
could be most effective. 
CHAPTER 3 focused on the dynamic aspect of forecast adoption and diffusion. In order to 
model this dynamic learning behavior, an agent-based model of forecast adoption and diffusion 
was developed that incorporates two types of learning: learning by doing, which is represented by 
a learning heuristic based on reinforcement learning mechanism, and learning from others, which 
is represented by a DeGroot-style belief aggregation model. The model was applied to a 
hypothetical case study area with 625 agents in 25 counties.  
The model provides new insights about the impact of social network on the temporal and 
spatial dynamics of forecast adoption. First, it is found that the diffusion of forecast adoption in 
the system follows the typical S-shaped curve suggested in the diffusion of innovation framework 





or both). However, the structure of social network has limited impact on adoption pattern when 
learning rate is large. In other words, in this case, the “learning by doing” component of learning 
process is dominant. In addition, the impact of an extension strategy similar to Training and Visit 
Extension strategy on adoption of forecasts was investigated by adding change agents to the model. 
Results show that this strategy would significantly influence the adoption process only when inter-
county interactions exist. Also, it is found that when the social network is only shaped based on 
physical proximity, adoption of forecasts spread from the county where change agents are located 
to the entire area. In real world, however, social networks are more complex, shaped by social 
interactions based on both physical proximity and social media. The results show that with a more 
complex social network, the diffusion of forecasts under Training and Visit strategy occurs at a 
much faster pace.  
In CHAPTER 4, an end-to-end forecasting framework was developed that integrates a crop 
growth simulation model (SWAT) and an economic decision-making model based on stochastic 
optimization. Seasonal climate forecasts from a state-of-the-art climate model (i.e., CWRF) were 
used as the input the model. The framework was applied to Salt Creek watershed, a typical rainfed 
watershed in Central Illinois, and the U.S. 2012 drought was used as a case study. First, results 
show that the CWRF forecasts could not capture the 2012 drought in the case study area. This is 
due to the limited predictability of the 2012 drought event [Yuan and Wood, 2013; Hoerling et al., 
2014], which is widely considered as flash drought [Otkin et al., 2018]. It is found that even though 
CWRF-based seasonal forecasts missed the 2012 drought, only those farmers who decided to 
forward-sell their corn to ethanol refineries suffered from the drought event, while other farmers 





To further investigate the role of institutional interventions, two scenarios of improved 
climate forecasts (i.e., reanalysis-based forecasts and perfects forecasts), two crop insurance 
options (i.e., revenue protection, yield protection), and different scenarios of corn harvest price are 
considered. It is found that despite the differences in optimal crop decisions guided by reanalysis-
based and perfect forecasts, the difference between the ex post value of reanalysis-based and 
perfect forecasts is almost negligible because of crop insurance paybacks and higher crop price 
after the harvest. In other words, because of these two factors, the additional value that farmers 
could obtain from improved forecasts is limited. The sensitivity analysis shows the value of 
improved forecasts significantly increases if farmers switch to yield protection policy which is a 
weaker insurance program compared to revenue protection.   
 Accurate estimation of the value of forecasts is necessary 1) to create a more realistic 
expectation of potential benefits that can be derived from forecasts, and 2) to provide pathways 
towards more effective and sustained use of forecasts in farmers’ decision making. This 
dissertation provides insights that help better understand the factors that determine farmers’ 
perception of the value of forecasts. The findings of this dissertation also provide implications for 
other groups and stakeholders to play a more active role in the process of improving forecast use 
among farmers. For instance, it is shown that government institutional interventions (in the form 
of crop insurance) could potentially reduce the value of improved seasonal forecasts during 
drought conditions. It is also found that the value of even a perfect forecast is limited for the 
farmers in the case study of 2012 U.S. drought except for those who consider forward contracts. 
Therefore, it is important to recognize that improving the quality of forecasts is only one piece of 





management strategies (e.g., crop insurance) to incentivize farmers to adopt forecasts. Moreover, 
it is shown that failing to account for how users process forecast information and directly use 
forecasts in decision making models would overestimate the ex ante value of forecasts, which 
could be interpreted as a wrong or misleading signal to both users and producers of forecasts. 
Therefore, an information processing component that reflects user’s trust in information should be 
considered in forecast valuation frameworks. In addition, it is important to recognize that trust (or 
perceived accuracy) varies over time as users compare forecasts with observations and learn more 
about the accuracy of forecasts. Furthermore, given that forecasts can be considered as an 
innovation, it seems prudent that increased attention should be paid to better understand the 
temporal and spatial dynamics of forecast adoption. In particular, this research highlights the role 
of social interactions and social network in farmers’ forecast adoption behavior. Finally, this 
dissertation highlights the value of interdisciplinary research in creating new understanding of 
important factors relating to use of climate forecasts and designing new strategies and policies that 
can ultimately lead to more effective, proactive management of climate risks.  
 
5.2 Limitations and future research 
The theoretical models presented in CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 3 provide flexible tools 
to better understand the different factors that influence farmers’ adoption of forecasts information. 
Such understanding can be helpful in more effectively tailoring forecast information to different 
users [Millner, 2008]. However, due to the theoretical nature of these models, their applications to 
real-world case studies, as well as generalization of their findings, could be limited. While the 





farmers, there are more nuances in the real-world application. For instance, farmers’ decisions in 
the real world could be influenced by how severe the drought condition is. In other words, instead 
of assuming that there are two possible states (i.e., normal, drought), weather condition can be 
characterized by a continuous variable (e.g., precipitation deficit, drought indices). In addition, the 
results and findings presented in these two chapters are based on the assumptions of crop yield 
parameters shown in Figure 2.2 and Figure 3.2. While the theoretical models could be extended to 
consider more complex decision-making problems and different crop yield scenarios, analytical 
derivations and the tractability of the models become more challenging as more complex cities are 
introduced. Therefore, similar to the model presented in CHAPTER 4, future research can consider 
using numerical approaches to techniques to address these issues.      
One main applications of the models presented in CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 3 is to 
design strategies and interventions to overcome the impediments and facilitate adoption of 
forecasts [Millner, 2008, 2009; Millner and Washington, 2011]. However, because of the different 
assumptions made in these model with regard to human behavior, they should be tested and 
validated before being used for policy recommendations in the real world [Millner, 2009]. For 
instance, to what extent the assumptions of Bayesian updating in CHAPTER 2 and reinforcement 
learning in CHAPTER 3 match the real-world behavior of farmers. There are several 
complementary methods that can provide the necessary information: descriptive field studies, 
highly structured interviews, and laboratory experiments (or decision experiments). In a controlled 
laboratory experiment, traditionally employed in experimental economics [Kagel and Roth, 2015], 
researchers can observe how decision makers respond to forecasts in hypothetical but reasonably 





approach compared to structured interviews or field studies is that it is possible to control the 
environment and build testable models with greater chance of being generalizable. Moreover, 
laboratory experiments are generally not as resource intensive as the other two methods. The 
studies of Ziervogel [2004] and Ziervogel et al. [2005] follow the same direction. Ziervogel [2004] 
conducted a role-play exercise with smallholder farmers in Lesotho to investigate how climate 
forecast information can be integrated into seasonal decision making. One of the key findings of 
this study was how participants changed their attitudes towards using forecast over different 
sequence of the game. Based on this study, Ziervogel et al. [2005] developed a heuristic 
representing how farmers updated their trust in forecasts over time and integrated that into a multi-
agent model of decision making based on seasonal forecasts. 
If laboratory experiments are designed carefully, econometric data analysis can then be 
used to quantify the behavioral parameters (e.g., risk aversion, learning rate) in the proposed 
models. In addition, it is also possible to determine to what extent users’ real-world behavior 
deviates from models and mechanisms used in the model (e.g., Bayesian learning, symmetric or 
asymmetric learning) and to generate heuristics to replace different components of the model. 
Finally, these experiments can shed light on important behavioral parameters that were ignored in 
the proposed models. For instance, recency bias could play a critical role in how DMs form 
perceptions about the risk of extreme events. Behavioral studies suggest that individuals are likely 
to underweight extreme events (e.g., drought) if those events have not occurred recently; however, 
they tend to overreact to a statistically rare event if they have experienced it in the recent past 
[Marx et al., 2007]. However, recency bias has not been incorporated in either of the model 





The model presented in CHAPTER 3 highlighted the role of social interactions and social 
network in the process of forecast adoption. Different scenarios of social interactions and different 
structures of the network were analyzed; however, an important extension of this study is how 
social network and its properties can be extracted in the real world. This is particularly important 
given that one of the main applications of the model is to design targeting strategies that rely on 
social capital and social network to success. Recently, there are number of filed-based studies that 
empirically analyzed the impacts of social networks and various social processes in the diffusion 
of agricultural innovations [Baerenklau, 2015; Cai et al., 2015a; Levy and Lubell, 2018]. However, 
based on our knowledge, Nidumolu et al. [2018] is the only study that used social network analysis 
at the village level in the context of forecast adoption. Given the importance of social network 
structure, as discussed in CHAPTER 3, it seems prudent that more studies focus on extracting and 
mapping social and information networks in order to design sound and more effective targeting 
strategies.  
CHAPTER 4 showed that crop insurance would negatively affect the value of forecasts 
and the relationship between forecast scenarios and different insurance policies was briefly 
discussed. However, the interaction between crop insurance and climate forecasts could be even 
more complex [Carriquiry and Osgood, 2012]. For instance, Luo et al. [1994] stated that early-
season weather information may lead to inter-temporal adverse selection in crop insurance because 
farmers may refuse to buy crop insurance in years they know they will have high yields based on 
climate information. Therefore, it is suggested that insurance transactions be carried out before 
forecasts have skill to avoid strategic behavior of clients leading to undermining the insurance 





excess rents may be garnered by private insurance companies through weather-based adverse 
selection activities.  
One possible way to better understand this complex relationship is to add insurance agents 
representing private insurance companies in the agent-based model. Such model can be used to 
address the critical question of how crop insurance and seasonal forecasts can be coupled more 
effectively. This question has received some attention in the context of index insurance in 
developing countries [Hellmuth et al., 2009], but the problem is more complex in the United States, 
where farmers do have access to different government-subsidized crop insurance programs. 
Unreliability of forecasts, particularly during extreme droughts, further complicates this problem. 
Despite these complexities, the rationale for designing effective mechanisms of coupling crop 
insurance policies and forecasts in the United States is that while crop insurance could help protect 
farm income, especially after extreme droughts, drought impacts will propagate to other levels of 
the society (e.g., tax payers) [Babcock, 2013]. For instance, as discussed in CHAPTER 4, during 
the historic drought year of 2012, many farmers obtained insurance payouts which, together with 
higher crop price in the market, made some farmers’ income even higher than that in a normal 
year. However 62 percent of the premiums came from taxpayers’ subsidies [Babcock, 2013]. The 
drought increased agricultural prices and U.S. export prices for corn, and influenced U.S. ethanol 
industry [Adonizio et al., 2012]. Therefore, effective coupling of crop insurance policies and 
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APPENDIX A PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS 
 
A.1 Proposition: Ex ante value of information (defined in Equation 2.14) is non-negative.  
Equation 2.14 presents the quasi ex ante value of information. Proof is by contradiction. 
Suppose that value of information is negative, i.e., 𝑉 < 0: 
  𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜃) + 𝑉 < 𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜃) A.1 
since 𝑈 is a strictly increasing function, 
 𝑈[𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜃) + 𝑉] < 𝑈[𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜃)] A.2 
 → 𝐸𝜃|𝑝𝑑[𝑈[𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜃) + 𝑉]] < 𝐸𝜃|𝑝𝑑[𝑈[𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜃)]] A.3 
since 𝑥∗ maximizes DM’s expected utility when the information is used, 
 𝐸𝜃|𝑝𝑑[𝑈[𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜃)]] < 𝐸𝜃|𝑝𝑑[𝑈[𝜋(𝑥
∗, 𝜃)]] A.4 
from Equations A.3 and A.4,  
 𝐸𝜃|𝑝𝑑[𝑈[𝜋(𝑥0
∗, 𝜃) + 𝑉]] < 𝐸𝜃|𝑝𝑑[𝑈[𝜋(𝑥
∗, 𝜃)]] A.5 
this relationship however contradicts the definition of 𝑉 as presented in Equation 2.14, and 
therefore 𝑉 ≥ 0∎ 
 
A.2 Derivations for Equations 2.19 and 2.20. 
Denote DM’s prior belief about forecast accuracy as 𝑓(𝜆). Once probabilistic forecast of 
𝑞(𝜂) is received and the state 𝜑 = 1 of the weather is observed, DM’s posterior or updated belief 





 𝑓(𝜆|𝑞(𝜂), 𝜑 = 1) = ∑ 𝑞(𝜂) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆|
𝜂
𝜂, 𝜑 = 1) A.6 
When 𝜂 is binary (i.e., 𝜂 ∈ {0,1}): 𝑞(𝜂 = 1) = 𝑝𝑑, 𝑞(𝜂 = 0) = 1 − 𝑝𝑑. Therefore, expanding the 
summation in the equation:  
 𝑓(𝜆|𝑞(𝜂), 𝜑 = 1) = 𝑝𝑑 ∙ 𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 1) + (1 − 𝑝𝑑) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 0, 𝜑 = 1) A.7 
Now, the two conditional terms in this equation should be determined. First, start with 
𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 1): 
 
𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 1) =
ℙ(𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 1|𝜆) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)
ℙ(𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 1)
 
A.8 
where  ℙ(𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 1|𝜆) =
ℙ(𝜂=1|𝜑=1,𝜆)∙ℙ(𝜑=1,𝜆)
𝑓(𝜆)
. Note that ℙ(𝜂 = 1|𝜑 = 1, 𝜆) = 𝜆, and 
ℙ(𝜑 = 1, 𝜆) = ℙ(𝜑 = 1) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆) = 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝑓(𝜆). The law of total probability is used in the 
denominator: ℙ(𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 1) = ∫ ℙ(𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 1|𝜆) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)𝑑𝜆
1
0
. So, Equation A.8 now 
becomes:  
 
𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 1) =
𝜆 ∙ 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)




Following similar procedure for 𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 0, 𝜑 = 1): 
 
𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 0, 𝜑 = 1) =
ℙ(𝜂 = 0, 𝜑 = 1|𝜆) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)
ℙ(𝜂 = 0, 𝜑 = 1)
 A.10 
where ℙ(𝜂 = 0, 𝜑 = 1|𝜆) = (1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑝𝜃; therefore: 
 
𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 0, 𝜑 = 1) =
(1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)









𝑓(𝜆|𝑞(𝜂), 𝜑 = 1) = 𝑝𝑑 ∙
𝜆 ∙ 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)
∫ 𝜆 ∙ 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)𝑑𝜆
1
0
+ (1 − 𝑝𝑑) ∙
(1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)




If the DM observes the state 𝜑 = 0 of the weather, a similar procedure can be followed to derive 
the posterior or updated belief about forecast accuracy 𝑓"(𝜆) = 𝑓(𝜆|𝑞(𝜂), 𝜑 = 0): 
 𝑓(𝜆|𝑞(𝜂), 𝜑 = 0) = 𝑝𝑑 ∙ 𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 0) + (1 − 𝑝𝑑) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 0, 𝜑 = 0) A.13 
where,  
 
𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 1, 𝜑 = 0) =
(1 − 𝜆) ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜃) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)





𝑓(𝜆|𝜂 = 0, 𝜑 = 0) =
𝜆 ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜃) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)




Replacing the conditional terms in Equation A.7 by Equations A.9 and A.11: 
𝑓(𝜆|𝑞(𝜂), 𝜑 = 0)
= 𝑝𝑑 ∙
(1 − 𝜆) ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜃) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)
∫ (1 − 𝜆) ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜃) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)𝑑𝜆
1
0
+ (1 − 𝑝𝑑)
∙
𝜆 ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜃) ∙ 𝑓(𝜆)









APPENDIX B DROUGHT FORECAST GENERATION 
 
B.1 Forecast generation based on given accuracy 
One of the main objectives pursued in this chapter is how decision makers learn about the 
accuracy of forecast information and how this knowledge influences the processing and evaluation 
of forecast information. In particular, the focus is on the dependency of DM’s perception about 
forecast accuracy to actual forecast accuracy in hypothetical but realistic scenarios where forecasts 
improve over time. In the literature, calibration-refinement factorization method is utilized to 
generate joint distributions of forecast and observation, i.e., 𝑓(𝜑, 𝑝𝑑) [Murphy and Winkler, 1987; 
Wilks, 2001]: 
 𝑓(𝜑, 𝑝𝑑) = 𝑓(𝜑|𝑝𝑑) ∙ 𝑓(𝑝𝑑) B.1 
where 𝑓(𝜑|𝑝𝑑) and 𝑓(𝑝𝑑) are the calibration and refinement functions, respectively. Refinement 
function is essentially a PDF of forecasts which is usually represented by a beta distribution. 
Calibration function, on the other hand, determines the probability of occurrence of an event 
conditional on forecasts, and therefore is a measure of the reliability of the forecasting system. For 
example, for a perfectly reliable forecasting system: 𝑓(𝜑 = 1|𝑝𝑑) = 𝑝𝑑. Therefore, using 
calibration function, it is possible to generate biased or reliable forecasts. However, assessing the 
“accuracy” of forecasts is not straightforward if forecasts are probabilistic. Instead, measures such 
as Brier skill score are utilized to quantify the accuracy [Wilks, 2006]. These measures are usually 
defined based on mean square error of forecasts which makes it difficult to generate forecasts 
based on a given accuracy. Therefore, ensemble forecasting approach is utilized to generate 





forecasting system at time 𝑡 and the system produces 𝑁 deterministic forecasts for a particular 
binary drought event (𝜑𝑡). Each deterministic forecast (𝜂𝑖𝑡) is referred to as an ensemble member, 







where 𝐵(1, 𝜅𝑡) indicates a binomial distribution with one trial and probability 𝜅𝑡 of success. Once 
















}. The definition above has an undesirable property that 𝑝𝑑𝑡  
could become zero or one, especially if 𝑁 is small. Therefore, different post-processing methods 
are suggested to account for finitize ensemble size [Roulston and Smith, 2002; Katz and 
Ehrendorfer, 2006], for instance:  




𝑖=1 ) + 0.5
𝑁 + 1
 B.4 
The last step in generating synthetic probabilistic drought forecasts in this work is to 
account for low-probability events with no or limited predictability (also called black swan event 
[Taleb, 2007]). One recent example is the flash drought of 2012 in the U.S. Midwest [Hoerling et 
al., 2014]. This is included in the procedure by simply drawing a random number from Binomial 
distribution with a small probability of success: 𝑏𝑡~𝐵(1,0.05). If 𝑏𝑡 = 1, the probability of success 





As explained above, generating time series of forecasts depends on time series of drought 
events. To generate synthetic time series of drought events, it is assumed that 𝜑𝑡 is a Bernoulli 
process with probability 𝑝𝜃 of success: 𝜑𝑡~𝐵(1, 𝑝𝜃). Note that for each 𝑝𝜃, only one time series 
of drought events is generated. This time series will be used to generate the time series of 
probabilistic forecasts. Probabilistic forecast time series on the other hand is considered as a 
stochastic process due to the randomness involved in generating forecasts at each time step.  
 
B.2 Belief trajectories based on ensemble forecasts 
The results and analyses presented in section 2.3.4 were based on one single realization of 
the time series of forecasts. However, as discussed in section B.1, for a given time series of drought 
events, it is possible to generate infinite number of forecast time series. Consequently, infinite 
number of belief trajectories can be derived. As an experiment, 𝑀 = 50 time series of forecasts 
were generated using the approach disused in APPENDIX A. Then, these time series were used to 
derive the trajectories of belief about forecast accuracy (𝑓𝑚(𝜆), where 𝑚 ∈ [1, 𝑀] identifies 






𝑚 = ∫ 𝜆 ∙ 𝑓𝑚(𝜆)
1
0
𝑑𝜆,  and the dashed blue line is 𝜇𝜆 for the same trajectory 
shown section 2.3.4. The shaded area determines the bounds for 𝜇𝜆






Figure B.1: Trajectories of perceived forecast accuracy based on 50 different time series of 
drought forecasts.  
 
B.3 Forecast generation using inverse sampling 
In section B.1, an ensemble forecasting approach is used to generate time series of 
probabilistic drought forecasts. With that approach, it is possible to generate a forecast with a 
certain accuracy at each time step, which was needed in CHAPTER 2. However, the goal in 
CHAPTER 3 is to model the forecast-adoption behavior of DMs in a social network setting with 
the assumption that forecasts are perfectly reliable [Murphy and Winkler, 1987]. This assumption 
is explained in the following. 
First, in practice, it is reasonable to assume that forecasts are usually communicated as 
discrete values. Suppose that ℱ = {0.025, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.975} (with 𝐼 =
|ℱ|) is a finite set of possible values of drought forecasts, 𝑝𝑑𝑖, where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝐼. A general 





observation, i.e., 𝑓(𝜑, 𝑝𝑑𝑖) [Murphy and Winkler, 1987; Wilks, 2006]. One way to generate 
𝑓(𝜑, 𝑝𝑑𝑖) is using calibration-refinement factorization [Murphy and Winkler, 1987; Wilks, 2001], 
that is: 
 𝑓(𝜑, 𝑝𝑑𝑖) = 𝑓(𝜑|𝑝𝑑𝑖) ∙ 𝑓(𝑝𝑑𝑖)  B.5 
where 𝑓(𝜑|𝑝𝑑𝑖) and 𝑓(𝑝𝑑𝑖) are the calibration and refinement functions, respectively. Refinement 
function is essentially a Probability Density Function (PDF) of 𝑝𝑑, which is usually represented 






𝑞1−1 ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝑑)
𝑞2−1 B.6 
where Γ(⦁) denotes the gamma function, and 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 are the two positive parameters that 
determine the shape of the distribution. The mean (𝑎𝑣𝑔) and standard deviation (𝑠𝑡𝑑) of the 












If it is assumed that forecasts are perfectly reliable, the mean of the refinement function is 
equal to the long-term climatological probability of the event, i.e., 𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 𝑝𝜃. Standard deviation, 
on the other hand, determines the sharpness of the distribution; when 𝑠𝑡𝑑 is small (e.g., 𝑠𝑡𝑑 =
0.1), forecasts deviate rarely from the mean value, which corresponds to less informative forecasts. 
For larger values of 𝜎, forecasts deviate largely from the mean value [Wilks, 2001]. Since forecasts 





discrete probabilities (or Probability Mass Function). As such, it is assumed that each 𝑝𝑑𝑖 is the 
midpoint of an interval and 𝑓(𝑝𝑑𝑖) is obtained by integrating Equation B.6 over that interval: 
 








+ are the start and end points of the interval whose midpoint is 𝑝𝑑𝑖.  
On the other hand, calibration function, i.e., 𝑓(𝜑|𝑝𝑑𝑖), determines the probability of 
occurrence of an event conditional on forecast 𝑝𝑑𝑖, and therefore is a measure of the reliability of 
the forecast system. Therefore, using calibration function, it is possible to generate biased or 
reliable forecasts. A forecast system is said to be perfectly reliable (or perfectly calibrated) if the 
following condition is satisfied for all possible forecasts [Murphy and Winkler, 1987]: 
  ∀ 𝑝𝑑𝑖 ∈ ℱ: ℙ(𝜑 = 1|𝑝𝑑𝑖) = 𝑝𝑑𝑖 B.10 
This condition states that over long term, the probability that a drought event occurs given 
the forecast of 𝑝𝑑𝑖 is equal to 𝑝𝑑𝑖. Therefore, for a perfectly reliable system, the plot of calibration 
function against forecast is an identity line (i.e., 1:1 line). In the following, a procedure based on 
inverse transform sampling in explained to generate time series of drought forecasts (𝑝𝑑𝑖) from a 
perfectly reliable system. First, the following assumptions are made: 
• given that only the case of 𝑝𝜃 = 0.3 is considered in CHAPTER 3, it is assumed that 
𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 0.3, 
• it is assumed that 𝑠𝑡𝑑 = 0.3 to ensure that forecasts are in general informative, 






 Since forecasts are to be generated conditional on drought events, two conditional distributions are 
derived:   
 
𝑓1(𝑝𝑑𝑖) = 𝑓(𝑝𝑑𝑖|𝜑 = 1) =




𝑓2(𝑝𝑑𝑖) = 𝑓(𝑝𝑑𝑖|𝜑 = 0) =
(1 − ℙ(𝜑 = 1|𝑝𝑑𝑖)) ∙ 𝑓(𝑝𝑑𝑖)
1 − 𝑝𝜃
 B.12 
Note that because the forecasting system is assumed to be perfectly reliable, ℙ(𝜑 = 1|𝑝𝑑𝑖) = 𝑝𝑑𝑖. Let 𝐹1 
and 𝐹2 be the cumulative distribution function of 𝑓1(𝑝𝑑𝑖) and 𝑓2(𝑝𝑑𝑖), respectively. At each time step 𝑡, a 
random number 𝑏𝑡~𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(0,1) is generated; if 𝜑𝑡 = 1 and 𝐹1(𝑝𝑑𝑖) ≤ 𝑏𝑡 ≤ 𝐹1(𝑝𝑑𝑖+1), then 𝑝𝑑𝑖 is the 
generated forecast; similarly, if 𝜑𝑡 = 0 and 𝐹0(𝑝𝑑𝑖) ≤ 𝑏𝑡 ≤ 𝐹0(𝑝𝑑𝑖+1), then 𝑝𝑑𝑖 is the generated forecast. 
Figure B.2 presents the results of this procedure in the form of a reliability diagram. “The reliability 
diagram is a graphical device that shows the full joint distribution of forecasts and observations for 
probability forecasts of a binary predictand, in terms of its calibration-refinement factorization” [Wilks, 
2006]. It can be observed that the calibration function associated with generated forecasts closely matches 
the identity line, which corresponds to perfect calibration (i.e., ℙ(𝜑 = 1|𝑝𝑑𝑖) = 𝑝𝑑𝑖). Additionally, the 








Figure B.2: Reliability diagram for the timeseries of probabilistic drought forecasts. The dashed 
1:1 line corresponds to perfect calibration. The refinement function is shown inside the diagram.   
 
The forecast time series presented in Figure B.2 is used in section 3.3.1 as well as in section 
3.3.2, but only for county 13. The same procedure is used to generate forecasts for the remaining 
24 counties. It is assumed that the time series of drought events is the same for all counties. It is 
also assumed that 𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 0.3 and 𝑠𝑡𝑑 = 0.3 for all counties. The results are shown in Figure B.3. 
The Brier skill score (𝐵𝑆𝑆) shown in each panel of this figure is a commonly used scalar measure 
of forecast quality when the observations are binary. The Brier skill score is defined as follows 
(refer to Wilks [2006] for more information):  
 







∙ ∑ (𝜑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑑𝑡)
2𝑇
𝑡=1 , and 𝐵𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑓 =
1
𝑇
∙ ∑ (𝜑𝑡 − 𝑝𝜃𝑡)
2𝑇
𝑡=1 . Note that 𝐵𝑆𝑆 ≤ 1, with 





as informative as climatological information, and negative values of 𝐵𝑆𝑆 indicate that forecasts 
are less accurate than climatological information. As can be seen in Figure B.3, the forecasts 
generated for all counties have 0.47 < 𝐵𝑆𝑆 < 0.54 which can be interpreted as 47 − 54 percent 
improvement with respect to climatological information.    
 
Figure B.3: Reliability diagrams for the probabilistic drought forecasts generated for the 25 






APPENDIX C CROP ALLOCATION DECISIONS – SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS 
 
According to Equation 2.6, optimal crop allocation decision (𝑥∗) depends on different 
factors, including yield distribution (𝑦), cost function (𝑐), initial wealth (𝜔), coefficient of risk 
aversion (𝑟), and belief about drought (𝑝𝜃). It is assumed that yield distribution follows Figure 3.2, 
and the cost function is given as 𝑐(𝜃) = {
0.04 𝜃 = 1
0.05 𝜃 = 0
. The following figures show how 𝑥∗ 
changes with 𝑟, 𝑝𝜃, and 𝜔. Although the yield distribution (shown in Figure 3.2) is different than 
the one used in CHAPTER 2 (Figure 2.2) and the cost is not negligible, the following results show 
similar patterns to Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5. First, as risk aversion increases, the fraction of land 
allocated to crop 𝐴 (i.e., 𝑥∗) also increases. For a constant value of 𝑟, larger fraction of land is 
allocated to crop A if the DM believes drought is more likely to occur (i.e., 𝑝𝜃 is higher) or if the 






Figure C.1: Optimal crop allocation decision. Value of initial wealth is fixed at 𝜔 = 0.5.  
 
 





APPENDIX D SOCIAL NETWORK GENERATION  
 
This section provides a description of an algorithm that is used to generate the social 
network in Section 3.3.4. In this algorithm, it is possible for any two agents to be socially 
connected. The likelihood of social interaction between any two agents is 𝑝1 if they are in the same 
county, 𝑝2 if they are in neighboring counties, and 𝑝3 otherwise. It is assumed that 𝑝1 > 𝑝2 > 𝑝3, 
and ∑ 𝑝𝑘 = 1
3
𝑘=1 ; as such, agents in the same county are more likely to be in a social clique. In the 
following a procedure for this algorithm is provided.   
First, for any agent 𝑖, a random number 𝑛𝑖 ∈ [𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥] from a uniform distribution is 
generated that determines the number of neighbors in agent 𝑖’s social neighborhood. To determine 
each neighbor of agent 𝑖, a random number 𝑟 ∈ [0,1] is generated: 
• If 𝑟 ≤ 𝑝1, one agent is randomly selected from agent 𝑖’s county as its neighbor, 
• If 𝑝1 < 𝑟 ≤ 𝑝1 + 𝑝2, one agent is randomly selected from one of the agent 𝑖’s neighboring 
counties as its neighbor, and 
• If 𝑟 > 𝑝1 + 𝑝2, one agent is randomly selected from any other counties as its neighbor. 
This procedure continues until all the neighbors for all the agents are selected. Since this 
process is random, an infinite number of social networks could be generated. It is assumed that 
each agent is equally influenced by its own and its neighbors’ experiences (hence, equal weights 
in Equation 3.10). For the example discussed in Section 3.3.4, the following assumptions are 





APPENDIX E SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES   
 
Figure E.1: Randomly generated values of (a) risk aversion based on 𝑟~𝑁(10,1), (b) Initial 






Figure E.2: Typical S-shaped form of diffusion curve adopted from Rogers [2003] with minor 






Figure E.3: Similar to Figure 3.9 but with the with the assumption that once agents adopt the 






Figure E.4: Diffusion of forecast adoption in the case study area. (a) Full interaction, (b) Only 
intra-county ties. Learning rate, risk aversion, and initial wealth are randomly assigned based on 







Figure E.5: Beliefs about forecast adoption averaged over each county for different scenarios of 
social interaction. Learning rate, risk aversion, and initial wealth are randomly assigned based on 







Figure E.6: Diffusion of forecast adoption in the case study area with full social interaction. (a) 
𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1) and (b) 𝜏~𝑁(2,0.1). Risk aversion and initial wealth are randomly assigned based 








Figure E.7: Beliefs about forecast adoption averaged over each county under full social 
interaction. Learning rate, risk aversion, and initial wealth are randomly assigned based on 














Figure E.9: The impact of complex social network on the diffusion process. The shaded area 
represents the envelope of diffusion curves based on 10 randomly generated social networks. 
The red curve is the same diffusion curve shown in Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.15. Learning rate, 
risk aversion, and initial wealth are randomly assigned based on 𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1), 𝑟~𝑁(10,1) and 





APPENDIX F SUPPLEMENTARY FILE 
 
The supplementary file “Shafiee-Jood_Dissertation_SupplementaryFile.pptx” contains all 
the animations referenced throughout CHAPTER 3. These animations show and compare the 
spatial and temporal diffusion of forecast adoption in the hypothetical case study area under 
different scenarios. All the animations in the file are listed below. 
 
Animation F.1: Impact of social interaction on spatial and temporal dynamics of diffusion 
Animation F.2: Impact of learning rate on spatial and temporal dynamics of diffusion (no 
change agents considered) 
Animation F.3: Impact of change agents on spatial and temporal dynamics of diffusion when 
𝜏~𝑁(1.5,0.1) 
Animation F.4: Impact of change agents on spatial and temporal dynamics of diffusion when 
𝜏~𝑁(1.0,0.1) 
Animation F.5: Impact of learning rate on spatial and temporal dynamics of diffusion (with 
change agents) 
Animation F.6: Impact of initial wealth level in the counties surrounding county 13 on spatial 
and temporal dynamics of diffusion 
Animation F.7: Impact of self-reliance on spatial and temporal dynamics of diffusion; 
comparison between 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1 and 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0.95 
Animation F.8: Impact of self-reliance on spatial and temporal dynamics of diffusion; 
comparison between 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0 and 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0.95 
Animation F.9: Impact of social network complexity on on spatial and temporal dynamics of 
diffusion 
